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		<title>Captagon Drug Networks Adapt and Survive in Middle East After Assad’s Fall</title>
		<link>https://sirajsy.net/captagon-drug-networks-adapt-and-survive-in-middle-east-after-assads-fall/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Radwan Awad]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 22 Sep 2025 13:57:11 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Investigations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Assad regime]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Captagon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Captagon factories]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Captagon seizures]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Middle East drug trade]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[narcotics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Arabia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://sirajsy.net/?p=11988</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Syria’s transitional government is cracking down on the production of Captagon — an illicit synthetic stimulant that flourished under the sponsorship of the Bashar al-Assad regime until its fall in December. But production and trade of the drug are continuing, particularly in parts of Syria not yet under the control of the new administration.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://sirajsy.net/captagon-drug-networks-adapt-and-survive-in-middle-east-after-assads-fall/">Captagon Drug Networks Adapt and Survive in Middle East After Assad’s Fall</a> appeared first on <a href="https://sirajsy.net">SIRAJ</a>.</p>
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<p>In June, Syria’s new interior minister announced on state television that his government had orchestrated a complete crackdown on the drug Captagon.</p>
<p>“We can say that there no longer is any factory that produces Captagon in Syria,” said the minister, Anas Khatab.</p>
<p>But his claim has been followed by a string of high-profile seizures of both Captagon pills and the materials used to make them — including 500 kg of precursor chemicals found outside Damascus earlier this month — raising questions about whether an illicit industry that flourished under the sponsorship of dictator Bashar al-Assad&#8217;s regime has really been wiped out, or has just gone deeper underground in parts of the country not yet under the control of the transitional government.</p>
<p>Before the fall of Assad in December last year, the U.S. and U.K. had imposed sanctions on senior regime officials for enriching themselves through the production and trafficking of the drug, as well as Iran-backed militia Hezbollah <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/tackling-the-illicit-drug-trade-fuelling-assads-war-machine">associates</a> “responsible for trafficking it across the Middle East.” (The Assad regime <a href="https://apnews.com/article/syria-eu-captagon-amphetamine-035ab3d445a5e19de3e8b40ee3cbba03">denied</a> accusations that it produced and marketed Captagon.)</p>
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<p><span class="infographic-box__credits">Credit: SIRAJ </span>Chemicals used to make Captagon found inside an abandoned drug production facility in Douma, on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria.</p>
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<p>International experts and drug monitoring agencies say that while large-scale state-sponsored production in Syria has collapsed, small, nimble labs still exist — even as traffickers are also dispersing production and stockpiles of the drug from Syria to neighboring countries with longstanding markets.</p>
<p>“You do still have in Syria small outfits moving around, setting up mobile laboratories, producing stuff, especially down south where the central government&#8217;s reach isn&#8217;t as strong” said Nicholas Krohley, who runs the Switzerland-based consultancy FrontLine Advisory and <a href="https://www.xcept-research.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/XCEPT-Evidence-Synthesis-Captagon-in-Iraq-and-Jordan.pdf">co-authored a report on Captagon last year</a>, adding that these “shops” have always struggled to meet demand.</p>
<p>Captagon is particularly <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/investigation/a-drug-war-syrias-neighbors-fight-a-flood-of-captagon-across-their-borders">popular</a> in the Middle East, especially in Gulf states like Saudi Arabia. In 2021, experts <a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/20220404-Captagon_Report-NLISAP-final-.pdf">estimated</a> the trade’s yearly potential street value to be at least $5.7 billion. Its spread presents a unique security challenge for law enforcement in the region, as poverty, social insecurity, and war create ready markets for the drug and opportunities for traffickers.</p>
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<p>Fighters from the new Syrian government forces uncover Captagon pills hidden inside an electrical power adapter in a facility used to produce Captagon under the previous regime of Bashar al-Assad in Douma, on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria.</p>
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<p>Caroline Rose, who leads the Captagon Trade Project at the Washington, D.C.-based think tank New Lines Institute, told OCCRP that “in the immediate aftermath of the regime&#8217;s fall, the interim government&#8217;s counternarcotics strategy was a simple one of interdiction and exposure, seizing the biggest, most obvious Captagon facilities with close ties to the regime (managed by individuals who fled and left the facilities unsupervised) and inviting journalists in for high-level coverage.”</p>
<p>Now, the new administration has the harder task of disrupting the smaller and medium-scale remnants of the trade, said Rose. The remnants were either directly tied to the regime or conduits to it, she said, adding that the new administration “is challenged by the current illicit landscape” as it has reduced capacity to exert control and “enact buy-in from communities along Syria’s coast and borderlands — traditional hubs of Captagon trafficking.” Ports and borders under the former regime’s control became hubs of the trade, benefitting from laxer security.</p>
<p>In June, a spokesman for the General Directorate for Combating Narcotics, a division of the Syrian Ministry of the Interior, told OCCRP&#8217;s partner ARIJ that Syrian officials had seized 16 drug shipments bound for neighboring countries and dismantled more than 10 large laboratories and small workshops since the fall of the regime.</p>
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<p><span class="infographic-box__credits">Credit: Screenshot of a Facebook post by Syria&#8217;s Ministry of the Interior </span>Syria&#8217;s Ministry of the Interior announced a Captagon seizure in Al Nabak, Syria, on June 27, 2025.</p>
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<p>Abdelhay said that most of the laboratories were located in areas affiliated with the Fourth Division, one of the Assad regime’s most powerful military units, which was sanctioned by the United States in 2020 for running illicit revenue-generation schemes, including for producing and trafficking Captagon. “We also seized more than one laboratory on the Syrian-Lebanese border and in the coastal region,” he added.</p>
<p>On April 12, the Syrian government announced a raid on a warehouse in Latakia, the country’s main Mediterranean port. They uncovered 5,000 iron bars in which about 4 million Captagon pills were hidden, ready for export, in what was reportedly their largest Captagon bust since the removal of Assad. In the following weeks, authorities said they dismantled a Captagon factory in Homs, near the Syrian-Lebanese border, and seized another 4 million tablets in the Latakia area.</p>
<p>The Ministry of the Interior <a href="https://sana.sy/en/local/2265260/">announced the seizure</a> of 500 kg of precursor chemicals for making the drug hidden inside food containers, along with a large quantity of pills outside Damascus this month. This followed the <a href="https://sana.sy/en/local/2260122/">seizure of hundreds of thousands of pills</a> in Aleppo and Daraa a month earlier.</p>
<p>The high profile raids come as senior figures in the military and transitional government call for more international support to fight Captagon networks. According to the Damascus-based media outlet Syria Report, Brigadier General Khaled Eid, Director of the Anti-Narcotics Department at the Ministry of the Interior, told the Annual Captagon Trade <a href="https://syria-report.com/captagon-trade-sheds-its-skin-in-post-assad-syria/">Conference</a> in Damascus this August: “We haven’t received any tangible assistance or support yet. We have however enjoyed a degree of coordination and sharing information. We also attended training courses in certain countries. There are many promises, but sanctions remain an obstacle.”</p>
<h2>Captagon Spillover Into the Region</h2>
<p>The technical knowledge to produce the drug or redeploy laboratories elsewhere has not been wiped out, despite the seizure of large quantities of pills in Syria, according to the New Lines Institute.</p>
<p>Pre-existing production infrastructure in neighboring countries can also potentially be stepped up to take over and feed the unabated demand for the drug.</p>
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<p><span class="infographic-box__credits">Credit: Ali Al Ibrahim/SIRAJ, </span>Fighters from the new Syrian government forces inside a Captagon production facility in Douma, on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria.</p>
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<p>According to <a href="https://www.unodc.org/unodc/data-and-analysis/world-drug-report-2025.html">the latest World Drug Report from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</a> (UNODC), “several large seizures reported in late 2024 and early 2025 in neighboring countries such as Iraq and Jordan, as well as Saudi Arabia, point to the continued use of established trafficking routes.”</p>
<p>Dr Mousa Daoud Al-Tareefi, president of The Jordan Anti-Drug Society, told OCCRP that in Jordan, “while availability has declined [after the collapse of the regime in Syria], some quantities are still being trafficked, indicating that production and storage may continue in some capacity.”</p>
<p>He added that “part of the decline in Captagon use may be explained by users shifting toward other substances such as crystal meth, synthetic cannabinoids (“Joker”), or misused prescription drugs. These alternatives are increasingly seen in some communities, especially due to ease of access or local production.”</p>
<p>In the suburbs of Beirut, a 28-year-old mechanic who became addicted to Captagon after starting to take it so that he could stay awake at work, said the pills were now “a bit more difficult to find,” and more expensive, but still widely available.</p>
<p>“Before, you could buy a pill for $2 or $3,” he explained, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the social stigma surrounding drug addiction. “Now, some people are selling one for $5 or even $7 depending on the type. If you want something guaranteed, you&#8217;ll have to pay more. It&#8217;s still available; it&#8217;s not rare. You just want to know who&#8217;s the real deal and who&#8217;s the fraud.”</p>
<p>Experts now wonder if the mass production of the drug will regrow with new patrons. “We don&#8217;t know yet who has enough power, will, and room, if they decide to go back to that industry,” said Krohley.</p>
<p>“There is a lot of uncertainty around that,” said Angela Me, chief of research and analysis at UNODC, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164696">in an interview with UN News in June</a>. “We see a lot of large shipments going from Syria through, for example, Jordan. There are probably still stocks of the substance being shipped out, but we&#8217;re looking at where the production may be shifting to.”</p>
<p>Rose and her colleagues have been ringing alarm bells over the last year about the expansion and diversification of Captagon production “moving closer to destination hubs or valuable transshipment sites in Europe, in order to increase interdiction resiliency or improve revenue opportunities,” she said, although she noted that the spread of Captagon production to other countries is not a new phenomenon.</p>
<p>She told OCCRP that Captagon laboratories were identified last year in Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, Kuwait, and even Germany, and that in Iraq, production had expanded into the country’s north.</p>
<p>The UNODC reported the dismantling of a methamphetamine and Captagon laboratory in the Iraqi Kurdish province of Sulaymaniyah in 2024, and  attempts to set-up Captagon production facilities in Iraq’s southern provinces a year prior.</p>
<p>In May, Lebanese authorities busted a clandestine Captagon lab in the Hermel area, near the Syrian border, following the seizure of a truck loaded with equipment for manufacturing Captagon that entered the country in April.</p>
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<p><span class="infographic-box__credits">Credit: Lebanese Army, </span>Lebanese authorities dismantled a clandestine Captagon lab in Hermel, near the Syrian border, after seizing a truck in May 2025 loaded with drug-making equipment.</p>
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<p>This summer, Yemeni authorities from the internationally recognized government <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/news/yemen-seizes-15-million-captagon-pills-alleges-houthis-fueling-war-through-drug-trade">announced</a> the capture of more than 1.5 million pills from Houthi-controlled Sanaa that were destined for Saudi Arabia, where the main consumer market for the drug is concentrated, according to the European Union Drugs Agency.</p>
<p>Major General Mutahhar Al-Shuaibi, director of police in the Yemeni port city of Aden, accused the rival-governing Houthis of establishing a Captagon factory in Al-Mahwit region, northern Yemen, “similar to the factory that was in Syria,” adding that Yemen is now being used as a transit zone for Saudi Arabia-bound Captagon.</p>
<p><em> <strong>Musab Alyassin contributed reporting.</strong></em></p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://sirajsy.net/captagon-drug-networks-adapt-and-survive-in-middle-east-after-assads-fall/">Captagon Drug Networks Adapt and Survive in Middle East After Assad’s Fall</a> appeared first on <a href="https://sirajsy.net">SIRAJ</a>.</p>
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		<title>From the Steppes of Donbas to the Deserts of Syria</title>
		<link>https://sirajsy.net/from-the-steppes-of-donbas-to-the-deserts-of-syria/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Radwan Awad]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Apr 2025 13:07:15 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Investigations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[(FPV) drones]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>The increasing use of first-person view drones in wars and conflicts involving Russia</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://sirajsy.net/from-the-steppes-of-donbas-to-the-deserts-of-syria/">From the Steppes of Donbas to the Deserts of Syria</a> appeared first on <a href="https://sirajsy.net">SIRAJ</a>.</p>
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<p class="">After more than 13 years of civil war, the Assad regime collapsed in a matter of weeks in December 2024. With few foreseeing the swiftness of the regime&#8217;s demise, Russian interests in the region were dealt a resounding blow, following nearly a decade of committed involvement. As arguably the Russian ally which enjoyed the most military backing, the old Syria under Assad proved to be somewhat of a testing ground for Russian military expertise &#8211; perhaps the most important element of its relations with friendly states in the ‘global south’.</p>
<p class="">Of particular interest are the efforts Russia was making to enhance the capabilities of Assad’s army in the 12 months before the regime’s collapse. Beginning in late 2023, regime propaganda websites and social media accounts began publishing photos and videos of Russian instructors training Syrian soldiers in the use of first-person view (FPV) drones &#8211; which could be considered the biggest battlefield innovation of the past decade, brought to light by the invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p class="">This report delves into the implications of these training programs, shedding light on how Russia is leveraging the military experience it is gaining in its war on Ukraine as a means to further its influence abroad.</p>
<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p class="">Following its full-scale intervention in Syria in 2015, Russia was arguably the most steadfast and decisive ally of the Assad regime. Backed by overwhelming Russian airpower, the Syrian state managed to fairly quickly claw back territory throughout the country. By the end of the following year, the Syrian state had full control over the city of Aleppo, rebel enclaves scattered throughout the country fell one by one, and antiregime groups were largely confined to Idlib Province until their breakout in winter 2024.  All of the regime’s gains were accomplished at an enormous cost to civilians. Throughout the Russian intervention, a persistent criticism by international media, humanitarian organizations and Syrian civil society was that the Russian state was effectively aiding and abetting—if not outright committing—the Assad regime’s war crimes. Indiscriminate, or even positively terroristic, bombing runs by Syrian and Russian warplanes played a decisive role in the string of defeats suffered by Syrian revolutionaries between 2015 and 2019, which demoralized constituent populations and overwhelmed already stretched opposition resources. The rebels had no response to this tactic.</p>
<p class="">In the last 12 months of its involvement in Syria, the Russian state was engaged in further enhancing the capabilities of the Assad regime by imparting lessons learned by the Russian army in Ukraine. Of particular interest for the purposes of this report is the proliferation of FPV drones in Syria brought by Russian instructors to the bases of the Assad regime’s most trusted units.</p>
<p class="">One of these, the 25th Special Forces Division—formerly known as the Tiger Forces—has been accused of some of the worst atrocities of the war, including massacres of protesters in the early days of the conflict.</p>
<p class="">FPV stands for ‘first-person view’, a technology once used primarily for drone racing, aerial photography, and videography, which has now found its way to battlefields in Ukraine, Syria, Sudan and beyond. The term ‘FPV’ refers to the method by which the drone pilot experiences the flight of the drone through a camera installed on it, which transmits a live video feed to a headset, monitor, or mobile device. This allows the pilot to see from the drone&#8217;s perspective at a relatively safe distance.</p>
<p class="">FPV drones represent a rapidly advancing technology that offers significant potential due to their affordability and lethality. They enable precise and targeted operations, making them a formidable tool for executing focused attacks on specific individuals or objectives.</p>
<p class="">The war in Ukraine precipitated an explosion in the development of FPV drone technology. First pioneered by Ukrainian army units several months into the war, the Russians quickly adapted and began establishing their own production lines. By <a href="https://focus.ua/digital/610125-bolee-1-mln-v-mesyac-pochti-polovina-regionov-rf-izgotavlivayut-fpv-drony-smi-foto">December 2</a>023, Ukrainian experts warned that Russia was producing six times as many of these drones as Ukraine &#8211; up to 300,000 monthly, with the capability to further scale up operations.These figures speak volumes about the efficacy of these weapons. <a href="https://x.com/DefenceU/status/1837049810882568277">Footage </a>exists of fairly modern tanks being completely obliterated by wellplaced FPV hits. Lighter vehicles are yet more vulnerable. Even using an FPV drone to kill a single enemy soldier represents a more <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2025/01/14/why-fpv-drones-are-still-ukraines-biggest-tank-killers/">cost-effective </a>use of munitions than conventional methods. The drones themselves are small, highly agile and fast, making them nearly impossible to shoot down with regular bullets. As such, they roam the battlefields of Ukraine with near impunity, coming to represent arguably the most feared weapon of the war.</p>
<p class="">Of particular concern is the mixture of accessibility and effectiveness provided by FPV drones, putting them within comfortable reach of terrorist organizations, individual assailants, and sanctioned regimes. The technology behind them is quite straightforward and can be assembled by hand in a matter of hours at a low cost. “It’s easy to legally obtain FPV drones for less than 750 euros each and convert them into kamikaze drones,” explains Julian Ropcke, a German military and security analyst speaking to Mohammed Bassiki. “All you need in addition is an RPG-7 warhead or any other type of explosive tied to the drone.”</p>
<p class=""> With these considerations in mind, there were reasonable misgivings about the implications of this technology finding its way into the hands of the Assad regime. According to Ropcke, speaking in mid-2024, “the drones are being used as a terror weapon by the regime rather than strategically to defeat rebel forces. It seems that the regime is using these as a cheap alternative to artillery or mortars, and the threshold for their use is lower due to their ‘civilian’ and even ‘playful’ nature.”</p>
<p class="">According to Syrian humanitarian organizations, FPVs were used to target civilians &#8211; whether as perverse ‘practice’ for operators, or as a continuation of the Syrian state’s strategy of brutality.</p>
<p class="">This investigation, based on open-source intelligence (OSINT), analyzes the nature of FPV drone usage in Syria by the fallen Assad regime, the implications this had for the Syrian population, and the nature of Russian influence operations.</p>
<h2>FPVs</h2>
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<p class=""><em>Quadcopter drones, primarily Chinese- and Russian-designed,  have been spotted in use by the Syrian Arab Army. The above pictures are likely to show Russian Gastello FPV quadcopters &#8211;</em><a href="https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2023/08/06/production-of-5000-gastello-kamikaze-uavs-monthly-begins-russia/"><em> reported t</em></a><em>o be in mass production in Russia since 2023.</em><a title="" href="https://osintforukraine.com/publications/from-the-steppes-of-donbas-to-the-deserts-of-syria#_ftn1"><em>[1]</em></a><em> The fourth image shows a screenshot of the drones being featured on Russian state media..  </em></p>
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<p class=""><em>In the above left picture, the operator appears to be carrying a Chinese Mavic 3 drone. The picture to the right shows a drone with the text “MA3” visible.</em></p>
<h2>Training and Deployment</h2>
<p class="">During its involvement in Syria in from 2015-2024, the Russian military preferred to work with a handful of specific Syrian Arab Army units, selected for their loyalty to the Assad regime and their relative combat efficacy compared to regular units. These often became the first-in-line to receive new Russian-manufactured equipment. A similar trend can be observed in regard to Russian training and supply of FPV drones.</p>
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<p class=""><em>Some trainers wear Serbian flag patches. Serbian mercenaries have also been spotted fighting for the Russian military in Ukraine.</em></p>
<p class=""><strong><em>According to our analysis using OSINT techniques, three Syrian Arab Army units underwent training in FPV drones usage: the 5th and 7th mechanized divisions, and the 25th Special Mission Forces Division, the renamed “Tiger Forces”, formerly under the command of the notorious Suheil al-Hasan. Al-Hasan is currently the head of the Syrian special forces. Training is evidently not confined just to the deployment of FPV drones. Russian instructors are seen with electronic warfare equipment, and what appears to be a new Russian-developed anti-drone rifle, the </em></strong><a href="https://zarya-russia.ru/snabzhenie/antidrony/tproduct/676648511-308063279861-portativnii-blokirator-dronov-garpiya-pr"><strong><em>Garpiya.</em></strong></a><strong><em> Officers up to the rank of brigadier general are seen undergoing training. </em></strong></p>
<p class="">Furthermore, based on analysis of images released by pro-regime Telegram and Twitter/X accounts, training appeared to be happening in at least two locations. One was at the 5th Mechanized Division’s headquarters in Izra, rural Daraa province. The second appeared to be in the town of Kom al-Wasiyah, by the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. This was identified again through OSINT analysis.</p>
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<p class=""><em>Image from pro-regime online account. Claims to be showing veterans of the “special military operation” (in Ukraine) training Syrian Army troops.</em></p>
<p class="">In the above image, one catches a glimpse of two signs bearing the Syrian flag. These appear to align with the below images, gleaned from the Kom al-Wasiyah municipality’s official Facebook account.</p>
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<p class="">Further pictures were uploaded on the same account of Russian instructors on rooftops, giving further clues regarding their location.</p>
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<p class="">In fact, the rooftop images appear to be of the village municipality building.</p>
<p class="">As mentioned earlier, the training also went beyond just the use of FPV drones. Some of the images posted by pro-Assad online accounts (see below) give rare glimpses of what could be a new Russian-made anti-drone rifle, the Garpiya. If this were the case, the Syrian Arab Army could have been among the first in the world to widely field this type of anti-drone weapon, reflecting the growing danger posed by FPV drones and other small remotely controlled weapons.</p>
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<p class=""><em>Garpiya anti-drone rifle.</em></p>
<p class="">According to a military source in the Syrian opposition, during 2024, “kamikaze drones are launched by Russian special forces from elevated areas along the frontlines in rural Idlib and Aleppo regions,” with “no observed presence of Syrian regime forces during the launches.” This is corroborated by a <a href="https://t.me/alaskari_news/12980">post b</a>y an official military account of the National Liberation Front, a faction of the Syrian anti-Assad rebels. According to the source, the kamikaze drones were guided by Russian observation drones and penetrated as far as 10 kilometers into what was then-rebel-held territory.</p>
<p class="">Analysis of non-public military footage of the Syrian opposition forces shows the bulk of pro-Assad FPV launch sites being clustered around the localities of Dana, Saraqib and Jabal al-Zawiya in Idlib Province, as well as Base 46, a fortified position in the Aleppo countryside that was the site of a major battle in 2012. According to Nawar Shaban, a researcher with the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, there is evidence that pro-Assad forces were actively developing the drones, such as by installing larger batteries and thus improving range.</p>
<h2>Impact on Civilians and Further Implications</h2>
<p class="">The brief period in which FPV drone technology was in the hands of the brutal Syrian Arab Army unfortunately led to Syrian civilians being terrorized by this new weapon. As we can see from the patterns of attacks described by the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights, pro-Assad forces were regularly targeting civilians with FPV drones &#8211; whether this was perverse “practice” or part of a broader strategy of terror directed at the civilian population, the effects remained the same. Dozens of civilians were targeted, maimed and killed by these devices, particularly at the start of 2024.</p>
<p class="">Beyond this, FPV drones gave the Assad regime significant tactical and strategic advantages. According to Dr Glenn Kolomeitz, an international law consultant and analyst and former Australian Army legal officer, these weapons are particularly effective in the hands of a faction with little regard for civilian casualties. “From a weaponeering and targetting perspective, FPV drones give commanders greater options and…greater flexibility and accuracy in the battlespace. This is especially the case when collateral damage does not feature prominently in a commander’s targeting decision making and when collateral damage estimates are not an element of the targeting process, both of which appear to be the case with pro-Assad forces.”</p>
<p class="">Furthermore, according to Dr Kolomeitz, the advantages stretch beyond the battlefield, thanks to what he calls the “Terminator Effect”. “This is the effect on the morale of opposition troops and in the creation of a state of panic and terror in the civilian population, of lethal machines in the nature of loitering munitions operated from a distance,” Dr Kolomeitz told OSINT for Ukraine.</p>
<p class="">Recall the common tactical usage by pro-Assad forces of barrel bombs &#8211; essentially barrels filled with explosives that would be dropped out of helicopters into densely populated areas, with practically no regard to accuracy. Pro-Assad forces consistently demonstrated their reliance on such terror tactics to subdue the civilian population into submission. FPV drones gave them a new vector with which to pursue this strategy, with even less risk for the operators, particularly as engineers devised ways to increase the drones’ range and lethality.</p>
<p class="">On an even broader scale, the adoption of FPV drone technology could have also been a major cost-cutting measure for the heavily sanctioned Assad regime. “Without reducing the humanitarian impact of these weapons to a cheap quote, these FPV drones deliver Syrian government forces ‘more bang for their buck’,” explains Dr Kolomeitz. “These drones…are far cheaper to make and operate than conventional indirect fire weapons systems…much of the technology, in terms of availability, is commercial off-the-shelf and multi-use.” This also would have made it significantly easier for the Assad regime to manufacture FPV drones, which they had evidently been doing.  Though the worst did not come to pass, even if the international community were to attempt to restrict another similarly rogue state’s ability to access the components needed to manufacture the drones, according to Dr Kolomeitz, “rapid advances in and improvements in the largely civilian and multi-use technology makes identifying and subjecting equipment to sanctions difficult.” That Russia and Iran are both making strides in homegrown manufacturing of FPV drones made it all the easier for rogue states’ to access the critical components  for building drones.</p>
<p class="">Thankfully, the worst-case scenario did not come to pass. Despite several dozens of recorded FPV drone attacks on civilians in the year or so prior to the fall of the Assad regime, the rebel offensive of December 2024 decisively put an end to this threat. Rather ironically, a large part of the success of the rebel offensive was due to their own astute use of FPV drones &#8211; likely involving Ukrainian trainers and even operators. Another armed Syrian faction, the Kurdish-dominated SDF, has also recently been using FPV drones in its fight against Turkish-backed militias.</p>
<p class="">However, the Russian involvement in training FPV pilots in the Syrian army does reflect the growing influence the Russian state is currently exerting, fueled by the experience it has acquired in its invasion of Ukraine. According to Dr Kolomeitz, Syria had become a “laboratory for drones,” allowing Russia to “test the ability of a client state to manufacture low-cost FPV drones locally using commercial technology, and test the ability to get around sanctions regimes.” With Russia and several of its allied states currently operating under sanctioned regimes, this was an invaluable opportunity for the Russian state to acquire realtime experience, both for its own ability to circumvent sanctions, and for its ability to support allied states and exert its influence. In doing so, Dr Kolomeitz says that “Russia has bought a seat at the table of Middle Eastern influence”.</p>
<p class="">This experience also helped Russia develop its own capabilities. For decades, the Russian military has been gradually evolving from its Soviet roots to develop more contemporary capabilities suited to today’s geopolitical and military climate. A major reflection of this shift is Russia’s focus on developing relatively small-scale expeditionary capabilities &#8211; as seen in its 2014 invasion of Ukraine, its intervention in Syria, and its involvement in numerous African conflicts. As such, training pro-Assad forces in FPV drone usage is “consistent with Russia’s application of its new generation warfare construct”, which Dr Kolomeitz explains possesses “an increasingly technological character”.</p>
<p class="">This can go a long way in offsetting the Russian state’s ailing weapons export industry. “If its FPV drone training role in Syria is anything to go by, it is not a long stretch to say that the sale of arms as a lever of influence is steadily being replaced by the sale of FPV drone expertise as a very niche lever of influence,” explains Dr Kolomeitz.</p>
<p class="">As such, the recent proliferation of FPV drone technology within pro-Assad forces carries significant implications beyond the battlefields of Syria. Through its experiences in Ukraine, the Russian military now has a level of expertise in modern large-scale combat far beyond virtually any other state in the world, barring Ukraine. This gives Russia the ability to project influence in a manner in which its rivals cannot, at least not to the same ability. Of particular significance in this is the welfare of civilians in Russia’s area of influence. Russian troops and their allies have developed a deserved reputation for their harm to civilians &#8211; whether in Ukraine, Syria, the Central African Republic, or the Sahel states, death stalks civilians wherever the Russian military and its proxies are involved. Through sharing its technological expertise, the Russian state makes it easier for its questionable allies to accomplish their agendas. While Russian ambitions in Syria were dealt a major blow in December 2024, Moscow retains the capability to exert influence through its military expertise.</p>
<p class="">FPV drones certainly represent a new frontier in warfare, and unfortunately, Russia is at the cutting edge of this frontier. The onus is on everyone else to catch up.</p>
<p class=""><em>The Arabic version of this investigation can be found on </em><a href="https://daraj.media/%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%b3%d9%87%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%af%d9%88%d9%86%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%b3-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a3%d9%88%d9%83%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d8%a5%d9%84%d9%89-%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Daraj.media</em></a><em>. </em></p>
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		<title>From espionage to arms deliveries: the shady practices behind the Iranian ships in Antwerp</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Radwan Awad]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 28 Mar 2025 14:12:21 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Iranian container ships use their commercial route to the port of Antwerp as a cover for shady and anti-Western practices. Six ships are suspected of espionage, aiding the Houthi rebels in their attacks on Western ships and transporting weapons to Syria and Russia. De Tijd followed the trail of the six vessels and received help from colleagues from Syria, Iran and other countries.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://sirajsy.net/from-espionage-to-arms-deliveries-the-shady-practices-behind-the-iranian-ships-in-antwerp/">From espionage to arms deliveries: the shady practices behind the Iranian ships in Antwerp</a> appeared first on <a href="https://sirajsy.net">SIRAJ</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure id="attachment_10999" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-10999" style="width: 1920px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-10999" src="https://sirajsy.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Picture1.jpg" alt="" width="1920" height="1078" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-10999" class="wp-caption-text">The Iranian ship Shiba that called at the port of Antwerp is suspected of having spied on Western ships off the coast of Yemen on the way, so that the Houthi rebels could attack them. ©Rv</figcaption></figure>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>On a rainy Wednesday, last year in September, a 188-metre-long container ship came to the port of Antwerp. The fourteen-year-old ship named Shiba sails under the flag of Iran. It was given berths in the port of Antwerp in the Churchill Terminal and the ABES terminal of Katoen Natie. All by the book.</p>
<p>But a month earlier, the Shiba showed a very suspicious travel pattern when passing through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. The ship departed Iran on 23 July, anchored in the Suez Canal on 9 August and arrived at its destination in Syria on 12 August. Between 2 and 5 August, it floated around seemingly aimlessly in the Gulf of Aden. Western security services had also noticed this, which see no logical, economic explanation for this. Every day of delay costs the shipowner money, so why all the delay?</p>
<p>In the same period, on August 3, the Yemeni Houthi rebels fired a missile at the Greek container ship Groton that was sailing in the Gulf of Aden at the time. To avoid such terror attacks and stay under the radar, Western ships switch off their automatic identification system (AIS) in that area. But the Houthi rebels are getting help from Iran for their attacks. The Iranian ship Shiba is suspected of having signaled the passing Western ship to the Houthis.</p>
<p>In January last year, a similar scenario took place. At that time, the Shiba was also hanging around there when the Houthis fired a missile at the dry bulk carrier Gibraltar Eagle on January 15.</p>
<p>And in March last year, it happened again, after the Shiba had left our country on February 25 and before the ship was back in Iran on March 13. In that interim period, the Shiba once again sailed through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, while the Houthis attacked the Propel Fortune with drones on March 8.</p>
<p>Such hidden Iranian aid to the Houthis is burning topical. In recent weeks, the rebels continued to target American targets, after which US President Donald Trump declared last week that he wants to eradicate the Houthis. Trump called on Iran to immediately stop all support to the rebels.</p>
<p>In addition to the Shiba, five other Iranian ships appear to have used their commercial traffic with the port of Antwerp as a cover for shady practices. The other ships are named Artam, Artenos, Azargoun, Daisy and Kashan. They are all large container ships that are 187 to more than 220 meters long and sail under the flag of Iran.</p>
<p>De Tijd started monitoring the shipping routes of the six suspected Iranian ships in September last year and mapped them on the basis of ship databases. We spoke with those involved in the ports and with security services in various countries. We also collected documents such as inspection reports and received help from fellow journalists from Syria in recent months (<a href="https://sirajsy.net/from-espionage-to-arms-deliveries-the-shady-practices-behind-the-iranian-ships-in-antwerp/">SIRAJ</a>), Iran (<a href="https://www.radiozamaneh.com/851423">Zamaneh</a>), Germany (<a href="https://www.papertrailmedia.de/">Paper Trail Media</a>), Netherlands (<a href="https://www.ftm.nl/">Fo</a><a href="https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/iran-wapentransport-containerschepen?share=x6sJY1l6j6pNMVfSy6jhWZyidkRoaotHOckLg%2BbhiwIjErDWvAM0bs3h2PfIYl8%3D">llow the Money</a>) and the collective<a href="https://www.occrp.org/en">OCCRP</a>. This research by De Tijd will therefore be published in English, Arabic and Farsi (the official language of Iran).</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Weapons for Hezbollah</strong></p>
<p>The shady practices of the Iranian ships do not appear to be limited to espionage for the benefit of the Houthis. According to Western and Israeli security services, they also made arms deliveries on their way to Antwerp at stopovers in Syria and Russia. It would mainly concern transports of parts to make weapons, rather than finished products, as well as of ammunition and <em>dual-use</em> goods that can be used for both civilian and military purposes. From Syria, the ammunition, weapons and parts would also have been transported to the radical Lebanese movement Hezbollah.</p>
<p>Our investigation into the traffic data confirms that the six Iranian ships have been going to Syria alternately and almost every month on their commercial route to Antwerp in recent years. This happened at least 27 times in 28 months (between June 2022 and October last year).</p>
<p>The six Iranian ships almost always followed the same route. That started after a long stay in Iran, often in Bandar Abbas, the country&#8217;s largest port controlled by the Iranian regime. From there, the ships set sail via the Suez Canal, usually without a stopover, to the main Syrian seaport in Latakia.</p>
<p>After one to three days in the Syrian port, the Iranian ships sailed on to Antwerp and other European ports in Italy (Ravenna), Spain (Valencia and Bilbao) and Romania (Constanta). The passage in Antwerp was often the last stop on the route and it usually took the longest. Then the ships returned to Iran.</p>
<p>What also makes the sailings suspicious: not all stopovers in Syria can be traced in the international shipping data on port visits and anchorages and berths, which the security services also use. We discovered at least one so-called <em>dark port call</em>, a stopover that has not been officially reported.</p>
<p>Our fellow journalists in Syria obtained confidential documents from the general intelligence service of the now fallen dictator Bashar al-Assad. They contain information about ships that came to Syrian ports between 2021 and 2024, including those from Latakia. Such a document shows that the Shiba visited the port of Latakia in May last year, which is not reflected in the official sailing records about that ship.</p>
<blockquote><p><strong>And the Iranian ships did not only make suspicious stopovers in Syria. On their way to Antwerp, the Azargoun and Artam also visited the Russian port of Novorossiysk. That happened in January and February 2023, about a year after Russia invaded Ukraine. In addition, the ship Artenos went to Venezuela in February and March 2023, also an alleged buyer of military systems from Iran. The ship also passed through Kenya and Tanzania, where Iran would also supply weapons.</strong></p></blockquote>
<p><strong>Container numbers</strong></p>
<p>The Belgian security services tried to catch the Iranian ships last year, De Tijd learned. This happened when the 207-metre-long container ship Azargoun entered the port of Antwerp on 30 June last year. Our security services had received exceptionally precise data from the Americans, even with the numbers of the containers in which the arms transports had taken place. But a thorough inspection, including of the crew&#8217;s cabins, found nothing at all. Not even remnants or any evidence that there were weapons or weapon parts on board before.</p>
<p>It illustrates how our security services have had to watch with dismay in recent years how the traffic to Antwerp was used for the anti-Western maneuvers of the Iranian regime. The alleged arms deliveries took place each time before the vessels behaved like legitimate merchant ships in European ports. When they came here to pick up goods, they were not even <em>dual-use</em> cargoes. So the ships have never been caught in Antwerp.</p>
<p>The issue was followed up by the Belgian Maritime Information Crossroads (MIK) and discussed with other countries in the North Sea and Channel Maritime Information Group (NSCMIG).</p>
<p>The Iranian ships also passed on information to Iran when they encountered military ships here. For example, the Daisy has already been spotted in Belgian waters when a military exercise with minehunters was underway.</p>
<p><strong>Solemnly welcomed</strong></p>
<p>Things may change. In March 2016, the Azargoun was the very first Iranian ship to be allowed to return to Antwerp after the EU had concluded a nuclear agreement with Iran and the sanctions had been lifted. The Azargoun was solemnly welcomed in the Deurganck dock by an official delegation led by the Antwerp port aldermen, eager to re-establish decades-old ties with Iran. Because until sanctions were introduced in 2010, Antwerp was the most important European destination for cargo from Iran.</p>
<p>Our investigation shows that the Azargoun came to the port of Antwerp seven times in the past three years and stopped six times in the Syrian port of Latakia along the way.</p>
<p>After a stop in the Russian port of Novorossiysk, the Azargoun was subjected to a purely technical inspection here in March 2023 at most. In the process, the inspectors discovered 37 defects, 16 of which were sufficiently heavy to hold the ship until everything was repaired. Among other things, the fire doors, fire extinguishing system and fire dampers were defective, the speed and distance indicator did not work, as did the oil filters and the emergency generator. But after 24 days, the Azargoun was released again and was able to continue its activities.</p>
<p>The crews of the Iranian ships also arouse suspicion. We learned that the ships are also accompanied by members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, who pretend to be different. &#8220;They do this to circumvent the sanctions and to spy in European ports,&#8221; it sounds. Our security services also heard this, but could not prove that the ships here had members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards on board incognito.</p>
<p>The confidential Syrian documents that our colleagues in Damascus found in the former headquarters of Assad&#8217;s general intelligence service contain the names, nationalities, dates of birth, passport details and functions of the varying 27 to 28 crew members of the Iranian ships Azargoun, Daisy, Kashan and Shiba when they visited the Syrian port. In addition to a handful of Indians, the changing crews, ranging from the captain to the cook, appear to consist only of Iranians.</p>
<p>An initial screening of the lists of names shows that there are at least some remarkable profiles among them. In addition to many crew members who are linked to the Iranian state-owned shipping company Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), there are also those who are not known as seafarers at all but officially have completely different, non-shipping-related jobs. There is also an Iranian officer who has a track record as an investigator in the General Inspection Department of the Iranian Law Enforcement Force.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Katoen Natie: &#8216;As a terminal, we don&#8217;t choose the ship&#8217;</strong></p>
<p>&#8216;The terminal follow the regulations, we don&#8217;t choose the ship,&#8221; says Patrik Naenen, <em>business unit manager</em> at Katoen Natie&#8217;s ABES terminal that received the Iranian ship Shiba. &#8216;It is the port authority that determines which ships are admitted and it follows the rules imposed by Europe.&#8217;</p>
<p>&#8216;So if a ship is sanctioned, it won&#8217;t come. If it is not sanctioned, it can be booked by a <em>forwarder</em>, who then assigns the ship to a terminal to do the loading and unloading operations. The forwarder makes contracts with the terminals in the ports, which determine the pricing, and on that basis he decides where to send a particular ship with its cargo. That choice will be determined by the price, but sometimes also by technical or nautical aspects, such as the draught.&#8217;</p>
<p>&#8216;It is also important to understand that it is not because an Iranian ship is coming, that you are doing business with an Iranian company. The ship is only the vehicle, the cargo is another matter. Katoen Natie is clear about this: we will not work with an Iranian company to set up a certain export flow. This is something else: we just carry out an operation on behalf of a forwarder.&#8217;</p>
<p>&#8216;As a terminal, you don&#8217;t necessarily have a view of the cargo. If it is bulk, it is of course loose goods and then you can see what goes on or off the ship, and there are also documents that state which category of goods it is, but we do not do the check, it is customs that checks the goods.&#8217;</p>
<p>The owner of the Churchill Terminal on the right bank of the port of Antwerp, where the six Iranian ships came most often, refused to answer our questions. The terminal with a total surface area of 27 hectares and 70,000 square meters of storage capacity is owned by the Belgian group Nova Natie. CEO Maarten Geerardyn: &#8216;We are absolutely not going to respond to that.&#8217;</p>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p><strong>Front company</strong></p>
<p>Officially, the Iranian container ships are owned by the Iranian company Hafez Darya Arya Shipping (HDS). But that would only be a front company of the Iranian state shipping company IRISL, which is known for providing logistical support to the Iranian army. The sanctions against Iran have caused dozens of &#8216;independent private companies&#8217; to emerge in the Iranian shipping industry, but in reality they still operate under the umbrella of IRISL and used to be integral departments of it.</p>
<p>IRISL had already been sanctioned by the US and on November 18 last year, the state-owned shipping company also ended up on the EU sanctions list. The Council of the EU then expanded its sanctions against Iran for its support &#8211; with missiles and drones &#8211; of Russia&#8217;s war against Ukraine.</p>
<p>Neither IRISL nor HDS answered our questions, but a German shipping agent who has been working with HDS since 2018 did. The German agent sees no problems with this cooperation and emphasizes that he only acted for HDS, never for IRISL. &#8216;Because there were no sanctions against HDS in the EU &#8211; and there still are none today &#8211; we thought it safe to operate as a line agent and ship broker for HDS within the EU. We are not aware that IRISL is the ultimate owner of the ships.&#8217;</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the Germans have now suspended cooperation with HDS &#8216;purely as a precautionary measure&#8217;, because according to them the sanctions against IRISL are &#8216;broad and vaguely formulated&#8217;. The EU sanctioning of IRISL has therefore suspended the visits of the six Iranian ships to the port of Antwerp until further notice.</p>
<p>The German agent said he did not know what goods the Iranian ships loaded and unloaded in the ports in Syria and Russia. &#8216;That falls outside the scope of our contractual obligations.&#8217; The Germans say they only know about the innocent goods that were imported and exported here in Antwerp. &#8216;Typical imports on HDS ships are polyethylene for packaging, used cooking oil for the biofuel sector, ceramic products such as tiles and foodstuffs such as pistachios. Exports from Antwerp to Iran are new machines, including for the beverage industry, used industrial equipment such as car parts, textile processing machines and insulation materials.&#8217;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<blockquote><p><strong>All Iranian weapons intercepted en route to Houthis</strong></p>
<p><strong>Between May 2021 and January 2023, the US authorities already intercepted a mass weapon of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards destined for Yemen. This happened during routine maritime security operations in and around the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. It involved more than 9,000 rifles, 284 machine guns, 194 rocket launchers, more than 70 anti-tank missiles and more than 700,000 pieces of ammunition. The French navy was also able to seize thousands of assault rifles, machine guns and anti-tank missiles in January 2023 in the Gulf of Oman, coming from Iran and on their way to the Houthi rebels in Yemen.</strong></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p></blockquote>
<p>Now that the six Iranian ships are no longer coming to Antwerp (for the time being) &#8211; the Daisy was the last to arrive here until November 9, 2024 &#8211; it is striking that they have immediately shifted their entire route. They have not been to Syria or Russia in recent months. The Azargoun is now moving to China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Libya. The Artenos now goes to India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and the UAE. The Kashan to India, the UAE, Kenya and Tanzania. The Shiba to India, Libya, Turkey and the UAE. The Artam to China, India, Tanzania, Kenya and the UAE.</p>
<p>Can the ships still return to Antwerp? Antwerp Port Authority refers &#8216;all questions about Iranian ships&#8217; to the Federal Public Service Mobility. According to Mobility spokesman Thomas De Spiegelaere, it is currently sufficient that the Iranian state-owned shipping company IRISL has been sanctioned to no longer allow the six ships to enter our ports, even though those ships are officially owned by another company. &#8216;IRISL is listed in the databases as <em>the beneficial owner </em>of the ships. That is enough for us to stop them. A ship has several managers and operators.&#8217;</p>
<p><strong>Everything checked</strong></p>
<p>&#8220;But other Iranian ships that do not belong to IRISL are still allowed to come to Belgian ports for legitimate reasons,&#8221; says the spokesperson for the FPS Mobility. &#8220;There are no sanctions against Iranian ships in general. We are not bound by the American sanctions against Iran and will therefore not follow them.&#8217;</p>
<blockquote><p><strong>In 2023 and 2024, twelve different Iranian ships came to Antwerp, accounting for 44 visits. In 20 of the 44 cases, it concerned ships that were sanctioned by the US. And six of the twelve ships would therefore have been involved in espionage or arms deliveries.</strong></p></blockquote>
<p>The question is whether other Iranian ships can now simply use Antwerp as a &#8216;cover&#8217;. Because the six ships remained untouched all this time. De Spiegelaere: &#8216;When these ships still came to the Belgian ports, there were no EU sanctions. There were sanctions against specific goods or <em>dual-use</em> goods. But that has always been checked, the calls of these ships were always legitimate and the goods that were loaded or unloaded were in accordance with the rules. So there were no legal grounds for refusing these ships.&#8217;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong><em>For <a href="https://www.tijd.be/politiek-economie/belgie/algemeen/van-spionage-tot-wapenleveringen-de-duistere-praktijken-achter-de-iraanse-schepen-in-antwerpen/10599110.html">our investigation</a> into the Iranian ships, we received help from foreign fellow journalists: the Iranian Mahtab Divsalar (</em><a href="https://www.radiozamaneh.com/851423"><em>Zamaneh</em></a><em>), the Syrian Mohammad Bassiki (</em><a href="https://sirajsy.net/from-espionage-to-arms-deliveries-the-shady-practices-behind-the-iranian-ships-in-antwerp/"><em>SIRAJ</em></a><em>), the German Ruben Schaar (</em><a href="https://www.papertrailmedia.de/"><em>Paper Trail Media</em></a><em>), Birte Schohaus and Dimitri Tokmetzis (</em><a href="https://www.ftm.eu/articles/container-ships-iran-arms-transportation-and-espionage"><em>Follow the Money)</em></a><em>and of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (</em><a href="https://www.occrp.org/en"><em>OCCRP</em></a><em>).</em></strong></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://sirajsy.net/from-espionage-to-arms-deliveries-the-shady-practices-behind-the-iranian-ships-in-antwerp/">From espionage to arms deliveries: the shady practices behind the Iranian ships in Antwerp</a> appeared first on <a href="https://sirajsy.net">SIRAJ</a>.</p>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[sadmin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Nov 2016 10:04:46 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Damascus,Nov 29,2015. By Ziad Omar and Ahmed Abdallah Alhayat– Beyond the known suffering of Syrians who are living under fire or migrating through rough seas [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://sirajsy.net/body-spare-parts-for-sale/">Body Spare Parts for Sale</a> appeared first on <a href="https://sirajsy.net">SIRAJ</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;"><strong>Damascus,Nov 29,2015.</strong></p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">By<strong> Ziad Omar and Ahmed Abdallah</strong></p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;"><strong><a href="http://www.alhayat.com/Articles/12411535" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Alhayat</a></strong>– Beyond the known suffering of Syrians who are living under fire or migrating through rough seas in rundown boats, another more brutal and dangerous world exists, that of a black market in organ trafficking leading to a worst fate.<br />
This report investigates the involvement of medical doctors in organ trafficking networks targeting Syrian victims. The networks begin in Syria and move across the borders to Lebanon, Egypt, and Turkey.<br />
Others are also involved in the business, starting with fake security officials and ex-convicts and ending with pimps. This investigative report documents hitherto details on unknown cases involving organ traders who were arrested by the Syrian authorities.<br />
In addition, the report reveals how hospitals and doctors continue to practice the business, benefiting a security breakdown since 2011. These gangs resort to a loophole in law number 3/2010 on combating human trafficking, as article three does not punish or incriminate the donor.</p>
<div class="kuplix_quote" dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Article Three: The authorities assigned to enforce this legislative decree provide care for the victims of human trafficking in general and in women and children in particular, away from any criminalisation and punishment regulations, in order to reintegrate them into the society.</div>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;"><strong>Complex networks</strong><br />
Among those revealed by the report are doctors, gunmen, women, a convicted pimp, and a fugitive wanted for “debauchery and organ trafficking”.<br />
Members of these networks work in clinics and hospitals across most Syrian cities and regions. Some of them carry unlicensed guns, while others manage the e-marketing of human organs, as per in the following advert:</p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">“For sale: Kidney of a 27 year-old male who needs the money to travel to Europe. Free of any viruses or genetic diseases. Currently residing in Turkey. For inquiries: send private message.”</p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Both reporters went undercover once posing as donors (sellers) and once as recipients (buyers). In both cases, they recorded conversations with the person behind the advert, who turned out to be a mediator for an organised network.<br />
The mediator asked about their blood type to match recipients with donors. He also offered his services for other organs if needed, as there are “fresh goods everyday”.<br />
The reporters then continued to track Syrians who sold their organs to networks of doctors and mediators.<br />
Donors sell their organs voluntarily to raise money to travel to Europe, or forcibly, as in the case of Ahmed Abdul Karim, who was buried in his hometown of Morek, north of Hamah, next to other bodies whose organs were stolen during medical treatment. These thefts started since 2013, according to locals in nearby villages, as well as human rights and media reports that documented this growing phenomenon as the Syrian war grew fiercer.<br />
On July 6, 2015, the head of Syria’s Doctors’ Syndicate Abdul Qader Hassan announced the dismissal and discipline of five doctors who were found involved in organ trafficking.<br />
Our reporters followed up on the case of these doctors and through a senior judicial source, managed to obtain a copy of the syndicate’s decision to dismiss them.<br />
The document, number 4/3/2011, was issued by the central disciplinary council of the Syrian Doctors’ syndicate.<br />
“The Syndicate has banned the doctors from practicing medicine permanently, referring them to the relevant judiciary authorities after investigations revealed their involvement in a transnational network that takes pregnant women to Lebanon to give birth, before selling their babies for large sums of money for organ harvesting,” the statement read.<br />
According to the statement, the sale took place in compliance with a doctor called Samir H., whom the recipient and donor had met at a conference earlier.<br />
The court based its decision on an initial confession by one of the doctors, as well as his secretary and driver, following extensive investigations, which also included a testimony by one of the victims.<br />
Other doctors led a 12-member network, from Damascus to Aleppo. Our reporters managed to obtain a copy of their case after they were arrested by the criminal security unit in the period between 2013 and 2015.<br />
The network was described by a security source as the “most active”. One of its members would pose as a security officer in charge of an armed group. Some of them had been arrested once before while others were arrested three times in less than two years.<br />
Ziad W. and Mohammed Ammar K. are wanted for organ trafficking. The latter is also wanted for attempted kidnapping for the purpose of debauchery and organ trafficking, according to the police report.<br />
Both reporters found that Ziad and Mohammed Ammar were the doctors whose names were included in the e-records announced by the doctors’ Syndicates of Syria and Aleppo.<br />
Abdul Qader Hassan confirmed that in July 2013, they were dismissed and deprived of their syndicate rights, including pensions, health insurance, personal protection, and medical licenses.<br />
However, according to Hassan, the syndicate cannot take other measures against them, as they no longer live in regime-controlled areas in Aleppo.<br />
Ahmed Sh., Naji F., Mohammed Ghazi S., Ahmed H., Nisreen F., Ahmed H. H., Ibrahim H., and Khaled A. are wanted on charges of organ trafficking, while Fadia D. has also been accused of mediation.<br />
Omar H. is wanted for running a prostitution network with the purpose of organ trafficking.<br />
Ahmed al-Sayyed, the attorney general in Damascus, told our reporters that Syrian courts had processed more than 20 cases related to organ trafficking in the past four years, once a rarity.<br />
Sayyed believes the total number of organ trafficking instances had exceeded 20,000.</p>
<div class="kuplix_quote" dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Frame: Article 10 of the law number 3/2010 against the trafficking of persons: “Imprisonment for one to three years and a fine of 100,000 to 200,000 Syrian Pounds is imposed on anyone who knowingly joins a criminal group that aims to commit crimes of human trafficking.” The law also imposes imprisonment of between 15 to 30 years on the mediators who do not need the organ themselves, defined as those who buy organs from the donor and sell them to the recipient with the aim of making profit. If the organ theft leads to death, the anti-trafficking law is no longer applicable. Instead, article 535 of the Penal Code is enforced, imposing the death penalty, as the crime is considered premeditated murder.</div>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Dr. Hussain Nofal, head of the recently-founded general authority for forensic medicine, estimates the number of Syrian cases of organ trafficking at over 18,000 in the past four years.<br />
By early 2013, he says, organs from 15,600 people (out of 62,000 wounded who received treatment in neighbouring countries) had been harvested.<br />
Dr. Nofal based his numbers on a comprehensive study conducted on those who were killed in war zones and border areas. The study includes pictures, videos, and other documents that should be released by the courts later.<br />
If you think children are not affected by organ theft, then you have not heard the story of Yasmin Shahada, 9.<br />
The doctors tried to steal her kidney in a hospital that her family cannot locate until now. She was only identified after three bullets were removed from her body following and injury during clashes in Latakia’s northern countryside in 2013.<br />
Our reporters met with the girl and her father in the neighbourhood of al-Daatour, near the city of Latakia.<br />
According to the father, he was informed on August 4, 2013 that his daughter was dead, so he requested an official death certificate (number 1367) from authorities in the nearby town of Salanfa. However, 17 days later, a Turkish doctor called him and said the girl was alive after surviving an attempt to harvest her organs.<br />
The father expressed gratitude and they agreed to meet at the Kassab border crossing. As the doctor delivered the girl, he told her father about the details of how members of the organ trafficking network agreed to sell her kidney through the hospital.<br />
The deal was made in the presence of the girl before the Turkish doctor saved her and smuggled her to Syria.<br />
During six months of extensive investigations, Both reporters documented 12 cases of organ trafficking through direct interviews with victims in Syria, Istanbul, and Beirut, including seven cases of voluntary donation for economic reasons, three cases of forced organ harvesting during medical treatment after war injuries, one case of survival from a harvesting attempt, and one case of fraud based on a medical excuse.<br />
All cases have been documented through audio-visual recordings. They include victims who are still alive, as well as family members in Syria and neighbouring countries. Yet, there are no accurate official statistics, even though all Syrian officials interviewed in this report have admitted the presence of organised networks that exploit the Syrians’ poor conditions to sell their organs.<br />
Our reporters, using hidden cameras, posed as escorts of patient in Damascus to document the doctors’ involvement.<br />
At 11 am on July, 7, 2015, Thura Ahmed, 16, is accompanied by her parents to undergo a corneal transplant surgery (Keratoplasty) in her left eye at a Damascus hospital.<br />
The girl and her family seemed at ease with the surgery, as the doctor had reassured them about its success rate, how it will be transplanted and the healing period. He said the new cornea would be officially imported from the US for $1,500.<br />
According to the doctor, the surgery has a 95 percent success rate. He said the cornea will arrive with a certificate detailing the donor’s medical information, including the harvest date and the donor being free of any genetic or microbial diseases.<br />
In addition, the doctor said the entire transplant surgery would be recorded on camera as a legal procedure that takes place in all transplant operations.<br />
Two days later, the cornea arrived from the US. “How could it arrive here so quickly?”<br />
The doctor called and said the cornea had arrived, according to the girl’s father. Within 20 minutes, the surgery took place in a hospital near the clinic, but the girl’s condition kept deteriorating.<br />
We showed Thura’s case file to Dr. Mohamed Raslan, head of the state-owned eye bank, which includes the official records of all doctors who import corneas.<br />
According to Article One/B of the legislative decree number 61/2010, the health minister can allow ophthalmologists to import corneas in exceptional cases for limited periods of time and for the public interest.<br />
We compared Thura’s information with official requests made by doctors to import corneas, but we could not find the name of the doctor who performed Thura’s surgery.<br />
We tried to search for Thura’s name in the patients’ database, but we still could not find any record of her.<br />
This means that the cornea was either smuggled into Syria or came from local sources.<br />
While the report was being published, Thura’s family was in the process of submitting a complaint to the doctors’ Syndicate.<br />
In Egypt, home to nearly 132,000 Syrian refugees, 29-year-old Mohamed Zaher (alias) was subjected to a new kind of experience.<br />
An organised group managed to set him up and buy his kidney for a certain amount of money, exploiting his need and ignorance of the country and its laws.<br />
Originally from Homs, Zaher works in auto-repairs. He currently lives in Istanbul, where he moved recently.<br />
Zaher left Cairo after he sold his kidney for $3,000 to someone whose real name he did not even know. All they had was a 15-minute face-to-face conversation to agree on the terms of the deal, including price, time, and place.<br />
We met with him in a house he shares with other Syrians in Istanbul.<br />
Zaher is consumed by regret. Every time he is reminded of the deal, he remembers the tragedy that is yet to end. He does not wish a similar fate upon anyone.<br />
The young man hesitated before he agreed to speak out. No one knows about it, not even his wife, whom he married using the money he made from selling his kidney.<br />
“This is the biggest crime I have ever committed in my life,” he said, “and I will never forgive myself.”<br />
Zaher had just returned from a medical examination, as he went to see a doctor after feeling pain in his remaining kidney.<br />
When the doctor found out he had sold his kidney, he told him: “You will inevitably die if your remaining kidney fails.”<br />
How did Zaher come to decide to sell his kidney? And why? What are the details of the procedure that took place at a Cairo hospital at midnight?<br />
We discussed the case with the Egyptian health ministry. Assistant health minister Saber Ghonaim said that if the hospital was proven to have allowed the Syrian young man’s surgery, the doctor and medical team who performed the surgery would be prosecuted, and possibly suspended.<br />
Ghonaim also said the young man should file an official complaint. However, this is not possible as he is currently not in Egypt.<br />
In addition, the Syrian donor has refrained from any official measures to avoid unnecessary legal consequences.</p>
<div class="kuplix_quote" dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;"><strong>Frame</strong>: According to article 6 of Egypt’s organ transplant law number 5/2010, “no human organ, body part, or tissue of any nature can be traded. Anyone who violates the law is subject to imprisonment or a fine of 50,000 to 200,000 Egyptian Pounds, as well as the confiscation of any money or profit or benefit gained from the crime.” Article 4 of the same law stipulates that “no human organ, body part, or tissue can be taken from a living person to be transplanted in another person’s body unless it was in the form of donation amongst Egyptian relatives.”</div>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Zaher’s story in Egypt is not one of its kind. Dozens of other Syrians abroad resorted to social media to sell their organs in order to make ends meet or fund a journey to Europe.<br />
Adverts found on online markets reflect the size of the tragedy, with some people advertising their organs online to flee the tragic situation in Lebanon.<br />
The idea began on social media pages related to migration and Syrians abroad. It has now become the norm. At least one or two new adverts are posted everyday by Syrians who want to sell their organs. There is even a Facebook page called “kidneys for sale”, where donors and brokers discuss their deals.<br />
We tried contacting Facebook to discuss the legality of these pages, as well as the social network’s policy to report them. They replied saying that the pages did not violate Facebook’s standards, as they do not incite violence or post inappropriate pictures.<br />
Organ sale online has even extended beyond kidneys, to liver, lung lobes and anything that could save the donors from their misery.<br />
In March 2015, an UNRWA report revealed that poverty and destitution amongst Syrians had reached 82.5 percent in 2014, compared to 64.8 percent in 2013.<br />
As a result, according to the report, “conflict-related transnational networks and criminal gangs emerged to engage in human trafficking.”</p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;"><strong>Online investigation</strong><br />
Our reporters infiltrated these networks, posing as brokers searching for organs. They posted an advert on a closed Facebook group for Syrians in Lebanon, asking for kidneys, without specifying a blood type.<br />
Syrian citizen Ali A. offered his kidney for sale, and asked about the price we were willing to pay.<br />
<strong>Reporters</strong>: $2,000 for one kidney.<br />
<strong>Ali</strong>: For a poor person, this is a fortune. All I want is to cover my children’s expenses, at least for a couple of months.<br />
The second offer came from Mohamed (alias), a 29 year-old Syrian living in a refugee camp in Rashaya, Lebanon. He is a father of three, including two disabled children who need medical care.<br />
<strong>Reporters</strong>: How much would you sell one of your kidneys for?<br />
<strong>Moahmed</strong>: I do not know much about this. If the price is good, I will go ahead with it. I need to go to Europe to treat my kids.<br />
<strong>Reporters</strong>: How about $4,000?<br />
<strong>Mohamed</strong>: Yes, I would leave Lebanon and travel immediately to Europe.<br />
On the other hand, we contacted a Syrian refugee who advertised his kidney for sale. He seemed professional, as he mentioned the blood type (B+) in the advert. However, he asked the reporters about the blood type they were looking for, which meant he had access to several kidneys with various blood types.<br />
<strong>Reporters</strong>: Do you still want to sell the kidney?<br />
<strong>Seller</strong>: What blood type are you looking for?<br />
<strong>Reporters</strong>: You said B+ in the advert.<br />
<strong>Seller</strong>: How much?<br />
<strong>Reporters</strong>: I do not know. How about $2,000?<br />
<strong>Seller</strong>: *laughs* I want $10,000.</p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">While markets for selling Syrians as spare parts host deals that occur both behind the scenes and in public, international organizations remain oblivious. Our reporters contacted more than four international organizations concerned with documenting these breaches to enquire about the phenomenon. The responses were either “we do not have any information on the phenomenon” or a complete refusal to respond to the enquiries.<br />
For example, Human Rights Watch wrote back on Sept. 7, 2015 saying: “Unfortunately we have not looked into this matter. You can write to Amnesty international or look into the following journalistic material”. They were referring to a report published in the Oct. 12, 2013 edition of Der Spiegel highlighting the story of Raed, 19, who fled from battles in Aleppo to Lebanon, where he sold his left kidney for $7000. The surgery took place in a secret clinic in a residential complex through a Lebanon-based active network that acquires the organs through a middle man called Abu Hussein. The latter receives a commission of $700. The organs are later sent to GCC countries.</p>
<div class="kuplix_quote" dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Background: A cornea is priced in Lebanon at $1500. Transplanting it costs around $3500. The Eye Bank in Lebanon performs these operation for free. The beneficiaries of the bank services in 2015 surmounted to 5000 patients. They included 150 Syrians out of the 1.172 Syrian refugees in Lebanon .</div>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Afterwards, we wrote to Amnesty International, twice. The first time on Sept. 3, 2015 and again on Sept. 8, 2015 but we never received a response. As for the World Health Organization, the reporters received a response after enquiring about its role in monitoring the trafficking of Syrian people’s organs and ways to limit the activity across borders. The WHO response, received on Oct. 29, 2015, stated: “We do not look into the issue of organ trafficking. It is the responsibility of the Interpol. We only examine how countries can prepare organ donation programs and the systems, which may discourage or eradicate the illegal trafficking of organs”.<br />
Doctors without Borders (MSF) did not respond to the reporters’ correspondence sent on Sept. 6, 2015. Their letter was not the only one MSF or other international humanitarian institutions did not reply to.<br />
Dr. Morhaf al-Mialim, in charge of the Syrian Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, claimed that he had written to numerous international organizations since early 2012. Nonetheless, they did not write back. Mr. Nizar Skief, the head of the Syrian Lawyers Union supported this discourse. He said he wrote to the Arab Lawyers Union twice. In the first time he wanted to alert them to crimes committed by Arabs in Syria and in the second time he wanted to shed light on the implication of Arab smugglers in arranging illegal migrations to Europe. Both correspondences were part of his personal effort to look into the matter of trading in Syrians abroad. Nonetheless, his correspondences received no response for the Arab Lawyers Union, which was established in Cairo in 1944.</p>
<table class=" alignleft" dir="ltr" width="612">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transport method</strong></td>
<td><strong>Transport mechanism</strong></td>
<td><strong>Consequences</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Sale camouflaged as organ donation within the national borders.</td>
<td>Organ donation is used as a legal loophole, but the transaction comprises a sale agreement between the two parties</td>
<td>The symptoms of having one kidney manifest after an undetermined period of time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Sale abroad in exchange for material gain.</td>
<td>Most refugees suffer terrible economic conditions. As such, they sell their organs either to better their conditions or to flee to Europe.</td>
<td>The symptoms of having one kidney manifest after an undetermined period of time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Secretly stealing non-vital organs</td>
<td>The refugee is persuaded that he/she needs an operation. His/her kidney is removed without him/her knowing. However, he/she soon finds out once the symptoms of the organ removal are experienced</td>
<td>The symptoms of having one kidney manifest after an undetermined period of time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Intentionally stealing vital organs</td>
<td>Occurs in Syria’s neighbouring countries, over borders, or in regions experiencing chaos.</td>
<td>Death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Stealing stem cells from corpses or cloning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-Selling sperms or fertilized eggs</td>
<td>A very serious issue, which is rarely looked into. While it is not physically harmful, but the sperms can be used to fertilize an egg and breed embryos. The practice is internationally criminalized. Moreover, whoever purchases sperms uses them to breed illegal children.</td>
<td>Stolen from amongst the deceased’s organs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-Stealing Placentas and umbilical chords</td>
<td>The placenta and umbilical chord comprise some of the most important stem cells for cloning embryos as they are rich for blood cell. Moreover, people neglect burying them after birth</td>
<td>The placenta is rich in blood cells and can be used to clone embryos.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;"><strong>Non-Deterrent Punishments</strong><br />
While the Syrian law goes in line with UN conventions on toughening the punishment against human trafficking, the phenomenon has spread during the war. Among the most important agreements signed by Syria is the “United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols”.<br />
Signed by Syria in 2009, the Convention seeks the manner with which to pursue the perpetrators of transnational crimes regardless of the political circumstances. The convention also stipulates the responsibility of the state in combating these crimes. However, Syria has reservations concerning paragraph 2, of article 35 of the convention pertaining to transferring these case to the International Court of Justice</p>
<div class="kuplix_quote" dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Background: Defining Human Trafficking: Human trafficking is the luring of people, their transportation, kidnapping, removing, hosting, or welcoming them for use in illegal actions or for illegal purposes in exchange for material or immaterial gain, a promise, or granting benefits, or in the attempt to achieve in of the latter or other things. “Article 4 of law 2010”</div>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Moreover, the Syrian laws were developed along similar lines. Legislative decree no 3 issued in 2010 deals with human trafficking. It increased the punishment in cases of international crimes or if they are committed against women or children. In the aforementioned cases, article 8 of civic degradation is applied. The later stipulates “whenever there is a reason to increase the punishment, it is increased from the third to the half”. As such, a sentence of 15 years would become 20-22 years and a half, and so on.<br />
The head of the Syrian Lawyers’ Union said: “It is true that the law is a deterrent yet the crime continues”. He added that the “chaos ensuing from the Syrian crisis strengthened organized crime gangs at the expense of parties, who are responsible for pursuing them. Consequently, the phenomenon is likely to expand even further and affect neighbouring countries unless there is an international effort to monitor these crimes and combat them”. The head of the Doctors’ Union agreed with that view. He emphasized that the only way out is through international cooperation to monitor the phenomenon to pursue and capture these networks through international police.</p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">In one of its latest reports on Syria by the United Nations entitled “Squandering Humanity” the issue of trafficking Syrians was highlighted. It spoke about people who are murdered in their country, drown in the sea as they attempt to run for their lives, or who die in hospitals in the pursuit of healing. Those who manage to survive all of that offer themselves and their organs for sale perchance their children can survive.<br />
<strong>Editor’s Notes:</strong><br />
The following researchers contributed to this investigation: Hussam al-Agha, Qassem Mohamed, and Mohamed al-Qazzaz.<br />
<strong>• This investigation was completed with support of Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism(ARIJ) www.arij.net and coached by Hammoud al-Mahmoud</strong></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://sirajsy.net/body-spare-parts-for-sale/">Body Spare Parts for Sale</a> appeared first on <a href="https://sirajsy.net">SIRAJ</a>.</p>
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		<title>False contracts for Syrian workers in Turkey</title>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Nov 2016 09:53:20 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Ahmed Haj Hamdo Istanbul, Turkey, March 2006, (al-Hayat) – The owner of a Turkish textile factory refused to pay the costs of treatment and compensation [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://sirajsy.net/false-contracts-for-syrian-workers-in-turkey/">False contracts for Syrian workers in Turkey</a> appeared first on <a href="https://sirajsy.net">SIRAJ</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="single_content">
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Ahmed Haj Hamdo<br />
Istanbul, Turkey, March 2006,</p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">(<a href="http://www.alhayat.com/Articles/14596790/%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%BA%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7----%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%87%D9%85">al-Hayat</a>) – The owner of a Turkish textile factory refused to pay the costs of treatment and compensation for a Syrian refugee worker who was left with permanent disability in his left foot while working at a machine.<br />
Ibrahim Al-Ali, 33, who worked at a factory at an industrial zone in Istanbul was transferred to a private hospital where doctors installed catheters in his leg right after the accident. His impoverished family in Syria painstakingly raised money to pay for his treatment, only for doctors to inform him he would no longer be able to use his injured leg for walking.<br />
After his treatment Ibrahim received another shock when his Turkish boss told him he had no rights at the company and would not be compensated for the damage and the cost of treatment.<br />
This was despite the fact that Turkish law guarantees such rights for workers with legal contracts. Ibrahim threatened to go to the police but ultimately, like most Syrians in Turkey do, he changed his mind, fearing prosecution and deportation.<br />
Ibrahim is not the only Syrian to have his labour rights violated in a country where more than 2.5 million Syrians have come as refugees since the conflict started in their country in 2011, according to official figures. At least half a million of them are looking for jobs and most of them do not have official permits to work that would guarantee their labour rights.<br />
Syrian middlemen in Turkey have become professionals at circumventing labour laws. According to interviewed workers, they lure jobseekers with probationary employment at sewing shops and textile factories. The jobseekers however remain vulnerable to be sacked without any compensation or health coverage in the event of accidents at the workplace, in a system of exploitation that is now known in Turkey as onbeş, the Turkish word for 15 [days].<br />
In mid-2013 Turkish labour laws were amended to clarify which foreign workers would keep the right to insurance, healthcare, paid leave and the minimum wage. Under the new amendments these rights were extended only to foreign investors, private sector employees working in the investment sector or those granted a normal work permit. Any and all other workers were not necessarily guaranteed those same rights, leaving refugee workers with nothing to gain by filing complaints and providing evidence of abuse.<br />
Nashaat, another refugee worker who is 18, did not fare better than Ibrahim. Nashaat was injured in his hand while working on a very old sewing machine., requiring eight stitches that unfortunately left his hand partially paralyzed.<br />
Nashaat said: “My boss forced me to work on the machine exclusively even though he knew it had injured me in the hand three months ago as the needles keep breaking”.<br />
An hour after working on the machine, the needle broke.<br />
Nashaat said everyone panicked when the incident happened. His employer sent someone to scout the street before sending him off to a private clinic. An hour later he had sent 70 Turkish liras ($20) and a message that said: “I don’t want any trouble because of you”.</p>
<blockquote dir="ltr"><p>“This meant I was fired,” Nashaat said.</p></blockquote>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Ghazwan Qurunful, a Syrian lawyer specializing in the affairs of Syrians in Turkey, said the proportion of Syrians with work permits is very low because of the difficulty of obtaining them.<br />
Qurunful added: “The Syrian workers’ lack of any working documents has made them prey to brokers and some companies looking to defraud them. At the same time, they are unable to secure their rights.”<br />
However, the lawyer said that refugees can go to the police and file complaints.<br />
The plight of exploited Syrian workers might be resolved now that the Turkish government decided earlier this year to grant work permits to Syrians on its territories. This measure according to Qurunful will protect Syrians from deportation, something that Syrian refugees in neighboring countries typically experience because they rarely obtain work permits.<br />
Qurunful also expressed hope that the problem of low wages would be resolved after the Turkish government agreed on a minimum wage at 1300 Turkish liras ($420) on 15/1/2016.<br />
But as Turkey approved work permits for Syrians on its territories, it also imposed entry visas on Syrians while exempting those in violation of residency papers from the requirements of departure, in effect leaving them in limbo.<br />
These decisions came after a deal between Turkey and the European Union was leaked to the public, by which Turkey prevents the flow of Syrians into Europe through its territories in return for $3 billion euros in aid for hosting them.<br />
Safwan Bash Almazi, a spokesman for the Turkish Labour Ministry told this reporter that the number of work permits that would be given to Syrians would be more than half a million.<br />
The Labour Ministry admitted implicitly to the existence of exploitation, saying they had issued a decision granting work permits to foreigners “under the temporary protection of the Turkish government” with the aim of specifying a legal framework for their employment and the prevention of their illegal exploitation by setting a minimum wage of 1300 Turkish liras.<br />
However, it has yet to be enforced according to Syrian workers we interviewed three months after the decision was issued. This means that that granting work permits cannot quickly put an end to the systematic exploitation of Syrian workers.<br />
The ministry added: “Foreign workers who are exposed to exploitation can file complaints. If complaints are submitted correctly, they are followed up at the Inspection Department.” The ministry said there had been 318 complaints submitted in 2015 by foreign workers against their employers. It also said that inspectors were assigned to investigate them, but did not say whether there were complaints from Syrian workers specifically.<br />
However, according to the ministry, this procedure faces two issues. First, some complaints are baseless. Second, the ministry needs time to check the complaint and collect documents, which could take up to two months in some cases. During this period, the worker in question may have left the workplace where he/she were exposed to rights violations, thus making it difficult to follow up on the complaint.<br />
Meanwhile, Syrians continue to be hired in workshops based on the informal onbeş system. The main function of this informal system is to circumvent Turkish Labour Law, which forces employers to respect all rights should they be caught by the Ministry of Labour patrols that inspect industrial and commercial facilities on a bi-weekly basis.<br />
Patrols run by the Social Security Corporation, for example, ensure that all workers in a given enterprise have work and health insurance.<br />
But what happens sometimes is that employers have memorised the times of visits by these patrol and end contracts before they arrive, according to interviews conducted with dozens of Syrian workers.<br />
“The inspectors of the ministry and the Social Security work to verify no laws are being broken by employers against foreign workers. In the event any breach of the law is documented, administrative sanctions are implemented,” the Labour Ministry official told this reporter.<br />
Binyamin Agha Dolaner, Executive Director at Securta, a government company specialized in labour insurance since 1987, said that the proportion of evasion of insurance for workers in normal years was about 42%.<br />
Rapid changes within the workforce, desperation for income and deliberate oversight by the Ministry of Labour had led this proportion to grow to more than 65%.<br />
The Ministry of Labour said it does not send out patrols every 15 days. But it did not elaborate on how the patrols work, nor did they discuss their schedule.<br />
<em><strong>Record numbers</strong></em><br />
Ammar N, 26, a Syrian national, has changed a record number of jobs at workshops.<br />
In response to an ad placed by a Syrian national in Istanbul on a poster in Bayrampaşa district, one sewing shop was contacted in the area of Gaziosmanpaşa in Istanbul on December 3, 2015.<br />
When he called the number, a Syrian national who worked for the Turkish employer answered stating that any prospective employee “must work for two weeks without pay at first as a trial period, to verify the quality of your work. After that, hours and the salary will be agreed. If the work does not suit you, you can move to another workshop to try it out.”<br />
Syrian Wael Baylouni was defrauded three times by the same broker working in collusion with Turkish employers to exploit workers. Wael met the broker at a café in Gaziantep, where he was promised a job at clothes factory.<br />
Wael said: “I worked in a small workshop for 10 days after signing a contract written in Turkish that I do not understand. Afterwards, he told me the employer was not happy with my performance, and took me to another shop, where I worked for 12 days before I was fired. Each time I asked about my wage, the employer would ask me to come back the following week because he did not have the money. So I knew I was being defrauded.”<br />
We tried to get a copy of the contract but we couldn’t as all his employers did not give him a copy. Legally speaking, this means that Wael has not signed a contract. Other workers surveyed all confirmed that they had not been given copies of their contracts either.<br />
<em><strong>Headhunting</strong></em><br />
The job seekers are hunted under various names on social media including Facebook and in hundreds of public and closed pages and groups.<br />
According to e-marketing expert Mahmoud Habbak, a large proportion of these sites are designed to lure Syrians to exploit them and defraud them. By observing how these pages are set up, he added, one can notice that more than ten pages are created each day, probably owned by the same network as the same phone numbers and addresses used.<br />
Closed groups are even more dangerous, he continued, as these pages invite users for specific purposes. Hence, the ability to lure victims increases, as happens with human and organ traffickers.<br />
In areas with large numbers of Syrians in Istanbul, Mersin, and Gaziantep, posters written in weak Arabic advertise jobs at attractive salaries without adequate information on the nature of the work or the hours.<br />
In the course of our investigation this reporter accompanied Duraid, a young Syrian who has been in Turkey since 2011, for five days to a workshop on the edges of Istanbul.<br />
“Every 15 days on average, the boss asks me to hide for an hour, until the Ministry of Labour patrol finishes its inspection round.” He added: “It is not only the Syrians who suffer from this, but also other refugees like Bengalis, Sudanese, and others.”<br />
Our inspection of five workshops and our survey of dozens of workers showed that more than three quarters of them had been asked to move to another workshops after 15 days or slightly more. It also showed that nearly two thirds were not asked to show permits or ID papers and more than three fifths had moved between three to five sewing workshops in Turkey.<br />
To see the rest of the survey and questions visit the following link:<br />
<a href="http://bit.ly/1Por9Tk"><strong><em>http://bit.ly/1Por9Tk</em></strong></a><br />
<em><strong>Competing with Syrians</strong></em><br />
In Turkey, as in Jordan and Egypt, Syrian-made products and services are competing in local markets because of their low prices and the cheaper wages in comparison local products and workers. Below are some examples of the difference in prices between Syrian and Turkish products:<br />
<strong><em>Item Turkish item/rate</em></strong><br />
Fee for sewing pants Syrian worker pay Turkish worker pay Chamber of Commerce mandated pay<br />
Sewing pants 30 Turkish liras 90 Turkish liras 75-100 liras<br />
Sewing cotton pyjamas 5 Turkish liras 22 Turkish liras 17-30 Turkish liras</p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Hamza, 48, prays every day to God to keep him employed. “Even if I have to change a workshop every 15 days I’m happy.” However, Salma, 52 and her husband, 60, who work at the packaging and processing department are more fearful.<br />
“We fear that what happened to us in Egypt would happen again. We complained against the employer so he sent us a patrol the next day and we were deported to Turkey.”<br />
<strong><em>Note: Mohammad Baroudi and Turkish journalist Tugba Tekeret contributed to this investigation that was completed with support from Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (ARIJ) – www.arij.net</em></strong></p>
</div>
<p>The post <a href="https://sirajsy.net/false-contracts-for-syrian-workers-in-turkey/">False contracts for Syrian workers in Turkey</a> appeared first on <a href="https://sirajsy.net">SIRAJ</a>.</p>
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		<title>Syria’s Fatherless Children</title>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Nov 2016 09:50:18 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Nisreen Aladdin and Mukhtar al-Ibrahim Damascus, Syria, (Al-Hayat) – Damascus: Reported This investigation began during a bus ride from Damascus to it’s suburbs on [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://sirajsy.net/syrias-fatherless-children/">Syria’s Fatherless Children</a> appeared first on <a href="https://sirajsy.net">SIRAJ</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="single_content">
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;"><strong><em>By Nisreen Aladdin and Mukhtar al-Ibrahim</em></strong></p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;"><strong><em>Damascus, Syria, (<a href="http://www.alhayat.com/Edition/Print/17553059/%D9%82%D8%B5%D8%B5-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B5%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A3%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7">Al-Hayat</a>) – Damascus: Reported<br />
</em></strong><br />
This investigation began during a bus ride from Damascus to it’s suburbs on Nov. 12, 2015. The reporter accidentally stumbled on the problem of unregistered children in Syria. Born during the ongoing war, these children were separated from their fathers who were kidnapped, killed or forced entirely to leave the country. As a result, they have been unavailable and incapable of registering their children as their own.<br />
Travelling on a small white bus that was transporting civilians across military checkpoints, the vehicle was stopped by a government soldier for inspection. Pacing up and down the aisles, he requested and received identification papers. On the bus was a young woman looking nervously at the soldier, as she cradled a young baby in her arms. She stared at him, as if waiting for him to ask who the child belonged to.<br />
But the child was not noticed. The soldier quickly left the bus and waved it on. As the bus moved on, the baby woke up and began crying, despite the mother’s attempts to calm it.<br />
“What is her name?”<br />
“She doesn’t have one registered yet,” the mother responded “And every so often I change my mind!”<br />
This is the first time that the mother – called Rania – visited Damascus in five years, even though she lived only fourteen kilometres south of the capital. She had to travel to Damascus to try and register her child in the judicial courts. Rania married at the age of fifteen – a year and a half ago at time of meeting – to a man called Khalil Jumah who was displaced from another region in Syria. A local sheik married them in a ceremony with two witnesses present, as is customary outside the urbanized areas of Syria.<br />
However , they did not receive the certification needed to register with the civil authorities.<br />
Tragedy struck soon afterwards when their town was bombed in mid-2014. Rania was forced to flee to another town..<br />
“Two months after that, my husband was killed. And later, my daughter was born without a marriage certificate.”<br />
A week after our first meeting, Rania found herself confronting legal complications that would require a lawyer. This was because the Civil Registry had refused to register her daughter because the marriage contract was not available..<br />
Her lawyer requested that she provide two witnesses from her hometown or paperwork to authenticate the marriage. This was very difficult because both witnesses had either fled the country or died in the war, while Rania only knew that her husband’s hometown is under the control of rebels.. This added an extra wrinkle, as it was unlikely government officials would recognize an official’s ruling from such an area.<br />
Her lawyer requested 100,000 Syrian pounds (nearly $ 400) to mount the lawsuit on her behalf, but Rania could not afford the cost, especially not after the death of her husband and both her parents as well as the loss of all her property.<br />
The Syrian civil code stipulates in Legislative Decree No. 26 of 2007, Chapter IV Article 28, paragraph c: (in case of children born to unregistered marriages, they cannot be registered until the marriage itself is registered).</p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">For up to a full year, Rania was still at the judicial courts trying to register her daughter, until her debts caught up to her. Now she survives on the charity and kindness of others.<br />
Rana’s case is one of many such stories emerging from the war in Syria, six years after the initial conflict began. This investigation was able to prove 29 different cases like Rania’s, after interviewing families in centres for displaced families in both Damascus and its countryside and in rural villages of the Quneitra Governate.<br />
All cases investigated were of mothers suffering difficulties in registering the births of their children, for reasons related to Syria’s personal status laws, which requires the meeting of many conditions, an impossible mission in times of war, displacement and migration.<br />
Among the conditions are the official registration of marriages that are needed to have one’s children recognized, that there is a documented marriage certificate for the husband with all his personal information, including date of birth, national number, parentage, etc… as expected of the wife, along with the wife’s guardian and the two adult male witnesses. Permission for marriage for the husband must also be granted from the military recruitment board, due to Syria’s national conscription laws. In addition, the address of the official certifying the marriage must be provided, along with the details for both the pre-marital dowry and the post-divorce support payments and the day of the wedding itself.<br />
The situation is complicated in areas that fall outside the official authority, where identification issued by the opposition and the courts and local councils do not get any international recognition, let alone that of the Syrian government in Damascus.<br />
This is what leads to the accumulation of cases brought before the courts, for mothers like Rania trying to prove their children’s parentage in the absence of their husbands. According to the first Sharia judge in Damascus, who documents the personal status lawsuits records, the marriage and paternity claims rose more than tenfold in Syria, when comparing from the two years of pre-war to 2015.<br />
This was further proven in interviews with around sixty family rights lawyers working in Damascus and around Quneitra, who collectively said that paternity claims have grown to be 80% of all their filed cases in the past five years, compared to less than 9% before the war.<br />
Exacerbating the situation is the harsh approach by the Ministry of Justice towards marriage and paternity claims and paperwork expectations. According to judge Mahmoud Al-Maarawi, many women are also unable to afford the legal costs and fees which begin at $ 100.<br />
Yousif Ayed Amaara, the president for the UN’s Family Reconciliation Office, is afraid for the murky future that awaits many of Syria’s young children, who he described as “victims of both the laws and the war”. He went on to say that these cases are constantly increasing, adding that “From 2007 to 2009 we had one such case, but now we are facing tens of new instances each month”.<br />
<em><strong>I Want My Rights</strong></em><br />
A report issued by the Syrian Center for Policy Research entitled “Facing Fragmentation” states that Syrian families are being dispersed at a dangerous rate, with six million Syrians displaced within Syria itself and another four million having fled outside the country.<br />
The 25-year-old Rola – better known as Um Salah – is one of the millions who have been displaced many times over in the country. She lives in a shelter for refugees in Latakia, where she arrived six months ago with her two children without any identification papers. Her husband disappeared three years ago after leaving home to go buy bread.<br />
Um Salah did not have the family papers, and has been unable to enter her son at school. She has also been unable to receive aid, because her children are not registered in official records. However, children born of adultery were able to register, a fact that still resonates with her after her lawyer informed her.</p>
<table class=" alignleft" dir="ltr" width="684">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Syrian civil code stipulates in Legislative Decree No. 26 of 2007, Chapter IV Article 28, paragraph c: (in case of children born to unregistered marriages, they cannot be registered until the marriage itself is registered).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">“I am not a prostitute, and I will not be and I will never be. But am I not harming my children? I brought them into this life and I have not provided them with their basic rights”.<br />
Her father married her to a man who came to their village in 2011. She gave birth to their firstborn child Salah, without registering their marriage because of the volatility of the situation at the time. After less than a year of their marriage, they began a series of displacements because of the escalation of violence. She then gave birth to her second son Mohammad in 2012, and then lost her husband in 2013.<br />
Rola’s husband is one of 65,000 people who have disappeared between March 2011 and August 2015, according to a report issued by Amnesty International. Meanwhile, the number of abductees in Syria have reached 20,000 between 2011 and the publication of this investigation according to Minister of State for the Syrian National Reconciliation Ali Haidar.<br />
Rola stayed in the area close to the place of her husband’s disappearance, hoping he would come back and find her with their children. She was left with nothing but her wedding ring after she was forced to sell her jewelry to spend on her family before going on to the charity of others. She moved to Aleppo in 2014 and then to Latakia in 2015 in search of safety, after her son Salah was injured in his foot.<br />
It came as a shock to her when she was asked for her children’s identification papers, and she forced to say they had been lost. She was subsequently given a room to share with another family, and upon requesting a separate room for her children she was asked to provide proof the children were hers or be at the risk dismissal from the shelter.<br />
“I do not have any papers to prove my marriage and my children. According to government records I am still single.”<br />
In surveying sixty lawyers in and around Damascus and Quneitra regarding the rise in parental suits during the war, answers varied between 80%, 100% and 700%. The survey also showed that by and large the largest obstacle was the absence of the husband.</p>
<table class=" alignleft" dir="ltr" width="662">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil status, No. 26 of Legislative Decree 2007 provides in paragraph (c): “No registration changes of any civil status to citizens inside or outside the country will be recognized unless under documents duly certified.” In article “28” in paragraph “b”: (b) “If the baby is illegal do not mention the name of the father or mother or both together in the birth records unless at the explicit request of them or by judicial order, and the Secretary of the Civil Registry will choose a first name and a surname unrelated to either parent.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;"><em><strong>Gone and never returned</strong></em><br />
Dunia listens carefully to every word her lawyer says.<br />
The road to proving her marriage began again after the first attempt – a three month ordeal which culminated her leaving her previous lawyer as he attempted to take advantage of her circumstances and propositioned her.<br />
Dunia married at the age of nineteen to a young man from the north of Syria who had come to work in Damascus and knows her husband’s surname, and his hometown. He had left her on Sept. 7, 2012 to go to work in Saqba, kissing her goodbye at five months pregnant. Three years have passed since he left, and since then, Dunia has rejected a proposal from a neighbor.<br />
When she attempted to register her two year old daughter, she was surprised to learn that she needed to appoint a lawyer to overseer the procedure. Her landlord offered to pay her legal fees and after five sessions with the lawyer in his office, he asked for her to come without her landlord. When she arrived, she was propositioned and told that he would continue the legal suit for free and give her the money her landlord paid in exchange for a sexual relationship.<br />
“I hit him with an ashtray and then I ran away and cried, all the while he was shouting at me, saying that he would send me to jail.”</p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;"><a href="https://sirajsy.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/1.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-3110 aligncenter" src="https://sirajsy.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/1.jpg" sizes="auto, (max-width: 637px) 100vw, 637px" srcset="https://sirajsy.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/1.jpg 960w, https://sirajsy.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/1-300x225.jpg 300w, https://sirajsy.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/1.jpg 768w" alt="1" width="637" height="478" /></a><a href="https://sirajsy.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-3111 aligncenter" src="https://sirajsy.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2.jpg" sizes="auto, (max-width: 592px) 100vw, 592px" srcset="https://sirajsy.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2.jpg 800w, https://sirajsy.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2-300x225.jpg 300w, https://sirajsy.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2.jpg 768w" alt="2" width="592" height="444" /></a></p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;"><em><strong>Justice Adds Insult To Injury</strong></em><br />
Mahmoud Al-Maarawi claims that the Syrian crisis has imposed an incredible strain on the country’s judiciary, and that it has become essential to establish a competent judicial commission to maintain the rights of unregistered children and wives.<br />
“Unfortunately, we are seeing a tightening of regulations from the Ministry of Justice, which is requesting a birth certificate from exclusively government hospitals, even though many women still deliver their babies with midwives or doctors in private clinics or even in their own homes. At the same time there are simply not enough judges with the courage to make rulings on these cases as the Ministry hands out more instructions”.<br />
<em><strong>The Loss of Identification</strong></em><br />
It does not escape an observer that violence in Syria effected government buildings after 2011, where documents, files and records of births, bonds, divorces and marriages are believed lost. Afterwards, regional militias and opposition groups created their own records and civil registries as part of normalizing control over their territories.<br />
A survey conducted by the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Syria in 2015 found that a lack or loss of personal documents, constituted a major challenge. According to the report, the personal status law in its current form is unable to help women to certify their marriages and their children, according to 81% of the respondents.<br />
According to lawyers we met as they worked with their clients, the best-case paternity suits that take between three and five months are those when women presented the consent of their husbands or the husbands were able to appear before the courts with documentation to prove their paternity. Other “best case scenarios” are when the women have paperwork certifying the marriage and witnesses, as well as the possibility of communicating with either the husband or the witnesses or where the judge is convinced in the validity of the marriage, regardless of certification or proof.<br />
If none of these instances are the case, the women are likely to lose cases or continue on for two years before losing, ultimately ending in a dismissal of the case and the lack of registration of children in most cases.<br />
The Bosnian and Tunisian Experiences As a Solution?</p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">A 1998 law in Tunis related to children with unknown parentage gave Tunisian mothers the possibility to identify their children as their own, without a father present. This would be predicated on proving the children were their own (through shared DNA, witnesses, etc…) but would provide the children born out of wedlock all the legal rights available to those born in a recognized marriage.<br />
But this cannot be applied directly in Syria due to the personal status law in the country, which is derived from Islamic Sharia, and is incompatible with Tunisian laws.<br />
Meanwhile in Bosnia, the country suffered a long war in the 90’s. Families were dispersed and many were raped. This caused many parentage problems that culminated in the adoption of an old Yugoslav law which did not put concern on whether the children were legitimate or not. This allowed single mothers to register their children even if the father is unknown and receive full rights. This was a solution to a problem women and children suffered during the Bosnian war along with its systematic rape and forced pregnancy without a father.<br />
<em><strong>A Typical Marriage Contract</strong></em><br />
Activists and lawyers are calling for a basic, pre-approved written marriage contract that would only need the particulars of each marriage agreement filled in. This would be accepted without fault by the judges, and would contain the evidence supporting the couple and the witnesses present, notarize the wife’s signature as consent, provide fingerprints of her husband and outline what guarantees are available to the women in case of their husband’s death, disappearance or migration. This would be temporary until the government takes control over the entirety of the country and the Sharia courts would be reinstated nationally.<br />
The lawyers who were consulted in this investigation regarding the personal status law said that it did not help Syrian women to prove the validity of their marriages, especially not when their husbands had disappeared or if they had lost their marital documents.<br />
They suggested to found a civil records commission specializing in dealing with children born during the war with records of their mothers until the identification of their fathers takes place when the war ends. This is to preserve the rights of the children, so as not to be constrained or considered stateless and to take the same treatment as with abandoned children. This would be in the hope of reaching a solution for those unrecognized, especially the cases of these mothers who are stuck between divorce or widowhood as well as their fatherless children.</p>
<p><strong><em>This investigation was completed with the support of Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (ARIJ) – www.arij.net and coached by Hamoud Almahmoud. Nicolas Awwad translated the investigation into English.</em></strong></p>
</div>
<p>The post <a href="https://sirajsy.net/syrias-fatherless-children/">Syria’s Fatherless Children</a> appeared first on <a href="https://sirajsy.net">SIRAJ</a>.</p>
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