The assassination marked a turning point in Lebanon’s history as well as the Syrian-Lebanese relations, ultimately leading to the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon on April 30, 2005, as fingers were pointed at the Syrian regime and its allies for responsibility for the crime.

Today, two decades later and after the fall of the Assad regime, long accused of orchestrating the assassination, digital copies of documents from Syrian intelligence, obtained by the Syrian Investigative Reporting for Accountability Journalism – SIRAJ, Zaman Al-Wasl newspaper, and Daraj website, reveal for the first time the strategy devised by Syrian intelligence chief Ali Mamlouk and the security agencies under his command to confront the accusations.

On October 10, 2005, Mamlouk, then head of the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), sent a briefing memo to Bashar al-Assad describing Syrian media outlets as being “in a state of coma regarding the event,” namely, the possibility that the International Investigation Commission into the assassination could reach evidence implicating Syria.

According to Taleb Qadi Amin, who served as Deputy Syrian Minister of Information between 2002 and 2008, “It wasn’t only Ali Mamlouk saying this. Even the head of the regime himself said it. When asked whether he followed Syrian television, he would say he did not. He knew very well what existed within his media institutions.”

Mamlouk’s criticism of Syrian media was followed by security coordination aimed at manipulating and spreading conflicting information to confuse the investigation, as revealed in another document summarizing a meeting between the International Commission investigating Hariri’s assassination and Syrian security officers.

According to the document, the behavior of those officers was characterized by “openness to cooperation. And their conduct appeared spontaneous, responsible, and serious. Their answers did not seem pre-coordinated despite prior coordination and instructions.”

It remains unclear what exactly was meant by “prior coordination and instructions.” What is known, however, is that in 2006, Mamlouk informed Bashar al-Assad about a meeting between the Syrian side and the Investigation Commission, during which Syria proposed a “third possibility” regarding the bombing of Hariri’s convoy, namely, an aerial attack.

This theory was later hinted at by then-Minister of Defense General Mustafa Tlass and later stated more explicitly by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, who accused Israel and the United States of being behind the assassination.

“In the Hariri assassination case, the Syrian regime relied on constructing a fabricated narrative,” Lebanese academic Ziad Majed says. Regarding the regime’s strategies, Majed, a professor of political science at the American University of Paris, explains that the Syrian regime consistently relied on several methods in cases of political violence, assassinations, and killings. However, in major operations, there was always a broad accusation based on repeating the same rhetoric about conspiracies, the United States, and Israel, to maintain its self-proclaimed position of “resistance.” Thus, the regime framed any killing or sabotage as an attack on national security or stability, or as an attempt to direct accusations toward Syria.

According to Majed, there was also another discourse adopted by the regime: one that did not directly deny the crime, especially when the regime believed the cost of carrying it out would not be too high. By avoiding outright denial and leaving room for speculation, the regime sought to project power, immunity from accountability, and indifference to consequences. This ambiguity signaled to its own institutions and loyalists that it knew exactly what it was doing and did not fear repercussions.

The Internationalization of Hariri’s Assassination

Following the assassination of Rafik Hariri, both local and international developments accelerated rapidly. On April 7, 2005, the United Nations announced the formation of an “International Independent Investigation Commission” pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution 1595.

With the establishment of the Commission, headed by German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis, the political and criminal dimensions of the case shifted onto an international track, coinciding with the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon.

The Commission’s first report accused Syria of destabilizing Lebanon’s security and interfering in its governance, stating that the Syrian government “bears primary responsibility for the political tension that preceded the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri.” The report also described how Bashar al-Assad allegedly threatened Hariri and Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt with “physical harm” if they refused to support the extension of President Emile Lahoud’s term during a ten-minute meeting in Damascus in 2004.

In its 2008 report, the Commission stated that it “confirms, based on the available evidence, that a network of individuals collaborated to carry out the assassination of Rafik Hariri.”

The report added that the Commission “appreciates the logistical and security arrangements undertaken by the Syrian authorities… and, in general, Syria continues to cooperate satisfactorily.”

During that period, Lebanon witnessed the practical implementation of a new strategy. Media outlets close to Hezbollah and the Assad regime launched a campaign promoting the idea that groups affiliated with al-Qaeda were behind the assassination. This narrative was preceded by the story of a videotape allegedly “sent” to journalist Ghassan Ben Jeddou, then director of Al Jazeera’s Beirut office and now head of Al Mayadeen TV.

The video featured Ahmad Abu Adas claiming responsibility for the assassination. Later, the narrative shifted toward accusing Israel and the United States, culminating in a press conference by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in which he presented what he described as evidence of Israeli involvement in the assassination.

Syrian Intelligence-Media Operations

On September 7, 2005, the Syrian GID sent a briefing memo to Bashar al-Assad regarding the participation of S.T., a former member of parliament and head of a research center who later became an opposition figure based in the UAE, in a conference on “Gulf Security and Middle East Security.”

According to the memo, S.T. relayed information from R.D. about a meeting attended by Hermann Pirchner, the founding President of the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC).

The meeting, held in Paris, was attended by representatives of the French Foreign Ministry, the European Union, and the British and American foreign ministries. According to the document, Mehlis stated during the meeting that he had “reached evidence strongly suggesting the involvement of Syrian officials in Hariri’s assassination.”

This declaration by the international investigator, and his explicit indication of Syrian regime involvement, prompted Damascus to mobilize and sound the alarm, operating simultaneously on political, diplomatic, media, and security levels in preparation for confrontation, according to exclusive documents reviewed in digital form by the journalists working on this investigation.

One week after Mehlis’ statement, the GID sent Bashar al-Assad a draft memorandum of understanding between Syria and the United Nations concerning the Hariri investigation and Resolution 1595.

Then, on September 10, 2005, another memo from the GID was sent to Assad regarding the “management of the media operation during Mehlis’ mission in Damascus.” The memo described Syrian media as being “in a state of coma regarding the event” and “confused by the event,” calling for “exceptional measures in the field of cooperation between media and security.”

This coordination was to continue “within the advisory media committee in the General Intelligence Directorate.” The initial plan relied on promoting a Syrian narrative via the Minister of Information at the time, Mehdi Dakhlallah, who would do so through media outlets. The memo stressed that this narrative had to be based on “security information, data, and facts.”

At the time, Dakhlallah told Al Jazeera Channel that accusing Assad of involvement in the assassination was “a provocation of instincts and cheap demagoguery.”

Notably, the same document included a handwritten reference to the “story of Mohammed Zuhair Siddiq,” whom Syrian authorities later cited through the spokesperson of the Syrian judicial committee investigating the case, as proof that the international investigation had “collapsed” and suffered a “knockout blow.”

This referred to the testimonies of Siddiq or Hossam Hossam, the so-called “masked witness,” who later claimed, after fleeing to Syria, that he had provided false testimony under torture and sedation in Lebanon. He later appeared on Syrian television, describing the alleged coercion.

Syrian journalist Samira al-Masalmeh, who at the time served as managing editor of a private Syrian newspaper, told us that following news of the assassination, a clear state of confusion spread throughout Syrian media circles, reflected in delays in the initial coverage.

Within a short time, however, the media narrative settled around describing Hariri as a “martyr,” while directing accusations toward Israel as the primary beneficiary of his assassination.

“The media discourse at the time shifted toward directly confronting any political or media opinion that raised questions about possible Syrian responsibility or referred to tensions in the relationship between Damascus and Hariri. Responding to and refuting such opinions became a clear priority and an obligation. Headlines and editorial directions were communicated to us through the relevant authorities in newspapers, and the coverage took on a predominantly defensive and aggressive tone, portraying these views as political campaigns targeting Syria,” al-Masalmeh says.

An Inadequate Media Machine

It became clear that Syrian state media was not prepared for the scale of the moment. On September 11, 2005, the GID sent a memo to Bashar al-Assad titled: “Regarding Mehlis’ Mission and Its Potential Repercussions – Preliminary Political Ideas for the Required Media Plan.”

The “ideas” outlined in the document appeared to directly target Detlev Mehlis himself, describing him as someone who “tends to display a friendly attitude at first… only to later launch calculated strikes that combine the traits of personal success for a criminal investigator with a media blow.” The memo later emphasized that Mehlis “did not act with friendliness or understanding toward Syria.”

Journalist al-Masalmeh recalls: “On March 13, 2005, I was summoned, along with a lawyer, to one of the security branches. While waiting in the branch chief’s assistant’s office, I noticed a delegation in religious attire leaving the building. I was told they represented Hezbollah. Accompanying them was someone I personally knew, identified as ‘Y.N.,’ who later became a member of parliament.”

Al-Masalmeh later referred to a meeting organized by lawyer Imad al-Zoubi, who later served as Syria’s Minister of Information between 2012 and 2016, with Hossam Hossam, the main witness in the Rafik Hariri assassination case.

“During the meeting, I noticed that Hossam Hossam constantly threatened to escape. He had already retracted the testimony he had given before the International Commission more than three times in front of the lawyer, while the latter kept telling him to calm down. Hossam was in an intense state of anger and agitation, and he told me literally: ‘If I tell the truth, I will destroy the country.’”

Al-Masalmeh says that when al-Zoubi briefly left the room, she asked Hossam to tell her the truth. He replied: “If you knew it, you would die.”

On September 19, 2005, Ali Mamlouk’s office at the GID sent another cable to Bashar al-Assad concerning “confronting media challenges surrounding the work of the International Investigation Commission into Hariri’s assassination,” in preparation for Mehlis’ visit to Damascus and for creating “a parallel media operation capable of keeping pace with developments.”

The cable, reviewed by journalists working on this investigation, proposed a strategy for Syrian media to ensure that “Syrian sources become the primary source of news regarding the investigation.” Among the recommendations was relying on the “semi-official Syrian level,” including “media outlets known for their ties to Syria” as well as “indirect Arab and international media.”

The goal was to “present the Syrian political position,” highlight the “dimensions of the ongoing conspiracies,” and “avoid questioning the Commission or insulting witnesses.” One of the central features of the proposed “media discourse” was the emphasis on “Syria’s fears over the politicization of the investigation.”

On October 2, 2005, the Syrian GID sent another cable to President Bashar al-Assad informing him of a meeting Mamlouk held with “security liaison officers” from Russia, Algeria, Turkey, and Italy. The purpose, according to the document, was to deliver a message to those states that Syria was being subjected to a “malicious media campaign” and had “no connection whatsoever to Hariri’s assassination.”

The cable further stated that Syrian authorities had “cooperated with the International Investigation Commission” and pointed to evidence allegedly implicating “a deserter from the Syrian army living in Lebanon, involved in fraud and scams, and married to a Lebanese woman related to Lebanese MP Marwan Hamadeh,” referring to Mohammed Zuhair Siddiq.

Days later, Mehlis publicly declared that it was “difficult to imagine the assassination taking place without the knowledge of Syrian intelligence.” He added that “after a short hesitation, Syrian authorities cooperated only to a limited degree with the Commission, while some individuals interviewed by the Commission attempted to mislead the investigation by providing false or inaccurate information.”

According to the United Nations, Mehlis also stated that Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa had “provided incorrect information.”

Manufacturing Propaganda Through Intelligence Networks

In an effort to coordinate previous intelligence operations, control the official narrative, and manage the handling of suspects, the Syrian GID submitted a memo for Bashar al-Assad’s review. The document included a handwritten letter from H.M., a Syrian-Palestinian based in Lebanon who worked in cultural and political circles focused on anti-Zionist activism and who had previously met Bashar al-Assad, addressed to “His Excellency the Combatant General Ali Mamlouk.” The letter was later transformed into an official briefing memo presented to Assad on September 15, 2005.

The memo proposed producing a documentary film about Detlev Mehlis titled “The International Investigator,” in cooperation with a German publishing house and an independent British media organization. The 45-minute documentary, according to the proposal, could be completed in less than two weeks if approximately €20,000 were transferred to Berlin, where meetings would take place with some of the film’s participants. Additional accommodation costs, estimated at $5,000-$6,000, were listed separately from the production budget.

The documents include a detailed outline for the documentary’s scenario. Rather than functioning as an investigation or explanatory piece, the film was designed as a tool to reframe the assassination narrative within a broader map of enemies and allies.

According to one of the documents, the scenario presented to Mamlouk aimed to reconstruct the narrative to align with the logic of the Syrian security apparatus. It relied on foreign sources and intelligence-style storytelling to appear as a “neutral” attempt at presenting an alternative account. The film’s core objective was to undermine Mehlis’ investigative methods and question his “legal credibility,” using human rights reports that criticized his previous work and accused him of “leaking information” and “manipulating witness testimonies” in earlier investigations.

The documents also reveal how H.M. secured approval from a publishing house to promote the film. The same publisher had previously released a book on Hariri’s assassination, accusing the US and Israel of orchestrating the killing.

Days after H.M.’s letter, another memo was sent from General Intelligence to Bashar al-Assad regarding the documentary, in which S.T. assumed a separate role. According to the memo, S.T. traveled to Berlin, met with officials from the publishing house, and introduced himself as a member of H.M.’s organization. Once again, discussions focused on stripping Mehlis of credibility by revisiting previous cases he had handled.

We sent questions to both H.M. and S.T. regarding the appearance of their names in the documents and the roles they played during that period, but received no response by the time this investigation was published.

“Jund al-Sham” and the “Third Scenario”

On the day of the assassination, Al Jazeera Network broadcast a video recording of Ahmad Abu Adas, who appeared claiming responsibility for the attack on behalf of “The Group for Support and Jihad in Bilad al-Sham.” From that moment, suspicions began shifting toward Islamist extremist groups.

The recording, aired on February 14, 2005, just hours after Hariri’s assassination, carries a striking backstory.

In its response to the Investigation Commission, Al Jazeera stated that Ghassan Ben Jeddou, then head of the network’s Beirut bureau, received the tape after being contacted by an unidentified source. Later, the Lebanese newspaper As-Safir interviewed Abu Adas’ brother, Khaled, who said: “In appearance, it was my brother Ahmad. But in terms of the content, the expressions, and the tone of voice, he was someone unknown and strange to me, despite us living together in the same house.”

He added, “I am certain that my brother Ahmad was forced by an external power to read the statement through torture, coercion, or some other method. My brother Ahmad was very simple and peaceful, and easy to manipulate.”

On September 7, 2006, another memo from GID to the Syrian presidency documented the Investigation Commission’s request to meet 13 “wanted terrorist elements” whom Syrian intelligence had presented to the commission.

The memo explained that the Commission requested the meeting because it had no prior knowledge of those suspects, noting that “the information provided by Syrian authorities was new and extensive.”

In the same memo, Syrian officers denied knowing Ziad Ramadan, a friend of Ahmad Abu Adas, except through media reports, stating that it was the International Commission that had interrogated him. The memo also referred to the possibility of allowing the Commission to meet “Osama al-Shousha, detained by Political Security.”

Another notable detail was the suggestion that the committee might provide Syrian authorities with a copy of Ahmad Abu Adas’ video to determine “whether the discourse reflected in it genuinely represented Salafi rhetoric or was fabricated.”

What stands out in the comments is that they went beyond portraying Syria as an expert on jihadist groups. In fact, the GID stated:

“It became apparent that the Syrian officers were open to cooperation and that their behavior [was] spontaneous, responsible, and serious. Their answers did not appear to have been coordinated in advance (despite prior coordination and instructions).”

At the time, “Jund al-Sham” and several of its alleged members were mentioned in Mehlis’ report. The accusations increasingly shifted toward a radical Islamist organization. Syrian authorities arrested several individuals linked to the group, including Ziad Ramadan, whom Amnesty International urged Assad in 2009 to release. He was later sentenced to six years in prison in 2011.

The broader objective of these meetings appeared to be linking the assassination to extremist organizations. Syrian intelligence emphasized that the suspects named in the Commission’s report were known only by their aliases, such as “Mohammed Osama al-Shousha” and “Abu Muhjan (Ahmad al-Saadi),” while repeatedly stressing that Syria itself was fighting terrorism and that there were 13 suspects allegedly tied to al-Qaeda. Discussions also touched on Ahmad Abu Adas, whom Syrian intelligence claimed it did not know.

On July 13, 2006, following Mehlis’ resignation and the appointment of Serge Brammertz as his successor, another GID briefing memo to Bashar al-Assad documented a meeting between Brammertz and Syrian officials.

The Syrian delegation included Major General Deeb Zeitoun, Brigadier Zuhair Hamad, Brigadier Ali Makhlouf, and Colonel Munir Shalabi, while S.T. served as translator for the Syrian side.

The memo described the meeting as a “Syrian initiative to enrich cooperation,” particularly because “information concerning terrorist elements had been received from the Political Intelligence Branch.” The ultimate objective, according to the document, was to introduce a “third scenario” for the bombing of Hariri’s convoy, namely, the possibility that the attack had been carried out from the air.

Tracking the “Living Witness”

The Syrian regime did not stop at attempting to recruit witnesses and public figures with media and legal expertise to produce a documentary aimed at undermining the narrative and efforts of the international investigation into Hariri’s assassination. Rather, it operated with a security and intelligence mentality that extended for years after the assassination itself, all with the objective of distancing suspicion from the regime as the orchestrator of the killing.

On December 20, 2014, a man named Abdul Basit Bani Odeh appeared in a televised interview on Lebanon’s Al Jadeed TV channel during the program “Lel Nashr” (“For Publishing”). He was later described as the “Israeli witness” in the Hariri case.

During the live broadcast, Bani Odeh spoke about his activities, his work, and his alleged relationships with Syrian and Lebanese security and intelligence figures. He also claimed to possess sensitive photos and documents related to the case.

The Syrian security apparatus responded immediately by launching efforts to track him down.

On December 23, the “Technical Branch” of Syrian Air Force Intelligence, headed by Brigadier General Mouin Qassem, circulated information, photographs, and four screenshots taken directly from the Al Jadeed broadcast showing the witness’s face, along with a full audio recording of his interview.

These materials were attached to an internal intelligence memorandum distributed to 19 Syrian security branches. The witness’s image and voice were circulated on a CD for identification and tracking purposes.

More than two decades after Hariri’s assassination, a central question remains: why did the Syrian regime resort to these methods of confrontation? And why did it take upon itself the task of countering the global narrative accusing it of involvement in Hariri’s assassination?

What the documents and correspondence reveal is that the Syrian regime attempted to fight back through a form of “soft power,”  producing films and broadcasting them on television screens. It reflected a security-media mindset aimed at shaping perceptions and influencing public opinion, a pattern that would repeat itself throughout the years of the Syrian uprising until the regime’s fall in December 2024.

Put differently: why would the Syrian regime have sought to wage such an extensive campaign of confrontation if it had no role in the assassination?

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon ultimately concluded that Hezbollah operatives were behind the assassination. Yet the evidence reviewed in this investigation suggests that the former Syrian regime may have been entrusted with the task of managing the disinformation campaign surrounding the crime and its aftermath.

• Creative direction and visual design: Radwan Awad

The post “The Media is in a Coma.” How Ali Mamlouk Planned to Repel the International Investigation into Hariri’s Assassination appeared first on SIRAJ.

Credit: SIRAJ Chemicals used to make Captagon found inside an abandoned drug production facility in Douma, on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria.

Fighters from the new Syrian government forces uncover Captagon pills hidden inside an electrical power adapter in a facility used to produce Captagon under the previous regime of Bashar al-Assad in Douma, on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria.

Credit: Screenshot of a Facebook post by Syria’s Ministry of the Interior Syria’s Ministry of the Interior announced a Captagon seizure in Al Nabak, Syria, on June 27, 2025.

Credit: Ali Al Ibrahim/SIRAJ, Fighters from the new Syrian government forces inside a Captagon production facility in Douma, on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria.

Credit: Lebanese Army, Lebanese authorities dismantled a clandestine Captagon lab in Hermel, near the Syrian border, after seizing a truck in May 2025 loaded with drug-making equipment.

The post Captagon Drug Networks Adapt and Survive in Middle East After Assad’s Fall appeared first on SIRAJ.

Our investigation exposes the extent of an international network fuelling a multi-billion-dollar drug industry stretching from the port of Nhava Sheva in India, via Beirut, to a mysterious, long fortified mansion in the Damascus Suburb. The whole network was masterminded by the Assad’s regime Syrian army’s Fourth Division, under the command of Maher al-Assad, using official pharmaceutical cover.

Businessman and former MP Amer Tayseer Kheiti took over an old potato chip factory in the city of Douma, in the Damascus suburbs, and turned it into a well-guarded drug production facility under the supervision of the Fourth Division.

The chemicals found in the Captagon factories had come from India, China, Germany, and Britain.

In 2021, Indian authorities recorded the export to Syria of 400 drums of diphenhydramine, a pharmaceutical compound used as an antihistamine. The listed recipient for the shipment was a company called Future Pharmaceuticals. The point of arrival was given as Beirut port, from where it was transported by road to the Damascus suburb. There, the shipment arrived at the warehouse of the official Syrian importer: the chemical company Eyad Laham and Partner, based in the Damascus suburb.

All the official documents were there: approvals from the ministries of health, economy and customs, and a shipping route that appeared legal and gave no grounds for suspicion.

But behind this bureaucratic façade, a completely different operation had been put together by people involved in the Captagon industry.

On December 8 2024, these same drums of diphenhydramine came to light at a secret Captagon making facility housed in a mansion on the outskirts of Damascus that was under the control of the Syrian army’s Fourth Division, commanded by Maher al-Assad, brother of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This plant was not licensed, and the fact that the drums were there was no coincidence.

Photos from inside one of the Captagon production factories, which the investigation team visited

That day brought to light a hidden network that had been quietly operating for more than a decade, protected by the walls of a mansion shrouded in secrecy for 13 years.

The mansion sits between the towns of Yafour and Dimmas in a strategic area west of Damascus, on the international highway between Beirut, Damascus and the Damascus suburb area, and had for years been the preserve of the Fourth Division.

With the end of the Assad family’s rule in Syria, local people were finally able to see behind the gilded iron gates and marble walls of this mansion and discover its secrets.

We are now inside Syria’s largest Captagon factory

This investigation charts the global supply chains that fuelled the Captagon industry in Syria, which had one of the fastest-growing synthetic drug economies in the world. Captagon, a powerful amphetamine, not only drove a regional addiction crisis, but also became a financial lifeline for sanctioned elements of the Assad regime, for the Lebanese Hezbollah militia, and for their networks across the Levant.

A study by the Center for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR) shows that Syria became a global hub for the production of Captagon and reached an unprecedented level of sophistication in drug manufacture during the Assad regime, thanks to its large-scale production and export of Captagon. The value of the Captagon trade outstripped the country’s legal exports many times over, making it an economic lifeline for the former Syrian regime and its allies.

The Captagon Room

Walking past piles of bags and hundreds of drums filled with various raw materials, ARIJ’s investigation team – working alongside journalists from the Syrian Investigative Reporting for Accountability Journalism Association (Siraj) – was able to examine the contents of one of the palace’s spacious ground floor rooms. They found black bags and large blue and black containers which were stamped with numbers, barcodes and coding strings, which made it possible to track them from their country of origin to the final importer.

An image from the database documenting the raw materials found inside the Captagon factories belonging to the Fourth Division in Damascus.

We established that ten essential chemicals had been imported from factories in China, India, Malaysia, Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom. One particular shipment contained diphenhydramine. This is a substance used in making counterfeit Captagon tablets, many of which have been seized in Europe.

A shipment of drugs, labelled as “perfumes and cosmetics” in the shipping document, was sent from a pharmaceutical factory in the Indian state of Gujarat to a Lebanese company in the western Bekaa. This document, bearing the signature of the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) – one of the world’s largest shipping companies, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland – appears normal. It shows the name of the shipper, the recipient, and the contents of the container, listed as “cosmetics”.

The Lebanese company involved was the local branch of the Syrian-owned Mak Overseas Shipping & Clearance. It is based in the town of Al-Rafid, near the Lebanon-Syria border, and owned by a Lebanese national and two Syrian partners.

What the details of the shipping documents fail to mention is that the main ingredient of the consignment (diphenhydramine) is one of the components used in the manufacture of Captagon tablets. When it arrived in Lebanon, the shipment did not go to a shop or perfume factory, but was instead sent on to Syria. There, secret workshops controlled by the Fourth Division in areas like Douma have been actively producing hundreds of thousands of tablets for export to the Gulf and Europe.

From database searches and contacts with the Lebanese authorities, we found that this shipment had transited through Lebanon to Syria under an import licence from the Syrian Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade – and with the approval of the Environment Directorate in Damascus Suburb,  and the former minister of economy – for use in the manufacture of medicines.

According to documents obtained by our team of investigators, the material was shipped by Mak Overseas from the Alcon Biosciences plant in India via the port of Nhava Sheva to the Logistic Free Zone Beirut port. It was then transported by land to Tripoli and from there to Jdeidet Yabous in the Damascus Suburb.

After the consignment entered Syria, it was stored in a warehouse belonging to chemical company Eyad Laham and Partner in Jdeidet Artouz in the Damascus Suburb area, before being sold on to Future Pharmaceuticals in Aleppo, according to the import licence No. 21020101.

A recurring pattern of financial irregularities and smuggling

Shipping documents list 400 barrels of diphenhydramine with a total weight of ten tonnes and a value of US$20,000 along with official approvals for their use in the manufacture of medicines.

Shipping and receipt of the shipment

Bill of lading

Lebanese transit statement

Syrian clearance documents

Receipt from Future Pharmaceuticals

It is important to note that the owner of Future Pharmaceuticals, Omar Farouk Barakat, has a criminal record for smuggling, according to an official decision issued by the Syrian Ministry of Finance.

Official records show a long history of financial and legal violations linked to Barakat and his company. On December 16 2014, his movable and immovable assets were provisionally impounded under case No. 21/2014 of the Third Anti-Narcotics Unit, for smuggling imported goods worth 78,453,500 Syrian pounds. He faced a maximum fine of 627,628,000 Syrian pounds. This seizure of assets was temporarily lifted on May 17 2015, after the legal grounds for it lapsed.

However, on 4 February 2016, a new financial seizure was imposed on the Future Pharmaceuticals plant in Kafr Dael-Mansoura and its legal representative Omar Barakat, under case No. 4/2015. This covered smuggling of imported goods not exempt from seizure with a value of 20,510,637 Syrian pounds, a charge carrying a maximum fine of 102,553,185 Syrian pounds.

On September 7 2020, a third seizure of assets was ordered on Barakat and on any assets held by his wife, under case No. 42/2020 run by the same authority (Third Anti-Narcotics Unit). This time the charge was illicit import and export of goods exempt from seizure (translator’s note: should be not exempt?), worth 502,856,725 Syrian pounds, which carried a maximum fine of 3,787,493,300 Syrian pounds.

Finally, Omar Farouk Barakat’s name reappears in the Syrian Official Gazette on July 25 2024, in connection with another financial seizure. This all reflects a clear pattern of repeated violations and links to cases of smuggling and tax evasion over at least ten years.

Despite this track record, Barakat’s Future Pharmaceuticals plant obtained the necessary approval to import large quantities of diphenhydramine under official import licence no. 210201014715. We found some of this substance at a Captagon manufacturing facility, allegedly controlled by the Fourth Division.

Syrian Official Gazette entry on seizure of assets from the owner of the Future Pharmaceuticals plant.

Our investigation team consulted three pharmaceutical industry experts – two pharmacists and a drug factory production manager – and shared with them details of the shipment the roughly 400 drums (around ten tonnes) of diphenhydramine, imported by the Future Pharmaceutical factory in Syria.

All three experts agreed that the quantity of diphenhydramine imported had “no pharmaceutical justification” and was inappropriate for the needs of any licensed drug factory, even if the substance was used across a variety of treatments, such as creams, syrups and tablets.

Aya Al-Oran, a pharmacist with a master’s degree in pharmaceutical technology from Anadolu University in Turkey, explains that this amount of imported diphenhydramine (about ten tonnes of raw material) was so large that it would be difficult to justify for any pharmaceutical use.

According to Al-Oran, the amount of diphenhydramine was enough to produce in theory around ten million boxes of medicine at the maximum dose (50 milligrams), or up to 25 million boxes at the less common 12.5 milligram dose. She adds: “To handle such huge quantities would need a plant with a production capacity of around 7,000 boxes, which is way more than most local drug factories could manage, without a large distribution or export network.”

“The limited shelf life of the active ingredient, especially when it’s in a highly perishable form like syrup, means it may need to be used within just two years. This reinforces the hypothesis that these large quantities were intended for some purpose other than normal medicinal use,” says Al-Oran.

Arafat Tayawi, production manager at a drug factory in Hama province, agrees that it is impossible that any licensed factory would need such quantities for purely medicinal use.

Ayman Khosraf is a pharmacist specialising in laboratory diagnostics and a researcher in biotechnology at Gaziantep University in Turkey. He says that 400 drums (ten tonnes) of imported diphenhydramine is far in excess of what any normal medicinal drug laboratory would need.

He goes on to explain, however, that that the economic and security environment within which the pharmaceutical industry in Syria operated during the war years made it difficult for local companies to completely ensure the tracking of shipments or to control their end use.

“The prevailing security environment forced many drug firms to yield to powerful networks, either through direct pressure or the use of front companies that were given licenses to import materials which were then diverted into making narcotics. In such an environment, the license holder is not always the real decision maker,” says Khosraf.

A former worker at a Captagon manufacturing plant in Damascus revealed exclusively to our investigation team that the essential chemicals would arrive in Lebanon with legal commercial documents that classified them as cosmetics, food supplements or medicines. Then they would be taken across the border to secret production facilities run by people close to the Assad family.

“No one asked any questions,” he says. “The paperwork was all in order, and the shipments went through as if they were for making ordinary medicines. It wasn’t just a one-off. This was an organised system designed to keep the vital supply chains running for making Captagon, despite the international sanctions that the Assad regime and its institutions linked to chemical production were under at the time.”

In the spring of 2024, a World Bank report estimated that the Captagon market in Syria was worth between $1.9 billion and $5.6 billion a year, not far short of Syria’s total GDP for 2023. The report stated that “entities linked to Syria” had profited from the various stages of the Captagon trade, from production to distribution. It estimated annual revenues at between $0.6 billion and $1.9 billion.

In its response to questions from our investigation team, the interior ministry of the current Syrian government said that “those who ran the narcotics networks in Syria were the leading figures in Assad’s regime and worked under his direct supervision.” The ministry said that some of those involved had fled after the fall of the regime, while the rest were being tracked down inside the country.

Inside the mansion, a production line had been set up amid the scattered drums labelled as containing diphenhydramine. Dozens more such drums, all of them from the same Indian factory, were to be found in the warehouse,.

The production section in the mansion used to make Captagon tablets – exclusive

It was somewhat surprising to find diphenhydramine in a plant making Captagon, since this substance has a sedative effect, causing drowsiness and possibly dizziness, dryness of the mouth and eyes, blurred vision and raised heart rate.

According to Dr Nicola Lee, a researcher at the National Drug Research Institute at Curtin University in the US (translator’s note: Curtin University’s NDRI is located in Perth, Australia, not the US) diphenhydramine has an opposite effect to that of the stimulant Captagon. She adds that the manufacture of fake Captagon is not well regulated, making it even more dangerous.

The use of diphenhydramine in the manufacture of fake Captagon from Syria came as no surprise, however, to other researchers and law enforcement authorities. The US Centre for Forensic Science Research and Education (CFSRE) points out that this and other materials go into making counterfeit Captagon, according to research conducted in collaboration with the Forensic Laboratories Department of the Public Security Directorate in the Jordanian capital, Amman.

According to the CFSRE, mixing together sedatives and stimulants does not cancel out their effects, but instead brings about a state of complex agitation in the user. It engenders a feeling of excitement and euphoria but also slow or confused thinking, impaired decision-making and increased impulsive behaviour.

Diphenhydramine was used in the manufacture of a consignment of counterfeit Captagon tablets from Syria seized in Romania in 2020. The German authorities also reported that diphenhydramine was found in some consignments of Captagon, according to a report by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction in 2023.

Laurent Laniel, a researcher on crime and drugs at the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA), says that forensic analysis of seized Captagon tablets carried out by several EU countries revealed the presence of diphenhydramine in many of the samples. The main active ingredient detected, however, was amphetamine.

Being an illegal substance, amphetamine is expensive to make or purchase from illegal sources, Laniel adds. That is why cheaper and more readily available substances – like caffeine, theophylline and diphenhydramine – are often used in the manufacture of Captagon tablets.

From India to Beirut

About a year after the Captagon seizure in Romania, a consignment of diphenhydramine arrived at Beirut port from India.

According to the labels on the drums, the Indian company Alcon Biosciences Private Limited, which manufactured the diphenhydramine in early 2021, shipped 400 drums of it through Beirut port to a company called Mak Overseas Shipping & Clearance.

One of the barrels of diphenhydramine found in the unlicensed factory

Caroline Rose, director of the Crime-Conflict Nexus and Military Withdrawals Portfolio at the New Lines Institute, says that China and India are main centres for the production of dual-use raw materials. These are chemicals that can be used to manufacture synthetic drugs, but which are not listed by the International Narcotics Control Board. This means they are not subject to any security or legal controls.

Rose adds that the lack of any legal restriction on the trade in dual-use raw materials, coupled with easy trading routes with China and India, may be offering Syrian Captagon producers a golden opportunity to continue their activities.

The Ministry of Interior states that “shipments of raw materials and equipment used in the manufacturing process would enter Syria illegally or be classified as pharmaceutical manufacturing machinery.” It explains that “organisations supplying the country with logistical materials are criminal organisations and networks, and we are coordinating with several other countries to dismantle them.”

Responding to questions from the investigation team, the Lebanese General Directorate of Customs said “it appears that a consignment of diphenhydramine entered through the free zone in the port of Beirut and was transited on to Syria, in accordance with legal procedures and official documents. It has been established that the Syrian importing company was duly licensed and had obtained an import permit for this consignment from the Syrian Ministry of Economy and Trade, with the approval of both the Directorate of Environment in the Damascus Suburb and the Minister of Economy for use in the manufacture of medicines.”

But, though the shipment was exported for legitimate purposes, many of the drums of diphenhydramine ended up in an illegal Captagon plant in the Damascus suburb, the same area where approvals for the imported shipment had been issued.

The company responsible for the shipping and logistics denied any knowledge of what had happened to the consignment. In a written response dated June 25 2025, Mak Overseas Shipping & Clearance wrote that its role was limited to providing “logistical services.” It said the shipment of diphenhydramine was sent to Syria “legally”, with official authorisation, including a licence issued by the Syrian Ministry of Health.

The company went on to say it delivered the drums “to a well-known pharmaceutical plant” in Damascus and that it was not responsible for what happened subsequently, emphasising that material was “not subject to control” and was not listed as a banned substance.

The company said it did not know how the shipment had ended up in a secret factory rumoured to be run by a company directly linked to the Fourth Division, commanded by the ex president’s brother, Maher al-Assad.

According to documents obtained by the investigation team, the consignment of diphenhydramine left the port of Beirut on October 25 2021, and passed through Tripoli to the Eyad Laham warehouse in the Damascus suburb, before being sent on to the Future Pharmaceutical factory in Aleppo.

Future Pharmaceuticals failed to answer our questions over whether it had taken delivery of the shipment of diphenhydramine or how dozens of drums from it had ended up in a mansion in the Damascus Suburb used for manufacturing Captagon.

We were unable to find any registered address for the Eyad Laham and Partner company in the Damascus Suburb. When we called the number given in the Lebanese customs clearance documents as that of the company receiving the shipment, it turned out that the number was that of the shipping company, Mak Overseas. The investigation team also contacted five pharmacies in the Jdeidet Artouz area, the most likely location for the company. But all of them said they had no knowledge of it and had never had dealings with it.

Transport via Lebanon

Caroline Rose, from the New Lines Institute, who has conducted extensive research into the Captagon trade in Syria, thinks that using Lebanese ports, like Beirut, to import raw materials for making Captagon is a way of averting suspicion, given the distrust surrounding those circles loyal to the former regime in Syria. She argues that transporting raw materials through Lebanon instead of exporting them directly to Syria may be an attempt to conceal the illegal production and trading of Captagon inside Syria and to maintain the fiction that Syria is merely a transit hub and not a manufacturing country.

A former production manager at a Syrian pharmaceutical company revealed that the raw materials used in the manufacture of Captagon, such as phenylacetone and phenylacetic acid, arrive in Lebanon in shipments from countries like Iran, China and India and are then driven into Syria. These materials are listed as ingredients for making pharmaceuticals or cleaning products, which makes it easier to take them across borders without arousing suspicion.

We found more information about how the ingredients used to make Captagon pass between Syria and Lebanon from the file the Lebanese Internal Security Forces have on Hassan Daqqou, the so-called “Captagon King” and others charged with trafficking and smuggling Captagon.

This case file, which runs to over 500 pages, shows that one of the accused had been smuggling chemicals used to make Captagon – like caffeine, lactose and paracetamol – between Syria and Lebanon since 2013.

Infographic here

Caption: Route of diphenhydramine shipment from India to Damascus suburb

The investigation file showed that the suspect also acted as an intermediary between Daqqou (who was living in Beirut) and customers in Syria who required oil for use in making Captagon.

The investigating authorities (the information division of the Internal Security Forces) also found a conversation on Hassan Daqqou’s phone in which he had asked one of the suspected drug traffickers and manufacturers to obtain some ephedrine, used in the manufacture of Captagon. In 2014, a deal was concluded to purchase eight sacks (large bags for carrying bulk materials like chemicals) of caustic soda and ammonium bicarbonate, both substances “suspected of being used in the manufacture of Captagon.” Daqqou, however, denied knowing anything about these phone messages.

Daqqou was reported as saying he has been part of the Syrian Fourth Division security team since 2014, and used to enter Syria from Lebanon in Hezbollah convoys.

Daqqou was put on the US sanctions list in 2023 for his involvement in “drug smuggling operations by the Syrian army’s Fourth Division, commanded by Maher al-Assad, under Hezbollah cover.”

The Fourth Division and the Captagon industry

After the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in March 2011 ,and the Syrian regime’s violent response, the European Union imposed a range of sanctions on Syria covering 23 sectors.

Despite the ban on sale of products used in the oil, electricity and other sectors, which the former regime could have used in the violent clampdown on civilians, some of the raw materials used in the manufacture of Captagon remained exempt from sanctions. This was due in part to the fact that some of these materials are used also in the manufacture of pharmaceuticals.

A statement by the UK government in 2023, estimated that 80 per cent of the world’s Captagon was made in Syria. And independent experts have put the value of the Captagon trade in Syria at $57 billion.

In August 2011, the US issued Executive Order 13582, imposing sanctions on the former Syrian regime. By 2019, the US administration had enacted the Caesar Act, which imposes secondary sanctions on anyone proved to have knowingly provided significant support to the Syrian government.

The US administration set out to punish anyone involved in the Captagon industry, pointing out that proceeds from the “illicit Captagon trade have become a major source of income for the Assad regime, the Syrian armed forces, and paramilitary forces in Syria.”

The US Treasury Department repeatedly linked the Fourth Division to illicit trade, particularly that involving Captagon, saying: “Maher al-Assad and the Fourth Division are known to run numerous illicit revenue streams, ranging from cigarette and mobile phone smuggling, to facilitating the production and smuggling of Captagon.”

Syria’s interior ministry has revealed that its investigations have led to “the seizure of over ten major factories and smaller workshops since the fall of the regime” and that they were “mostly located in areas controlled by the Fourth Division.”

The factory in the Damascus Suburb and the Fourth Division

After the fall of the Assad regime, video clips circulated on social media showing people from villages along the Damascus and Lebanon highway entering the mansion where we found the shipment of diphenhydramine. There they found rooms crammed with drums, large sacks and thick plastic bags filled with bulk raw materials as well as scales and mixers, while out in the courtyard were forklifts and packing machines.

Those posting the videos linked the factory to Maher al-Assad’s Fourth Division.

Mohammed Arsali, who lives in the Dimmas area in the Damascus Suburb, says the mansion was controlled by Fourth Division’s security office, headed by Bassim Fawzi Deeb, and that security barriers lined the main road leading to it.

Arsali goes on to say that, after discovering what had gone on inside the mansion, they summoned a local dignitary, who decided to burn the drugs, while the contents of the factory remained under heavy guard.

Another local resident, Shadi Sohoud, said that the whole area up to three kilometres around the mansion was full of luxury houses, owned by Syrians and other nationalities. He said that, from 2012, the security forces of the former regime had controlled the area, while the road to it had been under tight security from the Fourth Division.

Arsali reports that trucks would drive to and from the luxury house along the road to this area without local people knowing what they were carrying.

Testimony from local residents also indicates that huge trucks had used this road for years without anyone knowing what was inside them. Several accounts confirm that Bassim Fawzi Deeb, who was a major in Dimmas before being promoted to colonel, subsequently took charge of the security office adjacent to the mansion. Witness said that no truck could enter or move except on his direct orders.

In response to our questions, the Syrian Ministry of Interior said that “most of the major Captagon manufacturing plants seized after the fall of the regime came under the Fourth Division and were concentrated in border areas and along the Syrian coast.”

A soap factory… brainwashing

Our investigation team documented the presence of raw materials used in the manufacture of counterfeit Captagon in another factory, on a hill overlooking a main road west of Damascus, a place also under the control of the Fourth Division.

Inside vast, unlit warehouses on abandoned land in the city of Douma, our team spotted thousands of narcotics concealed inside pieces of furniture, artificial fruit, coloured gravel and even electrical voltage stabilisers. These impounded materials had been stacked on wooden pallets, ready to be loaded onto a truck outside.

The huge building, surrounded by high walls, had originally been a factory for producing potato crisps, but was later turned into a plant for making narcotics, well-fortified and under tight security.

After the fall of the Syrian regime, the factory was opened up to local residents for the first time in years. One of them, Abu Ahmad, a man in his sixties who recently returned to his land next to the factory, said: “We all knew this factory belonged to the Fourth Division and was under Maher al-Assad’s control. No one would dare go near it. We used to watch these lorries and huge refrigerated trucks carrying stuff at night. If they headed south, we knew they were on their way to Jordan or the Gulf, and if they went north, they were going towards the sea.”

The factory stands between two hills and can be seen at night from the centre of Douma. It was run by Amer Tayseer Kheiti, a well-known businessman and former member of the Syrian parliament, who was sanctioned by the US in 2020, over his ties to the Assad regime. The UK also imposed sanctions on him, because he owned multiple companies in Syria “which facilitate the production and smuggling of drugs, including Captagon.”

Known to be one of the financial fronts of the Fourth Division, Kheiti fled the country after the regime fell. He had set up the factory in 2017, employing both military personnel and pharmacists affiliated with the Fourth Division to run its production lines.

The factory site

Mohammed Fares al-Toot, the original owner of the factory, told the investigation team: “My brothers and I owned this place, as well as a number of plants specialising in food and canned goods. This was the biggest factory in Syria and maybe the whole Middle east for potato crisps.”

The plant was taken over in 2018, he said. “Amid all the chaos in Syria, Amer Tayseer Kheiti took over the factory. He was an agent for Maher al-Assad and Ghassan Bilal, of the Fourth Division.”

He said that it had been badly damaged: “There were more than 160 production lines at the plant … everything was looted, stolen.”

Our investigation team managed to gain entry to the site after the fall of the regime and found large quantities of chemicals, including chloroform, formaldehyde, hydrochloric acid, petroleum ether and ethyl acetate. They were stored in brown boxes bearing the logo of a major UK chemical company.

Inside the Captagon manufacturing plant in Douma – which had been under the control of the Fourth Division, commanded by Maher al-Assad – the team found boxes of xylene, a pure chemical usually used as a laboratory solvent and classified as harmful to health under European safety standards.

Xylene is sometimes used as a solvent in the manufacture of amphetamine, the main active ingredient in Captagon, particularly when it is made using irregular production lines relying on cheap, readily available chemicals.

The 2.5 litre containers found inside the laboratory carried the name of Surechem Products Ltd, a British company based in Suffolk, England. The labels on them  showed the production batch number 16448/3a and an expiry date of November 2015.

Documents show that the shipment was imported into Syria to a company called Manqiz Habbal and Brothers, based on Al-Alamein Street in Hama, through a distributor called Arwani Trading.

In one of the rooms, we found hundreds of business cards in the name Amer Tayseer Kheiti, clearly showing that he had directly overseen the operations at the plant and its conversion into what residents called a “brainwashing factory.”

Abu Ahmad was not the only witness to what had been going on there. Another man from Douma, whose right leg showed signs of torture, broke in saying he had been detained by the Fourth Division: “Their men would come and go from the factory in black cars, some without licence plates. They stopped me going into the quarry next door and told me not to come back to that area. They did the same to many farmers.”

Lighting up a cigarette, he points to the hills behind, where the factory building is clearly visible: “They told us it was a soap making plant…but when it started up, we realised it was really a brainwashing factory.”

This investigation was carried out with the support of ARIJ.

The post Syria’s Captagon Empire.. From factories in Europe and India to the Fourth Division’s laboratories in Syria appeared first on SIRAJ.

On a rainy Wednesday, last year in September, a 188-metre-long container ship came to the port of Antwerp. The fourteen-year-old ship named Shiba sails under the flag of Iran. It was given berths in the port of Antwerp in the Churchill Terminal and the ABES terminal of Katoen Natie. All by the book.

But a month earlier, the Shiba showed a very suspicious travel pattern when passing through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. The ship departed Iran on 23 July, anchored in the Suez Canal on 9 August and arrived at its destination in Syria on 12 August. Between 2 and 5 August, it floated around seemingly aimlessly in the Gulf of Aden. Western security services had also noticed this, which see no logical, economic explanation for this. Every day of delay costs the shipowner money, so why all the delay?

In the same period, on August 3, the Yemeni Houthi rebels fired a missile at the Greek container ship Groton that was sailing in the Gulf of Aden at the time. To avoid such terror attacks and stay under the radar, Western ships switch off their automatic identification system (AIS) in that area. But the Houthi rebels are getting help from Iran for their attacks. The Iranian ship Shiba is suspected of having signaled the passing Western ship to the Houthis.

In January last year, a similar scenario took place. At that time, the Shiba was also hanging around there when the Houthis fired a missile at the dry bulk carrier Gibraltar Eagle on January 15.

And in March last year, it happened again, after the Shiba had left our country on February 25 and before the ship was back in Iran on March 13. In that interim period, the Shiba once again sailed through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, while the Houthis attacked the Propel Fortune with drones on March 8.

Such hidden Iranian aid to the Houthis is burning topical. In recent weeks, the rebels continued to target American targets, after which US President Donald Trump declared last week that he wants to eradicate the Houthis. Trump called on Iran to immediately stop all support to the rebels.

In addition to the Shiba, five other Iranian ships appear to have used their commercial traffic with the port of Antwerp as a cover for shady practices. The other ships are named Artam, Artenos, Azargoun, Daisy and Kashan. They are all large container ships that are 187 to more than 220 meters long and sail under the flag of Iran.

De Tijd started monitoring the shipping routes of the six suspected Iranian ships in September last year and mapped them on the basis of ship databases. We spoke with those involved in the ports and with security services in various countries. We also collected documents such as inspection reports and received help from fellow journalists from Syria in recent months (SIRAJ), Iran (Zamaneh), Germany (Paper Trail Media), Netherlands (Follow the Money) and the collectiveOCCRP. This research by De Tijd will therefore be published in English, Arabic and Farsi (the official language of Iran).

Weapons for Hezbollah

The shady practices of the Iranian ships do not appear to be limited to espionage for the benefit of the Houthis. According to Western and Israeli security services, they also made arms deliveries on their way to Antwerp at stopovers in Syria and Russia. It would mainly concern transports of parts to make weapons, rather than finished products, as well as of ammunition and dual-use goods that can be used for both civilian and military purposes. From Syria, the ammunition, weapons and parts would also have been transported to the radical Lebanese movement Hezbollah.

Our investigation into the traffic data confirms that the six Iranian ships have been going to Syria alternately and almost every month on their commercial route to Antwerp in recent years. This happened at least 27 times in 28 months (between June 2022 and October last year).

The six Iranian ships almost always followed the same route. That started after a long stay in Iran, often in Bandar Abbas, the country’s largest port controlled by the Iranian regime. From there, the ships set sail via the Suez Canal, usually without a stopover, to the main Syrian seaport in Latakia.

After one to three days in the Syrian port, the Iranian ships sailed on to Antwerp and other European ports in Italy (Ravenna), Spain (Valencia and Bilbao) and Romania (Constanta). The passage in Antwerp was often the last stop on the route and it usually took the longest. Then the ships returned to Iran.

What also makes the sailings suspicious: not all stopovers in Syria can be traced in the international shipping data on port visits and anchorages and berths, which the security services also use. We discovered at least one so-called dark port call, a stopover that has not been officially reported.

Our fellow journalists in Syria obtained confidential documents from the general intelligence service of the now fallen dictator Bashar al-Assad. They contain information about ships that came to Syrian ports between 2021 and 2024, including those from Latakia. Such a document shows that the Shiba visited the port of Latakia in May last year, which is not reflected in the official sailing records about that ship.

And the Iranian ships did not only make suspicious stopovers in Syria. On their way to Antwerp, the Azargoun and Artam also visited the Russian port of Novorossiysk. That happened in January and February 2023, about a year after Russia invaded Ukraine. In addition, the ship Artenos went to Venezuela in February and March 2023, also an alleged buyer of military systems from Iran. The ship also passed through Kenya and Tanzania, where Iran would also supply weapons.

Container numbers

The Belgian security services tried to catch the Iranian ships last year, De Tijd learned. This happened when the 207-metre-long container ship Azargoun entered the port of Antwerp on 30 June last year. Our security services had received exceptionally precise data from the Americans, even with the numbers of the containers in which the arms transports had taken place. But a thorough inspection, including of the crew’s cabins, found nothing at all. Not even remnants or any evidence that there were weapons or weapon parts on board before.

It illustrates how our security services have had to watch with dismay in recent years how the traffic to Antwerp was used for the anti-Western maneuvers of the Iranian regime. The alleged arms deliveries took place each time before the vessels behaved like legitimate merchant ships in European ports. When they came here to pick up goods, they were not even dual-use cargoes. So the ships have never been caught in Antwerp.

The issue was followed up by the Belgian Maritime Information Crossroads (MIK) and discussed with other countries in the North Sea and Channel Maritime Information Group (NSCMIG).

The Iranian ships also passed on information to Iran when they encountered military ships here. For example, the Daisy has already been spotted in Belgian waters when a military exercise with minehunters was underway.

Solemnly welcomed

Things may change. In March 2016, the Azargoun was the very first Iranian ship to be allowed to return to Antwerp after the EU had concluded a nuclear agreement with Iran and the sanctions had been lifted. The Azargoun was solemnly welcomed in the Deurganck dock by an official delegation led by the Antwerp port aldermen, eager to re-establish decades-old ties with Iran. Because until sanctions were introduced in 2010, Antwerp was the most important European destination for cargo from Iran.

Our investigation shows that the Azargoun came to the port of Antwerp seven times in the past three years and stopped six times in the Syrian port of Latakia along the way.

After a stop in the Russian port of Novorossiysk, the Azargoun was subjected to a purely technical inspection here in March 2023 at most. In the process, the inspectors discovered 37 defects, 16 of which were sufficiently heavy to hold the ship until everything was repaired. Among other things, the fire doors, fire extinguishing system and fire dampers were defective, the speed and distance indicator did not work, as did the oil filters and the emergency generator. But after 24 days, the Azargoun was released again and was able to continue its activities.

The crews of the Iranian ships also arouse suspicion. We learned that the ships are also accompanied by members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, who pretend to be different. “They do this to circumvent the sanctions and to spy in European ports,” it sounds. Our security services also heard this, but could not prove that the ships here had members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards on board incognito.

The confidential Syrian documents that our colleagues in Damascus found in the former headquarters of Assad’s general intelligence service contain the names, nationalities, dates of birth, passport details and functions of the varying 27 to 28 crew members of the Iranian ships Azargoun, Daisy, Kashan and Shiba when they visited the Syrian port. In addition to a handful of Indians, the changing crews, ranging from the captain to the cook, appear to consist only of Iranians.

An initial screening of the lists of names shows that there are at least some remarkable profiles among them. In addition to many crew members who are linked to the Iranian state-owned shipping company Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), there are also those who are not known as seafarers at all but officially have completely different, non-shipping-related jobs. There is also an Iranian officer who has a track record as an investigator in the General Inspection Department of the Iranian Law Enforcement Force.

Katoen Natie: ‘As a terminal, we don’t choose the ship’

‘The terminal follow the regulations, we don’t choose the ship,” says Patrik Naenen, business unit manager at Katoen Natie’s ABES terminal that received the Iranian ship Shiba. ‘It is the port authority that determines which ships are admitted and it follows the rules imposed by Europe.’

‘So if a ship is sanctioned, it won’t come. If it is not sanctioned, it can be booked by a forwarder, who then assigns the ship to a terminal to do the loading and unloading operations. The forwarder makes contracts with the terminals in the ports, which determine the pricing, and on that basis he decides where to send a particular ship with its cargo. That choice will be determined by the price, but sometimes also by technical or nautical aspects, such as the draught.’

‘It is also important to understand that it is not because an Iranian ship is coming, that you are doing business with an Iranian company. The ship is only the vehicle, the cargo is another matter. Katoen Natie is clear about this: we will not work with an Iranian company to set up a certain export flow. This is something else: we just carry out an operation on behalf of a forwarder.’

‘As a terminal, you don’t necessarily have a view of the cargo. If it is bulk, it is of course loose goods and then you can see what goes on or off the ship, and there are also documents that state which category of goods it is, but we do not do the check, it is customs that checks the goods.’

The owner of the Churchill Terminal on the right bank of the port of Antwerp, where the six Iranian ships came most often, refused to answer our questions. The terminal with a total surface area of 27 hectares and 70,000 square meters of storage capacity is owned by the Belgian group Nova Natie. CEO Maarten Geerardyn: ‘We are absolutely not going to respond to that.’

Front company

Officially, the Iranian container ships are owned by the Iranian company Hafez Darya Arya Shipping (HDS). But that would only be a front company of the Iranian state shipping company IRISL, which is known for providing logistical support to the Iranian army. The sanctions against Iran have caused dozens of ‘independent private companies’ to emerge in the Iranian shipping industry, but in reality they still operate under the umbrella of IRISL and used to be integral departments of it.

IRISL had already been sanctioned by the US and on November 18 last year, the state-owned shipping company also ended up on the EU sanctions list. The Council of the EU then expanded its sanctions against Iran for its support – with missiles and drones – of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Neither IRISL nor HDS answered our questions, but a German shipping agent who has been working with HDS since 2018 did. The German agent sees no problems with this cooperation and emphasizes that he only acted for HDS, never for IRISL. ‘Because there were no sanctions against HDS in the EU – and there still are none today – we thought it safe to operate as a line agent and ship broker for HDS within the EU. We are not aware that IRISL is the ultimate owner of the ships.’

Nevertheless, the Germans have now suspended cooperation with HDS ‘purely as a precautionary measure’, because according to them the sanctions against IRISL are ‘broad and vaguely formulated’. The EU sanctioning of IRISL has therefore suspended the visits of the six Iranian ships to the port of Antwerp until further notice.

The German agent said he did not know what goods the Iranian ships loaded and unloaded in the ports in Syria and Russia. ‘That falls outside the scope of our contractual obligations.’ The Germans say they only know about the innocent goods that were imported and exported here in Antwerp. ‘Typical imports on HDS ships are polyethylene for packaging, used cooking oil for the biofuel sector, ceramic products such as tiles and foodstuffs such as pistachios. Exports from Antwerp to Iran are new machines, including for the beverage industry, used industrial equipment such as car parts, textile processing machines and insulation materials.’

All Iranian weapons intercepted en route to Houthis

Between May 2021 and January 2023, the US authorities already intercepted a mass weapon of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards destined for Yemen. This happened during routine maritime security operations in and around the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. It involved more than 9,000 rifles, 284 machine guns, 194 rocket launchers, more than 70 anti-tank missiles and more than 700,000 pieces of ammunition. The French navy was also able to seize thousands of assault rifles, machine guns and anti-tank missiles in January 2023 in the Gulf of Oman, coming from Iran and on their way to the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

 

Now that the six Iranian ships are no longer coming to Antwerp (for the time being) – the Daisy was the last to arrive here until November 9, 2024 – it is striking that they have immediately shifted their entire route. They have not been to Syria or Russia in recent months. The Azargoun is now moving to China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Libya. The Artenos now goes to India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and the UAE. The Kashan to India, the UAE, Kenya and Tanzania. The Shiba to India, Libya, Turkey and the UAE. The Artam to China, India, Tanzania, Kenya and the UAE.

Can the ships still return to Antwerp? Antwerp Port Authority refers ‘all questions about Iranian ships’ to the Federal Public Service Mobility. According to Mobility spokesman Thomas De Spiegelaere, it is currently sufficient that the Iranian state-owned shipping company IRISL has been sanctioned to no longer allow the six ships to enter our ports, even though those ships are officially owned by another company. ‘IRISL is listed in the databases as the beneficial owner of the ships. That is enough for us to stop them. A ship has several managers and operators.’

Everything checked

“But other Iranian ships that do not belong to IRISL are still allowed to come to Belgian ports for legitimate reasons,” says the spokesperson for the FPS Mobility. “There are no sanctions against Iranian ships in general. We are not bound by the American sanctions against Iran and will therefore not follow them.’

In 2023 and 2024, twelve different Iranian ships came to Antwerp, accounting for 44 visits. In 20 of the 44 cases, it concerned ships that were sanctioned by the US. And six of the twelve ships would therefore have been involved in espionage or arms deliveries.

The question is whether other Iranian ships can now simply use Antwerp as a ‘cover’. Because the six ships remained untouched all this time. De Spiegelaere: ‘When these ships still came to the Belgian ports, there were no EU sanctions. There were sanctions against specific goods or dual-use goods. But that has always been checked, the calls of these ships were always legitimate and the goods that were loaded or unloaded were in accordance with the rules. So there were no legal grounds for refusing these ships.’

For our investigation into the Iranian ships, we received help from foreign fellow journalists: the Iranian Mahtab Divsalar (Zamaneh), the Syrian Mohammad Bassiki (SIRAJ), the German Ruben Schaar (Paper Trail Media), Birte Schohaus and Dimitri Tokmetzis (Follow the Money)and of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP).

The post From espionage to arms deliveries: the shady practices behind the Iranian ships in Antwerp appeared first on SIRAJ.