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Ships Accused of Stealing Ukrainian Grain Linked to Assad Regime Front

Radwan Awad — Thu, 16 Oct 2025 10:11:33 +0000

On a clear, cool day in early January, the red deck of a cargo ship was spotted near a granary at a Black Sea port under the control of occupying Russian forces in Ukraine.

Alongside two sister ships, the bulk carrier had just been sanctioned by the European Union for belonging to Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” — a network of vessels with murky ownership that have helped transport looted Ukrainian grain and other goods despite a web of international sanctions.

The three vessels, originally named the Finikia, the Laodicea, and the Souria, were once owned by the Syrian government, a key ally to Russia under the rule of former dictator Bashar Al-Assad.

But in 2023, they were quietly offloaded to an offshore firm in the Seychelles, an archipelago in the Indian Ocean that maintains strict corporate secrecy regulations and does not publicly reveal the names of company owners. This June, the ships were among hundreds of Syrian entities and individuals that the U.S. Treasury Department cleared from its sanctions list, granting relief to the country’s new government after Assad’s ouster.

But journalists can now reveal that the Seychelles company that bought and still owns two of the ships was directed by an apparent insider from the Assad regime, according to sales contracts and corporate records obtained by OCCRP and its Syrian partner SIRAJ.

Credit: Yörük Işık Laodicea ship seen in Istanbul, Turkey on April 30, 2021.

There is another indication that the vessels may have been appropriated by those close to the former dictator before his fall: At least two of the ships were sold by a Syrian government agency to the Seychelles firm for $1 each.

“Selling multi-million dollar hulls for $1 strongly suggests a related-party deal designed to move assets off the Syrian state’s books while keeping them under the regime’s de facto control,” said Vittorio Maresca di Serracapriola, a sanctions specialist at the New Zealand-based consultancy Karam Shaar Advisory, which focuses on Syria’s political economy.

He said it appeared to be a “textbook example” of “the broader cannibalization of the Syrian state” that took place in the final years of Assad’s rule.

“Public assets were stripped from the treasury and funnelled into offshore shells tied to his networks, blurring any line between state property and the former regime’s wealth,” he said. “Even after Assad’s ouster, these asset transfers show how entrenched his patronage system remains.”

Since their 2023 sale, the three cargo freighters have navigated trade routes under a cloud of obfuscation, using multiple names, misrepresenting their country of registration with so-called “false flags,” and repeatedly switching off systems used to broadcast their location to authorities and other vessels.

Ukrainian authorities allege that all three of the ships belong to a fleet that has helped Russia expropriate some 15 million tons of Ukrainian grain since the 2022 invasion.

Reporters managed to piece together some of the ships’ recent movements with help from satellite images and ship tracking specialists. Crew lists and other documents obtained by reporters revealed another clue about who might be behind them: Since they were sold off by the government, the vessels have been managed — and in one case, acquired — by companies with ties to Taher Kayali, a 65-year-old Syrian under U.S., U.K., and EU sanctions for alleged maritime trafficking of Captagon, the illicit amphetamine drug whose lucrative trade was a financial lifeline for the Assad regime.

Credit: Guardia di Finanza Napoli Captagon pills seized in Italy in 2020.

Kayali and the Seychelles company that bought the vessels in 2023, AlHouda Holding, did not respond to requests for comment. Reporters were unable to reach AlHouda Holding’s director at the time of the sale, a Syrian businessman named Ali Mohamed Deeb.

The ships’ sale aligns with a pattern documented in a 2024 report published by the Brookings Institution, a Washington-based think tank. The report details how Assad brought key sectors of the Syrian economy under his control through the use of private business fronts, often led by low-profile proxies. This restructuring was aimed at insulating his regime from sanctions, and it further eroded “distinctions between the public budget and the Assad family’s personal finances,” the report notes.

In May 2025, a brief presidential decree signed by Syria’s new president Ahmed Al Sharaa established a commission tasked with tracing and investigating stolen funds until they can be “legally ascertained.” Aside from that, there has been little transparency on the new government’s efforts to recover the fortune that Assad, who has taken refuge in Russia, corruptly amassed during his rule and parked in luxury assets and secret bank accounts throughout the world.

The Syrian Ministry of Transport did not respond to requests for comment on the ships.

The Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports, a new agency established by the country’s transitional government, told OCCRP the sale of the ships took place before its creation in 2025 and did not provide any further information.

The One-Dollar Ships

For more than a decade, the Finikia, the Laodicea, and the Souria operated under the ownership of Syria’s General Authority for Maritime Transport, a division of the transport ministry under Assad’s government.

In August 2015, the freighters were hit with U.S. sanctions that targeted resources used by the regime to wage violence against civilians in Syria’s civil war.

Then, in 2023, the three ships were sold to an obscure offshore company.

Incorporated in January 2019, the Seychelles-based AlHouda Holding has no functioning website, and until now, no information about the individuals directly involved in the firm has been disclosed to the public.

But the Syrian General Authority for Maritime Transport sold two of the ships — the Finikia and the Souria — to the company in April 2023 for the nominal price of just $1 apiece, according to sales contracts obtained by SIRAJ.

AlHouda acquired the third ship, the Laodicea, around the same time but OCCRP was unable to verify the sales price.

Sold for a Dollar

Sales contracts obtained by SIRAJ show the ships were sold by the Syrian government for just $1 apiece.

A contract for the $1 sale of the Finikia to the Seychelles-based AlHouda Holding in 2023.Translations added by OCCRP.

Archived versions of the UAE Levant Fleet’s website show that as recently as January of this year, the site presented itself as the public-facing portal of the British Levant Fleet Ltd, where Kayali was director between August 2020 and April 2023 and the company’s sole shareholder in 2020. He resigned a week after he was sanctioned by the British government, which alleged that he is a “business magnate with links to the captagon industry” who has been “tied to multiple captagon seizures, including in Europe.”

While Kayali is no longer involved in the U.K. company, records show he is a director of a Panamanian company also called Levant Fleet Ltd S.A. whose executives have the same names as those of Levant Fleet in London, suggesting the companies are related.

The U.K.-based Levant Fleet has served as the safety manager for the Laodicea and the Souria since 2023, according to the shipping database Equasis, and as a crew manager for the Souria and the Finikia in 2024, according to partial employment contracts obtained by SIRAJ.

And a crew list for the Souria dated January 5, 2024, features the name Orient Fleet at the top of the document.Kayali is a 99-percent shareholder of a Syrian company established in 2022 named Orient Fleet Maritime LLC.

The other shareholder of Kayali’s Orient Fleet Maritime bears the same name, Moaead Hani Walio, as the secretary of the U.K.-based Levant Fleet.Kayali and Walio have both served as officers in the U.K. and Panamanian Levant Fleets, while a third man, Ahmad AlKhanji, is also a director in both companies.

Walio did not respond to requests for comment. AlKhanji told OCCRP he parted ways with Levant Fleet, without specifying the jurisdiction, in 2023 due to “a dispute with the company personnel that continues to this day.” He said the dispute prevented him from answering further questions about the company, and did not respond to follow-up questions about his links to Kayali and Levant Fleet in the U.K., the UAE, and Panama in time for publication.

Orient Fleet Maritime and the UAE- and U.K.-based Levant Fleet companies did not respond to requests for comment. But after sending the queries, OCCRP received a message from an unknown Syrian number, whose profile image featured the name — Neptunus — of another Syrian company belonging to Kayali that was hit with Western sanctions. The author said they were responding to questions about Levant Fleet and promised to provide “all necessary documents and materials” but did not do so in time for publication.

Credit: James O’Brien/OCCRP Taher Kayali, a sanctioned Syrian businessman and alleged Captagon trafficker, is part of a network linked to the UAE-based Levant Fleet LLC-FZ.

In September 2025, Finikia’s ownership changed again: It was transferred to Bayaze Shipping Ltd, a company incorporated in the Marshall Islands on 13 June, according to the International Maritime Organization and company records.

False Flags

When the Finikia was spotted this January by a granary at the Avlita cargo terminal in Sevastopol, the Ukrainian Black Sea port that Russia seized in February 2014, only two weeks had passed since it had been hit with EU sanctions.

The ship was now sailing under its third name since 2009 – Monte Bianco – and a new flag, Gambia, also its third since then. The AIS transponder used to broadcast its location had been switched off, but the vessel remained visible by satellite, according to an image provided to OCCRP by satellite intelligence company Vantor.

Credit: James O’Brien/OCCRP A timeline of the changing names and flags of registration for the three ships.

This type of regular rotation of names and flags of registration, plus the disabling of AIS transponders, has been a feature of all three of the Syrian vessels since they were sold by Assad’s regime in 2023. All three have also misrepresented their countries of registration with so-called “false flags.”

For instance, in December 2023, the freighters registered with the Kingdom of Eswatini, formerly known as Swaziland, in southern Africa. But just a month later, the landlocked nation rescinded the registrations, citing a “direct violation” of its policies, Eswatini maritime authorities told OCCRP.

All three of the Syrian freighters continued flying the Eswatini flag in 2024, primarily traveling between Russia and Syria, even though the African nation told the International Maritime Organization in a letter in August of last year that it had “not yet given permission to any company or agency to register ship vessels sailing in high seas in its flag.”

Michelle Bockmann, a senior maritime intelligence analyst with Windward, a maritime consultancy, said “flag-hopping” is typical behavior for sanctions-hit vessels that face limited options for countries willing to accept their registrations.

Lacking valid insurance and other safety certificates, such ships pose “significant threats” to maritime safety, security, and the environment, she wrote in a submission this year to the U.S. Federal Maritime Commission. “These ships are essentially lawless and stateless.”

Asked about false-flagging, the International Maritime Organization said that it is a problematic practice that prevents authorities from exercising effective control over vessels at sea, but that “[t]here is currently no binding international framework to regulate the process of ship registration.”

Despite their efforts at obfuscation, satellite images and dedicated ship tracking publications helped reporters track some of the freighters’ recent movements.

For instance, the Souria, which is now called San Damian and still flies a false Eswatini flag,departed the Kavkaz port in southern Russia in November 2024 and anchored a little over a week later at the grain terminal in Egypt’s Alexandria port. Satellite imagery analyzed by OCCRP indicates the ship was moored in Syria’s Latakia port on June 30.

After its January stop in Sevastopol, the Finikia was seen sailing in the crystalline blue waters off Cyprus in June with an East Timor flag that the International Maritime Organization website describes as “false.”The East Timor ship registry told OCCRP in July that the jurisdiction does not maintain an international ship registry and it has no knowledge of the vessel.

Işık from the Bosphorus Observer consultancy spotted the ship — with yet another new name, Bayaze D — crossing the Bosphorus a few weeks later. According to the ship-tracking website VesselFinder it was heading for Russia’s Kavkaz port. Later that month, on July 17, it was again seen near Istanbul.

According to Vladyslav Vlasiuk, sanctions commissioner for Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky, the Finikia made a call at the occupied port of Komysh-Burun as recently as August 2025. (Ship-tracking data reviewed by OCCRP shows the vessel in the area at the time).^.

The Laodicea, meanwhile, was seen in the vicinity of Simferopol in Russian-occupied Crimea last June, and was spotted several months later sailing near Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey before making a stop in Lebanon. In November 2024, it switched off its AIS transponder until April 2025.

During this “dark” period, SIRAJ reporters spotted the vessel anchored in Syria’s Latakia port in mid-January, just over five weeks after the fall of Assad’s regime.

A contract for the $1 sale of the Souria to the Seychelles-based AlHouda Holding in 2023. Translations added by OCCRP.

Yörük Işik, a maritime shipping analyst who runs the Istanbul-based Bosphorus Observer consultancy, said he had observed the ships multiple times in the Bosphorus Strait.

“Especially in the Bosphorus, you see so many Russian ships and their engines are so old, the vessel can hardly climb to the Black Sea… These three ships are not like that, they make good speed,” Işik said.

The AlHouda Holding director who signed his name to the $1 contracts, Ali Mohamed Deeb, has a minimal public profile. But Syrian corporate records and contracts obtained by OCCRP and SIRAJ reveal that he has deep ties to many individuals and companies connected to Assad’s regime, several of whom have been sanctioned for these links.

For instance, Deeb was a 33-percent shareholder in the Syrian company Iloma Investment Private JSC, which was founded in 2023 and the following year took over the operations and ticket revenue of the state-owned Syrian Airlines, according to documents leaked to SIRAJ.

The EU imposed sanctions on Iloma in January 2024, describing itas “a front for the Assad family and part of the regime’s efforts to personally gain from manipulation of the economy.”

Deeb also served as Iloma’s chairman in 2024, according to a contract between the company and Syrian Airlines.

The airline’s former general director Obeida Jibrail, who led the company during contract negotiations with Iloma, told SIRAJ that Deeb represented the interests of the Assad regime.

Iloma, which had no track record in the airline business, was “the company of the president,” Jibrail said he was told at the time.

Syrian corporate records show that Deeb also held stakes in at least eight other companies established from 2021-24. Three of his fellow shareholders in these firms were sanctioned by the EU for supporting and benefiting from the Assad regime.

The first two businessmen, plus both of Ali Mohamed Deeb’s fellow shareholders in Iloma, were also identified in the Brookings report as part of a network of business fronts for Assad that included his former economic advisor, Yassar Hussein Ibrahim.

Credit: James O’Brien/OCCRP Syrian corporate records show that Deeb held stakes in companies with fellow shareholders sanctioned by the EU for supporting and benefiting from the Assad regime.

OCCRP was unable to reach Yassar Ibrahim, Iloma’s shareholders, or Ali Najib Ibrahim for comment, while Ahmad Khalil Khalil and Nasser Deeb Deeb did not respond to queries sent by reporters.

AlHouda continues to own the Souria and Laodicea to this day, according to the International Maritime Organization, the United Nations agency responsible for safe shipping. But ownership of the third vessel — the Finikia — was transferred to another company in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

That company, records obtained by OCCRP and SIRAJ show, has multiple links to a sanctioned Syrian businessman notorious as an alleged Captagon trafficker.

The Captagon Connection

On January 24 of this year, just over a month after it was hit with EU sanctions along with its sister ships over the alleged “transport of stolen Ukrainian grain,” ownership of the Finikia was registered to an UAE-incorporated company called Levant Fleet LLC-FZ, according to the shipping database Equasis.

Details about the shareholders and beneficiaries of Levant Fleet LLC-FZ are not publicly available. But reporters found two other companies in other jurisdictions also called Levant Fleet that are connected to Taher Kayali, a Syrian businessman whom the U.S., U.K., and EU have accused of trafficking the illicit amphetamine Captagon, raising questions about his possible involvement in Levant Fleet in the UAE. Levant Fleet Ltd in the U.K. was previously owned by Kayali and appears to have provided management services to the Laodicea, the Souria, and the Finikia.

https://sirajsy.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/syrian-ship-Flourish.mp4

The ship’s new name was hidden behind a tarp that someone had hung on the back of the vessel. But the new moniker — Monte Rosa — remained visible on a lifeboat on deck. A gust of wind lifted the tarp just long enough for reporters to see “Rosa” painted on the hull.

Ahmed Haj Bakri (SIRAJ), Rana Sabbagh, and reporters from Daraj contributed reporting.

The post Ships Accused of Stealing Ukrainian Grain Linked to Assad Regime Front appeared first on SIRAJ.

Syrian Intelligence Files Offer Clues in Case of Abducted American Reporter

Radwan Awad — Thu, 30 Jan 2025 10:48:54 +0000

The documents mention Austin Tice, who disappeared while working for the Washington Post and the McClatchy news chain. The files do not list him as deceased.

It’s an important distinction, because little is known about Tice’s disappearance. His mother, Debra Tice, recently traveled to Syria in hopes of learning details about his detention and whereabouts.

“I feel very strongly that Austin’s here, and I think he knows I’m here,” she told Reuters in mid-January in Damascus.

Syrian Investigative Reporting for Accountability Journalism (SIRAJ), a collective of journalists and OCCRP partner, found the documents in late December while combing through files left behind during the hasty collapse of the Assad regime earlier that month.

The documents are dated March 4, 2013, about seven months after Tice’s presumed capture. They suggest that he was alive at the time, but give no further details. If alive today, Tice would be 43.

SIRAJ interviewed a former prisoner who said he had been detained by Syrian intelligence in 2018 in a cell next to one that he believed held Tice. The man, who requested anonymity due to security concerns, said he did not know who Tice was at the time. But he recalled that guards would bring an English translator to speak to the prisoner, who they referred to as Austin.

“The translator would ask him, ‘Austin, what do you want to eat today?’ I could hear the translator talking to Austin directly, because I was close to his cell,” the former prisoner said.

Former members of the Assad regime who could have information about Tice have fled the country or gone into hiding since a rebel coalition took control on December 8.

And Syrian officials were uncooperative before the regime fell, according to a person who has been involved for more than a decade in U.S. efforts to find Tice.

“In numerous meetings and exchanges with the Syrian government we were never able to… obtain proof of life or an admission that they had had him at any point,” said the person, speaking anonymously to avoid disrupting ongoing search efforts.

Tice was detained at a checkpoint after leaving a Damascus suburb as he headed for Lebanon, according to a website run by his family. Just over a month later, the family was sent a 43-second video showing Tice with a group of armed men. The family never received any more information after that video, which had been titled “Austin Tice is Alive.”

The documents discovered by SIRAJ are written in Arabic and include a list of journalists who snuck into Syria to cover the war. Among those listed along with Tice are reporters from BBC and CNN, as well as Spain’s El Pais and France’s Le Monde newspapers.

Also listed is Marie Colvin who was killed along with French photographer Remi Ochlik in a targeted attack by Syrian forces in the city of Homs.

“She entered the country illegally to Homs—Baba Omar in the first month of 2012 and she died there,” reads the matter-of-fact entry.

The entry for Tice says simply: “He entered Syria illegally at the Turkish border in mid-June and he spent several days in Khan Shaikhoun where he met individuals who call themselves the Free Army.”

That town in northwestern Syria gained infamy in 2017 for the use of chemical weapons by Syrian forces. The Syrian Free Army was the name given to opposition forces who rose up against the Assad regime in 2011, leading to a nearly 14-year civil war.

The advocacy group Reporters Sans Frontiers (RSF) said 23 journalists remained in prison the day the Assad regime fell. Another seven journalists “were victims of enforced disappearances — abducted to unknown locations.”

Assad’s regime and its affiliates have killed at least 181 media professionals since 2011, according to RSF.

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Syria’s Youth Soccer Teams Were the Pride of the Nation — But Dozens of Players Were Too Old To Compete

Radwan Awad — Wed, 18 Sep 2024 12:39:27 +0000

For a decade and a half, Syria’s “under-20” soccer teams routinely outperformed the national squad in big tournaments. An investigation by OCCRP and its partners found that dozens of players’ ages were understated — some by as much as five or six years.

It was midway through the second half when Syria’s young forward, Mohammed al-Hamwi, pounced on a header across goal and knocked it past the Italian keeper, putting his country on the path to one of its most dramatic international soccer victories.

Syria’s 2-1 triumph over Italy in the group stages of the 2005 FIFA World Youth Championship electrified the nation, and crowned a run of eye-catching wins by the youth team over the previous decade and a half.

But Hamwi should have never been on the field. He was 21 at the time, even though the tournament was only open to players under 20.

Hamwi was able to enter thanks to official documents that misrepresented his date of birth, OCCRP and its partners have found. Nor was he alone. From 1989 to 2005, at least 40 over-age Syrian players were able to compete in youth tournaments thanks to falsified passports.

These players made decisive contributions to some of Syria’s biggest soccer wins, including a run in the 1991 World Youth Championship where they helped knock out an England squad featuring Premier League star Andy Cole. They also won the under-20 Asian Cup in 1994.

They entered these tournaments by using “special mission” passports, issued by the Foreign Ministry, which contained false dates of birth. Syria’s soccer authority, the Syrian Arab Football Federation, then submitted these passports to FIFA, even though it is far more common for countries to use regular passports.

Reporters from OCCRP and its partner SIRAJ, along with a Swiss reporter, obtained birth certificates for 40 players through a source whose identity is being withheld for security reasons. Reporters selected the players for their prominent roles both on the field and later as analysts, officials, coaches, and other positions in the sports world.

The reporters compared the dates on the birth certificates with those listed in the special mission passports and on FIFA’s website. For three additional players, they found real ages acknowledged in sources such as social media posts, TV interviews, a coaching certificate, and a standard passport.

The differences in the submitted and real ages ranged from one to six years. The biggest gap was for Mazen Koussa, the goalkeeper for the 1991 squad: According to the “special mission” passport submitted to FIFA — which gave his name as “Malek” — he was born in 1971, but on social media and in an interview with a Syrian TV station he has said that he was actually born in 1965.

The reason for the discrepancy in the first names was not clear, and Koussa did not respond to requests for comment.

Walid al-Mehdi, who headed the committee that oversees Syria’s national team from 2005 to 2011, told SIRAJ that the practice of faking ages was so widespread that the number of players with genuine ages on some youth squads “did not exceed the number of fingers on one hand.”

He insisted that he had “categorically” rejected the practice during his tenure, and had once urged the head of the football federation to “appear in public and tear up the mission’s passports.”

The federation persisted in the practice to “demonstrate achievements to the political authorities,” he said.

Mustafa Shakoush, a goalkeeper with Syria’s youth team during the 2005 tournament, acknowledged in an interview with SIRAJ that the federation had changed his date of birth by a year, from 1985 to 1986, in his special mission passport.

Shakoush, now a football coach at a sports academy in Mersin, a city in south-central Turkey, said the forgery was carried out with “high-level support from multiple state institutions.”

Syria’s Foreign Ministry, football federation, and the General Sports Federation did not respond to requests for comment. A FIFA spokesperson told OCCRP that after checking their data, they “found no records of a disciplinary issue or complaint being submitted to FIFA on the topic.”

A String of Victories

Syria’s victories struck a chord with many in a country that loves soccer but rarely gets to see its teams thrive in international tournaments. The national team has never qualified for a World Cup.

After the youth team took the 1994 Asian Cup in a 2-1 win over Japan, the legendary Syrian sportscaster Adnan Bouzo published a book called “The Victory of the Youth.” He compared the day of their win to “the nation’s wedding day” and recalled how Damascus airport “turned into a human flood” as crowds flocked to greet the champions.

President Hafez al-Assad, who had ruled Syria since seizing power in a 1971 coup, proclaimed that the victory had “brought great joy to our people.”

Credit: OCCRP “The Victory of the Youth” by Adnan Bouzo

An image from “The Victory of the Youth” by Syrian sportscaster Adnan Bouzo.

Marwan Mouna, who played on the squad that won the cup and whose age was understated by three years, remembered how the team was invited to meet Assad and showered with gifts after their victory.

“They wanted to build a team that could win a championship. The sports leadership wanted to show off in front of government officials and win recognition from the president — and that’s what happened,” said Mouna, who fled to Turkey after Syria’s conflict broke out in 2011.

The team’s performance in the 2005 World Youth Championship in the Netherlands was also lauded. The comments section of a YouTube clip of one match brims with praise and nostalgia: “One of the Syrian national team’s best matches and one of the most beautiful of theirs I’ve seen,” one says. “Where did this magnificent team disappear?” asks another.

In a 2021 interview with the Syrian outlet Radio Rozana, the 2005 squad’s goalkeeper, Adnan al-Hafez, reminisced with the host about how crowds of Syrians had gathered in coffee shops and homes to follow the games.

When the host asked why the players who found so much success on the youth teams did not seem to excel on the men’s national team, Hafez — whose age was understated by two years, according to his birth certificate — blamed the lack of “training programs and continuous follow-up” found in other countries. Hafez did not respond to requests for comment.

Decisive Contributions

Over the decade and a half where the ages were misstated, Syria’s “under-20” squads qualified for four FIFA youth championships, where they posted a win over Uruguay, and draws with Spain, Canada, and England. In England’s case, the draw helped knock the team out of the group stage.

In these games, the contributions of over-age players were often decisive. In the 1991 tournament, for instance, the team’s nine goals — including four during penalties — were all scored by players whose ages had been falsified.

After advancing from the group stage in 2005, the team lost narrowly to powerhouse Brazil in the knockout round after Hamwi, the forward who scored against Italy, bounced a shot off the crossbar. A goal in the draw against Canada was provided by striker Majid al-Haj, whose birth certificate shows his age was also understated by two years. Haj did not respond to requests for comment.

Credit: OCCRP, Firas1977, Wikimedia Syrian footballer Mohammed al-Hamwi.

Though this is the first time age fraud by Syria has been reported, similar cases have been uncovered in the past. In 1989, FIFA banned Nigeria from international events for two years after it was found the ages of three players in the previous year’s Olympics had been misrepresented. In 2003, Kenya’s under-17 team was dissolved after some players admitted they were over-age.

FIFA introduced MRI tests to verify ages ahead of the “under-17” World Cup in Nigeria in 2009. After carrying out its own scans, Nigeria dropped over a dozen players from its team.

Anas Ammo, a Syrian sports journalist and author, said that the cost of forgery wasn’t just that the youth team’s victories were tainted by cheating — it also prevented talented players from developing properly because they were stuck competing against younger opponents.

“We’ve seen generations of Syrian soccer players buried on the youth teams,” he said.

Prominent Roles

Some of the Syrian players whose ages were falsified went on to hold prominent roles in the sports world.

Hatem al-Ghayeb, whose birth certificate shows he was four years older than stated on the FIFA website, went on to head Syria’s football federation after taking part in the 1991 World Youth Championship.

Muhammad Afash, who took part in the 1989 and 1991 tournaments, had a gap of five years. According to the documents submitted to FIFA, he was born in 1971, but his birth certificate shows he was born in 1966. Afash went on to play for the Greek club Ionikos Nikeas, and has regularly said he would run for president of Syria’s football federation.

Others included Ammar Awad, who was on the 1989 and 1991 teams and later played for a club in southern France before becoming a sports pundit; and Assaf Khalifa, who played on the 1991 team and served as manager of the Syrian national team in 2020.

Ghayeb, Afash, Awad, and Khalifa did not respond to requests for comment.

The president of Syria’s football federation during the 1989 and 1991 tournaments, Farouk Bouzo, also served as a FIFA referee and became the first Syrian to officiate a World Cup match in 1978. In 1996, he received FIFA’s “Order of Merit.” He declined to answer questions about the falsified ages.

Bassam al-Farikh, who played on the 1989 team, told SIRAJ that the special mission passports had been prepared for players without asking them. Though the players were aware their ages were misrepresented — some were even asked to shave their beards thoroughly before tournaments — officials never mentioned the fraud explicitly, he said.

“It was enough for us to be called up to the national team,” Farikh said. “When we traveled, all our documents were ready, and we didn’t do anything.”

Shakoush and Mouna, the former players now in Turkey, said they believed high-level officials had been well aware of the fraud at the time.

“In Syria, we now have a 50-year-old governing system. Do you think this political system — from the smallest employee in the football federation to the president — doesn’t know about this fraud?” Mouna said. “Of course they know. They’re the ones who taught us about fraud, bribery, and forgery.”

“Unfortunately,” he said, “forgery runs in our blood.”

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“Dubai Unlocked”: 10 Individuals Within Assad’s Close Circle Hide 50 Million Dollars in Dubai Estates

Radwan Awad — Wed, 15 May 2024 09:29:35 +0000

The “Dubai Unlocked” investigative reports reveal that US sanctions have not prevented prominent figures connected to the Syrian regime from acquiring and investing in the small emirate, raising questions about the perks enjoyed by regime insiders there. The project’s documents contain details of properties owned by Syrians from the financial and familial circle of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, including: his cousins Rami and Ihab Makhlouf, businessman brothers Samer and Amer Foz, Rania al-Dabas, the wife of Syrian businessman Mohammed Hamcho, and others.

Many Syrians have lost their homes, properties, and investments due to the Syrian war. Furthermore, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), over 753,000 refugees were in need of resettlement in 2024. At the same time, businessmen associated with the Syrian regime have found a safe haven for themselves in Dubai, avoiding American and European sanctions, which did not stop the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from allowing the businessmen to own and/or control luxurious properties in projects like the Palm Jumeirah, away from the eyes of the US Treasury and sanction monitoring offices, under the principle of “Business is Business.”

Among these businessmen are the well-known brothers in Syria: Rami and Ihab Makhlouf, Samer and Amer Foz, and Mudalal and Imad Khoury.

Why Dubai?

When former US President Donald Trump signed the Caesar Act, following the approval of the US House of Representatives on December 17, 2019, to tighten American sanctions on the Syrian regime and prevent any financial or technical support to it, the legislation was supposed to limit the financial growth of the regime and curb the businessmen and elites benefiting from the Syrian war. Meanwhile, they accumulated fortunes worth millions of dollars in cash, real estate assets, and real and fake companies throughout the years of the Syrian war.

However, documents from the “Dubai Unlocked” revealed that these sanctions did not prevent “regime men” from owning and investing in properties in Dubai, raising questions about the Due Diligence process followed by authorities in Dubai specifically, regarding the risks of money laundering and compliance with European and American sanctions regulations.

“Dubai Unlocked” is a cross-border investigative project led by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and the Norwegian financial news site E24, with the participation of 74 media outlets from 58 countries around the world, including the Syrian Unit for Investigative Journalism (SIRAJ) and its partner site, Daraj.

The project includes leaked documents revealing information about hundreds of thousands of properties in Dubai and their ownership, specifically in 2020 and 2022. The data was obtained from the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), a non-profit organization based in Washington, DC, researching international crimes and conflicts. The data was subsequently shared with the OCCRP and E24 project.

The project’s data, taken from more than 100 datasets, mostly from the Dubai Land Department, in addition to state-owned real estate companies, includes the listed owner’s name for each property, along with other identifying information. The dataset reviewed by journalists includes owners’ names as written in passports, passport data, identity cards, contact information, and key information about the properties.

Over several months, journalists participating in this international project used the documents as a starting point to discover the foreign real estate ownership scene in Dubai, and to verify the identities of the names and figures listed in the data, specifically those listed on international sanctions lists or classified as politically exposed persons (PEPs).

The project documents include details of properties owned by Syrians from the financial and familial circle of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, including his cousins Rami and Ihab Makhlouf, businessmen brothers Samer and Amer Foz, and Rania al-Dabas, the wife of Syrian businessman Mohammed Hamsho, who is close to Maher al-Assad, commander of the Fourth Division in the Syrian army, among others.

The Makhlouf brothers each own a luxurious villa in Dubai, with each villa covering a space of one dunam and 220 square meters, both located in the Jumeirah Palm area, an artificial archipelago known for its luxury properties. Samer Foz, a Syrian businessman active during the Syrian war and whose name appeared on the US and European sanctions lists, controls and owns three real estate assets in Dubai, including two units in the Platinum Tower in the Al Thanyah Fifth area.

In an interview with the investigative team, Karam Shaar, Manager of the Syria Program at the Observatory for Political and Economic Networks, said: “Real estate investment in Dubai is guaranteed compared to investment in monetary instruments or any other field. In the Syrian case, there is another benefit, as the ease of movement between Syria and the UAE is a factor for the flow of Syrian money into Emirati real estate. The UAE has become the number one destination for Syrian investors after Lebanon, which was the financial lung of the Syrian regime, was affected, especially after the Beirut port explosion in 2020.”

According to official Emirati statements, Syria occupies an advanced position in the trade relations between the two countries, as the UAE accounts for more than 14 percent of Syria’s foreign trade. The non-oil trade between the two countries reached about 2.6 billion dirhams (705 million US dollars) in 2020, while reaching about 1 billion dirhams (250 million US dollars) in the first half of 2021.

The Makhlouf Brothers

Syrian Money in Dubai

Until 2020, while about 90 percent of Syria’s population lived below the poverty line of two dollars a day, the names of businessmen and prominent figures connected to the Syrian regime’s center were appearing in Dubai’s real estate ownership records, after transferring money and investing in luxurious real estate there, as shown by the real estate ownership records and this investigative report.

The interests of these networks intersected in Dubai as a global financial center, in addition to the financial facilities and lower taxes offered by the emirate in its quest to compete for investments, says one Syrian economic expert.

Until the end of 2019, the value of Syrian direct investment in the UAE exceeded 1.5 billion dirhams (470 million US dollars), according to the Emirati Minister of Economy, Abdullah bin Touq Al Marri, but it is not known whether this figure includes real estate assets owned by Syrians in the country or not.

Owning property or purchasing real estate anywhere is not a violation or evidence of committing any violation, but rather a type of investment provided by any country within its laws, and it is preferred by many due to the high levels of security provided by investment in real estate assets. However, achieving the public interest requires answering questions such as: Who is buying this property? What is the source of the funds? And how is this done smoothly without conflicting with the European and American sanctions imposed on some buyers, whom it is prohibited to deal with financially for the public interest?

In fact, 3,716 Syrian investors and property owners –who invested their money in 5,392 properties in Dubai worth $1.8 billion– were identified by journalists on the 2022 ownership list.

Amongst these individuals, the investigative team traced real estate assets of 10 senior businessmen and a woman in the Assad regime’s economic circle, all of whom are on the US and European sanctions list. These individuals transferred money to Dubai and bought real estate assets. According to “Dubai Unlocked” documents, these individuals make up the controlling parties of about 25 properties in luxury areas in Dubai, valued at approximately $50 million, according to the European Union tax observatory and the Norwegian Center for Tax Research (Skatteforsk).

After analyzing real estate data, economists from the EU tax observatory and Skatteforsk estimated that the total foreign ownership of residential properties in Dubai amounted to about $160 billion in 2022, including properties under construction.

The analysis is based on property prices in Dubai in 2022 and does not take into account the subsequent rise in property prices there, which increased by more than 25 percent over two years, according to a report published by Deloitte, summarized in the Global Real Estate Guide and the Housing Index issued by the Dubai Land Department.

Samer Foz

The Foz Brothers… and Platinum Tower Dubai

Samer Foz’s name was widely mentioned in the Syrian business world during the Syrian war, and continues to be so today. The United States imposed sanctions on Foz in 2019, considering him to have “benefited from the atrocities of the Syrian conflict in a profit-making enterprise.” In return, the man was bolstering his financial and economic empire and receiving help for it from neighboring countries. Furthermore in 2018, he acquired Lebanese citizenship.

Foz owns three companies in Lebanon alone, the newest of which is Solid 1 Offshore, with his brother Amer Foz as a partner in all three companies.

Samer Foz owned three real estate assets in Dubai, including two units in the Platinum Tower in the Thanyah Fifth area and a property in the Thanya Fourth area. The financial value of one of the Platinum properties is estimated at around $627,000, while the estimated value of the third property is about $576,000. Foz also owns a commercial land property in the Thanyah Fourth area.

His brother Amer, 46, owns interests and businesses in various sectors in the Syrian economy (within regime-controlled areas), including Aman Damascus Holding Company, which allows him to trade and invest in Syria. He has been on the European sanctions list since February 17, 2020, along with seven other businessmen and two Syrian companies for supporting the Syrian regime. Property records show that he still owns a Signature villa in Palm Island in Jumeirah, with an estimated value of around $17 million.

The documents show that he also owned two properties in the Thanyah Fourth area in the form of villas, with their estimated values around $2 million and $1.9 million, respectively.

The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control accused him and his brother, along with another individual and an entity, of owning and managing stakes in an international network that supports the Assad regime. However, property records show that he owns these properties in Dubai.

The US Treasury Department did not respond to questions sent by the project’s investigative team about sanction violations and the due diligence that countries should adopt to avoid sanctions themselves.

The Foz brothers did not respond to the investigative team’s requests for comment until the publication of this investigation.

Andreas Økland, a postdoctoral fellow in the School of Economics and Business at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences, said that “According to leaks in 2022 and our estimates, foreigners owned at least 198,000 residential properties in Dubai, valued at over $90 billion in the same year.”

The Makhlouf Brothers… and Palm Jumeirah

It appears that the recent dispute between the Syrian regime and Rami Makhlouf, one of its most important financiers over the past twenty years since Bashar al-Assad took power after his father Hafez al-Assad’s death in 2000, has not yet affected his extensive ownership and shares around the world, including a massive financial empire inside and outside Syria, despite sanctions, as revealed by property records in Dubai.

Rami Makhlouf is listed as the owner of three properties in Palm Jumeirah, including a luxurious villa covering an area of approximately 1,244 square meters (one dunam and 244 square meters), with an estimated value of about $8 million.

In recent years, Makhlouf has become the subject of much discussion and media coverage after disputes arose between him and Bashar al-Assad and his wife Asma al-Assad. These disputes gradually reduced Makhlouf’s influence within the Syrian regime, and he was stripped of his ownership in Syriatel Mobile Telecom, the largest telecommunications company in Syria, in favor of an emerging class of businessmen led by Asma al-Assad.

Rami Makhlouf also owns a residential apartment in the AL DABAS building on Palm Jumeirah Island, with an estimated value of $1.5 million.

Al Dabas Building in the Palm Jumeriah Dubai, via Byout

Not too far from this luxurious building, lies another apartment owned by Makhlouf within the Abu Keibal building in Palm Island, which is estimated to be valued at around one million US dollars.

Abu Keibal in the Palm Jumeirah Dubai, via Byout

Ehab, on the other hand, owned a luxurious villa in Palm Jumeirah, with its value estimated around 8 million US dollars.

“Despite the UAE’s stance during the early years of the Syrian crisis and its rift with the Syrian regime, the Makhlouf family continued their business smoothly. The elite affiliated with the Syrian regime made Dubai the base for their business and networks,” says Ayman Aldassouky, a researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies.

He adds, “There was a blind eye being turned, and it served as a backdoor for communication with the regime through these networks and businessmen…Bushra al-Assad, Bashar’s sister, was residing in Dubai after the assassination of her husband, Assef Shawkat… Dubai was essentially a key hub for the regime’s elite.”

The Makhlouf brothers also did not respond to the investigative team’s request for comment.

Real Estate in Family Networks

Dubai, in particular, and the UAE in general, are heading towards competitiveness in registering and launching businesses, a legitimate economic advantage that attracts investments to the country. However, this strategy and the speed in attracting money to the UAE through various means, including real estate, have drawbacks and loopholes, according to economic experts.

The name Rania al-Dabas, a Syrian businesswoman and the wife of businessman Mohammad Hamcho on the US sanctions list under the Caesar Act of 2020, is mentioned as the current owner of an apartment in the DAMAC TOWERS building in the Business Bay area, ith its value estimated at $621,000.

Meanwhile, Ahmad Saber Hamcho, the brother of prominent businessman Mohammad Hamsho, was identified as the controlling entity for two properties in the Al Hebiah Third area.

Haid Haid, a senior researcher at the Royal Chatham House Institute in the UK, explains the reason behind these family networks’ tendency to own properties in Dubai, similar to other cities in the Arab world and globally: “Historically, Dubai has been a safe place for investments and property purchases for businessmen affiliated with the Syrian regime and Hezbollah. These businessmen have had two main goals: first, money laundering, as those with illicit funds try to hide their sources by buying and reselling properties repeatedly, making it difficult to trace the origins of these funds, which turn into luxurious properties that appear clean. And the second goal is real estate investment, as buying properties is considered a successful investment in the Arab region. However, the problem lies in banks and real estate offices dealing with individuals punished legally, as they could face sanctions if dealt with.”

The US Treasury Department stated that the Hamcho family “has interests in almost all sectors of the Syrian economy,and Mohammad Hamcho acted as a front and a close partner to Maher al-Assad, who leads the Fourth Armored Division in the Syrian army.”

Young Ahmad Hamcho serves as the Vice President of the Board of Directors of the International Chamber of Commerce in Syria, and is a partner in the companies Saf Al-Sham and Jupiter for Investments alongside Rania al-Dabas.

While al-Dabas and Hamcho did not respond to the investigative team’s questions, a Syrian economic expert explains that “Syrian businessmen using their family networks, including their wives and children, to register properties, is considered a strategy aimed at avoiding international sanctions.”

He says, “This approach allows business networks and the networks of the Syrian regime and Hezbollah to breathe, with the aim of maintaining the stability of the Syrian regime and preventing its collapse.”

In this context, investing in real estate in Dubai is considered a safe haven, as Syrian businessmen can register properties in the names of their wives and children to avoid risks and protect their assets.

Away from the Impacts of Sanctions… the Khoury Brothers’ Real Estate

Mudallal Khoury, a Syrian-Russian businessman, moved to Russia in the early 1970s, where he worked on building a complex network of banks, financial institutions, and external entities after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Khoury used this network in his business, leading to his inclusion on the European and American sanctions lists for facilitating activities on behalf of oppressive regimes like the Syrian regime.

Away from Syria and the financial entanglements across borders with Moscow, property ownership records in Dubai show that Khoury was the controlling entity for a property in The Matrix building in the Al Hebiah Fourth area, alongside a property in the Metro Central building in the Al Thanyah First area. His brother, Imad Khoury, was also the controlling entity of a residential apartment in The Matrix building in the Al Hebiah Fourth area.

The Khoury brothers also did not respond to the investigative team’s request for comment on property ownership and purchase operations, and whether they were declared to the Syrian or Russian authorities.

According to the US Treasury Department, Mudallal Khoury has been involved in financial transactions with the Assad regime since 1994, and Khoury used his complex network to support and finance the Assad regime after the start of the Syrian revolution in 2011.

In 2014, the Assad family’s close circle transferred money from Syria and invested part of it in purchasing offices and properties worth $40 million.

Investigations indicate that Khoury’s assistance to the Syrian regime included supporting the purchase of fuel, printing banknotes, and providing front companies spanning between Cyprus and the British Virgin Islands, which the Assad regime used in its programs for chemical and ballistic weapons.

The Secrecy in Skyscrapers

In recent years, Emirati authorities have tightened regulations related to combating money laundering, especially after the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the international governmental body for monitoring money laundering, added the UAE to its “gray list” in 2022 due to its failure to effectively combat the flow of illicit funds. After efforts to remove its name from the list, Emirati authorities received good news in February: FATF praised the UAE for its “significant progress” and removed it from further scrutiny, according to the OCCRP investigation on the project.

Within this context, the Emirati Embassy in the UK told The Times, partners in the “Dubai Unlocked” that “the UAE is playingits role in protecting the integrity of the global financial system very seriously. In February, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the international standard-setting body for combating money laundering, praised the significant progress made by the UAE in continuing to pursue global criminals. The UAE is cooperating closely with international partners to hinder and deter all forms of illicit financing. The UAE is committed to continuing these efforts and measures today and in the long-term future, more than ever before.”

How to Buy and Invest in Real Estate?

For businessmen affiliated with the Syrian regime, when it comes to linking money and business with the global financial system, these networks resort to other outlets, such as Dubai, to facilitate the transfer of funds, avoid restrictions and obstacles, and invest in real estate. This is especially the case after Lebanon was a vital financial center for passing what the Damascus regime needs in light of US sanctions and the siege on Syria since the outbreak of the revolution and arguably since the 1980s as well.

These individuals previously relied on Lebanon to conduct their business, much of which is conducted using cash due to the banking sector’s vulnerability to sanctions and the paralysis it has experienced since 2019, as well as the Beirut port explosion in August 2020.

“However, it appears that the Syrian regime benefits from the same financial network, which facilitates the transfer and movement between different financial centers, in an unnoticeable and difficult-to-track manner,” says researcher Ayman Aldassouky.

We wanted to know how someone from outside the UAE (even if they are sanctioned by the US Treasury or the European Union) can buy real estate in Dubai, if they have the necessary financial means, regardless of their nationality or current place of residence.

The real estate agent explained that “Bitcoin can be used to buy any property in Dubai, whether it’s an apartment or a villa,” and advised us that if that isn’t possible, to “transfer cash from Damascus to Dubai through exchange offices, and deliver it directly to the real estate office or property owner in Dubai,” emphasizing that “there are no legal concerns regarding the source of these funds,” and stressing that “there are no obstacles related to anti-money laundering in this process.”

Within the CAYAN TOWER skyscraper in the Dubai Marina area, which rises 306 meters in the city center, Syrian businessman Ammar Madhat Sharif, sanctioned by the United States and the European Union, owns a property (an apartment) in the Dubai Marina area.

Sharif is a prominent Syrian businessman active in the banking, insurance, and hospitality sectors, a founding partner of Byblos Bank Syria, a major shareholder in Unlimited Hospitality Ltd, and a board member of Solidarity Alliance and Al-Aqeelah Takaful Insurance, both insurance companies.

The European Union imposed sanctions on Sharif in 2016 for his cooperation with Rami Makhlouf, the cousin of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

According to the Paradise Papers project by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), Sharif owns a stake in the Global Exchange Group in Syria and has a parallel financial partnership in Lebanon with Rami Makhlouf through Rock Invest (registered in 2002).

Sharif did not respond to the investigation team’s requests for comment on ownership, nor did he provide any other information related to payment processes, financial transfers, or the source of funds that enabled him to purchase the property.

Dubai Real Estate… A Lifeline

Nader Qalei, a Syrian businessman known for his relationship and partnership with Rami Makhlouf, had his name mentioned in the Caesar Act sanctions imposed by the United States in June 2020.

Before 2011, his activities were prominent in Syria in the telecommunications and banking sectors, where he entered into strategic partnerships with Rami Makhlouf through Sham Holding in 2007, and as a member of the board of directors of Zbeideh Qalei and Zbeideh Qalai for Real Estate Development, among others.

The man controlled six properties (apartments) in the Dubai Marina area, within the Bahar 2 building.

Nader Qalei passed away at the age of 58 due to complications from the coronavirus, according to his family’s announcement on February 2, 2021.

His family did not respond to the investigation team’s requests for comment and clarification on the ownership of the properties and how the purchase transactions were conducted.

Luxury real estate investment seems to have been a lifeline for the economic elite of the Syrian regime to preserve the value of the money they earn, despite the ongoing Syrian conflict and the lack of a political solution. Will further sanctions prevent them from doing so?

Previously, US sanctions were imposed on Syrian businessmen affiliated with the regime who have businesses in the UAE, but despite the sanctions, real estate investment in Dubai continued because “Syrian businessmen affiliated with the regime believe that legal pursuit, if the sources of funding are illegal, may be nonexistent in Dubai,” says Karam Shaar.

Source: SIRAJ —Syrian Investigative Reporting for Accountability Journalism – DARAJ

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