On a video call, Maryam narrates the details of her daily routine that has remained unchanged in the times of COVID-19.

She wakes up everyday at dawn before waking the rest of her family, to start preparing for work. Collectively, the family starts preparing food in large quantities sufficient for everyone.

Around 1,000 refugees live in the Ahl al Qur’an camp, and after the recent wave of displacement, the number has increased, according to the camp’s director, Muhammad Sheikh Ismail.

“Here, social distancing and preventive measures recommended by the World Health Organization and other associations are not possible,” he said.

“There are no health or service facilities in the camps, and the number of tents is simply not sufficient for the number of people. Consequently, social distancing and self-isolation is not possible.”

“In each tent (two meters wide and three meters long), there are at least five people who share food and drink, while each section (consisting of 40 tents) has a total of six toilets; three for men and three for women,” Ismail said.

Despite the ongoing threat of the virus, residents felt reassured due to the blockade imposed by the Syrian government, and the Turkish government’s closure of three land crossings: Bab al-Hawa, Safety door, and Jarablos.

Airports and other ports have also been relatively empty since the area’s first recorded case.

However, the severity of the situation evolved after July 9 when the first cases were recorded at Bab Al-Hawa hospital, specifically, in a Syrian doctor who recently moved to Turkey.

There was great fear and concern that the cases would continue to spread due to the absence of preventive measures.

A study carried out by the Medicare Health Foundation, in cooperation with the health directorates in northern Syria, set out to assess the number of potential coronavirus cases, and found that the possibility for widespread infection is extremely high if necessary precautions are not taken.

The study indicated that in the first six weeks, cases may reach up to 240,000 (which represent 20% of the internally displaced population), of which 36,000 would be severe, 12,000 would be critical and 14,328 would be fatal.

These areas mostly rely on preventive measures implemented and funded by civil societies and organizations that are already limited in their capabilities and resources.

Director of Latakia (with jurisdiction over the Ahl al-Qur’an Camp) in the Syrian Civil Defense, Muhammad Haji Asaad, sheds light on some of the preventive measures that have been implemented.

“From late April to early September we sterilized 115 camps distributed from Al-Zouf to the village of Badama, including the Ahl al Qur’an camp.

We also sterilized approximately 22 villages in the western countryside of Idlib, and targeted areas with high population densities,” he said.

Dr. Mahmoud al-Hariri, the director of the health information unit in northern Syria (including Hama, Aleppo, the Sahel and Idlib) who works directly with the WHO, told ARIJ that, “[Until September], we only had one laboratory in Idlib equipped with tools for analyzing samples.

It was proposed to equip two new laboratories; one in the city of Jarablus [northeast of Aleppo] and the second in the city of Afrin [north of Aleppo]. Some of the equipment has arrived, albeit late, and included 6,0000 analysis kits and tests, which will be activated very soon.”

Dr. Muhammad Al-Salem, director of the vaccine program and member of the Early Warning and Epidemic Response Network, says that “1,390 tests were conducted for suspected cases by the end of June, all of which were negative.”

According to Al-Salem, the lab in Idlib analyses results from various areas and is not restricted to the governorate alone. Samples collected from Deir Ezzor, Raqqa, Aleppo and Hasaka were analyzed in Idlib, he told ARIJ.

The ACU runs the only laboratory in the opposition-controlled areas of northern Syria. According to Al-Salem, the protocol for positive tests is as follows: in the event of a positive result, a second swab is taken from the potential patient and transferred to Turkey for confirmation.

The confirmation is typically provided 24 hours after the test is conducted. As for the hospitals directly supported by Turkey and located in the northern and northeastern countryside of Aleppo, samples are collected there and then sent to Turkey.

Just two days after the first COVID-19 case was recorded in opposition-controlled areas,  specifically on July 11, the Ministry of Health of Syria’s interim government announced that the number of cases had risen to three – two of which belonged to doctors working in the Azaz City Hospital who had recently entered from Turkey.

As of 23 July, the number of confirmed cases had risen to 22 out of 3,111 tested, according to Dr. M. Ram Al-Sheikh.

On September 5, the Early Warning Network announced an additional 14 recorded cases — the highest since the pandemic reached the north, bringing the total number of cases to 112.

The accelerated rate at which COVID-19 cases were being recorded, only increased fears in light of already extremely difficult living conditions.

An Exhausted Medical Sector

“Currently, Northern Syria does not have a unified health system, and only a few limited health institutions are operating at maximum capacity to fulfil the needs of more than 4 million people in an unstable and unprepared area,” says Dr. Yasser Najeeb, Executive Director of an Immunization Group in Syria.

The group consists of a medical team that provides vaccines for children under the supervision of the WHO, and is one of several working to tackle the crisis in northern Syria, with support from the WHO.

The ARIJ reporter attempted to contact Dr. Munther Khalil, the Director of the Idlib Health Directorate and responsible for coordinating medical support in the governorate, who did not respond.

Al-Salem describes the medical sector as “exhausted”.

“In northern Syria, there are only 600 doctors serving over 4 million people, a third of which live in overcrowded camps on the border with Turkey. We need at least four times the current number of doctors, and qualified laboratory technicians are very rare. Moreover, the infrastructure has been completely destroyed, and most of the hospitals currently operating are relatively rudimentary,” he told ARIJ.

Dr. Mahmoud Al-Hariri added that, “we fear there will be a great number of casualties among medical staff. As of September 8, we recorded 10 cases among the medical teams, which forced them to remain in isolation for 15 days. For us, it is a big problem for a doctor to be absent throughout this period in light of their scarcity.”

There are only 90-100 respirators available in the entire northern region of Syria, which are meant to serve 4 million people in normal conditions, excluding the pandemic and warzones. Of the total number of respirators, 80 to 85 devices are already being used around the clock, according to Al-Salem, leaving only a few devices available.

In its 2019 annual report, the Syrian Network for Human Rights documented the death of 26 medical personnel and a total of 98 attacks on medical facilities in that year alone. The attacks were also confirmed in a report by Physicians for Human Rights, which recorded 595 attempted attacks on 350 separate medical facilities, with a death toll of 923 medical workers between March 2011 and February 2020.

According to Dr. Hariri, the WHO has formed a working group, under its direct supervision, for local organizations to confront the pandemic since March.

The group operates in coordination with health directorates, and has a budget of $64 million for a period of six months.

Al-Salem also indicated that Global Health provides safety equipment for workers in the medical sector, and more is scheduled to be sent in the coming period. It has also provided both online and in person training for medical personnel.

“Only four quarantine centers were equipped out of 30. Additionally, just four out of nine hospitals were equipped according to the medical plan initially drafted by medical organizations, with the support of the WHO, to confront the virus,” Al-Salem added.

Local Organizations

According to Mustafa Al-Hassan, the Protection Coordinator at the Sadad Humanitarian organization, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) allocated $11 million to support response projects, increase hygiene in the camps and support the water and health sector.

It later announced a $75 million grant that would be allocated to organizations, subject to the OCHA’s approval, and according to their projects and plans. These funding figures have been confirmed and matched by three independent sources, but have not been published by the OCHA itself.

For Al-Hassan, “the problem is that most of the organizations working in the humanitarian field in northern Syria are not committed to pandemic prevention measures, and only a few are implementing the appropriate safety and awareness measures amongst their staff.”

Dr. Hariri insists that “no health system is capable of confronting the pandemic without a societal commitment to preventive measures, which is why it is imperative to equip hospitals and isolation centers.

For example, the cost of equipping an intensive care bed can reach up to $13,000 while the cost of a mask is less than half a dollar, and it provides a large amount of protection and largely reduces the risk of infection.”

“However,” he continued, “the majority of the public does not comply with these simple preventative measures. We have even spotted some health sector workers who are not committed to wearing masks.”

The ARIJ reporter found numerous instances of aid organizations not adhering to minimal preventative measures, such as masks.

Beyond the social media accounts of these organizations, which show staff in masks and adhering to the minimal standards, most of the fieldwork is conducted without the necessary health and safety precautions.

Director of the Maram Relief and Development Organization, Yaqzan al-Shishakli, indicated that since last April, his organization has established an isolation and quarantine center in the village of Sheikh Bahr in the countryside of Idlib.

The center provides services to those affected by COVID-19 in a well-equipped arena, to ensure that the virus is not transmitted. Al-Shishakli said that as of September 1, the center has not received a single case.

“The center has a capacity of 160 people and is designed to double its size within a week in the event of an increase in cases, to accommodate 320 people. The center also aims to relieve pressure on local hospitals and coordinates with Idlib Health so that their work is under their supervision,” Al-Shishakli told ARIJ.

Al-Shishakli confirms that his organization has provided several training sessions and workshops on safety and prevention measures, and that the organization has shifted the schools they supervise to e-learning, especially since most of the schools in northern Syria have completely shut down.

“We tried to complete the school year with our 4800 students online, and deliver all the lessons through WhatsApp. However, we faced some accessibility issues, because some families did not have access to WiFi and blackouts meant that the internet was not particularly reliable,” he added.

Chaos and Clashing Authorities

In a region dominated by chaos and lawlessness, the authorities and military organizations seek to gain from the COVID-19 crisis without considering the dangers and consequences of a virus spread.

All decisions aimed at preventing the spread of the virus and issued by the Salvation Government (loyal to the Al-Nusra Front) which manages the city of Idlib and some parts of its countryside, have been superficial, according to Muhammad Haj Hammoud.

Hammoud, a Syrian journalist and Director of the Idlib Plus network, explains how efforts by the authorities are ultimately driven by ulterior motives. Specifically, authorities aim to use this crisis to strengthen their influence “on the ground” and narrow their grip and power over civilians.

This investigation monitored a number of decisions that have effectively put civilians’ lives in danger.

For example, the decision taken on April 2 to suspend Friday prayers in mosques lasted just two weeks. This was a major issue, especially given the month of Ramadan and the increased amount of prayers in local mosques, which continued despite the ongoing crisis and in the absence of any preventative or precautionary measures.

Then, on May 31, came the decision to grant exemptions for vehicle registration fees within a period of 15 days, “with the aim of encouraging people to go back to normality”.

This resulted in citizens flocking to register their vehicles, causing severe congestion, and forcing the government to extend the initial grace period.

This also led to an increase in the risk of contracting COVID-19. Here, the authorities are criticized for attempting to “return to normality” when their interests are clearly focused on remedying the financial deficit and issues with their treasury, instead of prioritizing people’s lives and their safety.

Furthermore, no decision was issued to limit commercial or industrial activity in the governorate. Instead, the Salvation Government tried to open new crossings and trade routes, which threatened the isolation of Idlib and put it at risk of infection from neighbouring areas.

According to various sources (from the Ministry of Health and other unofficial sources), as of June, the neighboring areas had already recorded at least 204 cases. This is despite numerous warnings from the Doctors’ Union in Northern Syria regarding the dangers of opening these crossings.

On April 15, the Headquarters for the “Liberation of Al-Sham” announced the opening of a commercial crossing with areas near the city of Saraqib, due to pressure from the business owners and traders trying to compensate for their losses after the crossings with Turkey were closed. However, the authorities stood to gain from taxes imposed on all vehicles using the crossing, in either direction.

Demonstrations quickly spread in northern Syria, and several popular parties issued statements rejecting the decision and demanding that the crossing be closed. In response to the protests, the authorities simply opened a crossing in a different area in the western countryside of Aleppo on April 30.

Tahrir al-Sham published a video of the crossing’s activities and the entry of trucks from regime-controlled areas. Once again, the people protested by organizing a sit-in to express their opposition to the authorities’ decision. However, the authorities retaliated by shooting at protestors, killing some.

A worker in a local organization speaking on the condition of anonymity, indicates that “the most dangerous thing for humanitarian organizations operating in the northern regions is the interference of the Government through the Office of the Displaced Administration and the Office of Organizations Affairs.

It would be impossible for an organization to operate in those areas or in the camps without their approval, and obstructing these organizations prevents aid from reaching those who need it.”

Due to deteriorating economic conditions, the collapse of the Syrian currency, the threat of the pandemic, and the implementation of the Caesar Act, the suffering and needs of civilians have increased, thereby increasing their dependence on relief and humanitarian organizations.

Ahmed Abdel Hakim, a displaced person who lives in a camp on the Syrian-Turkish border in the western countryside of Idlib, explains how the aid he receives is crucial in sustaining him and his family.

He told ARIJ that if the aid provided to him is cut for just one month, he and his family face starvation and food insecurity, as he is unemployed and without a source of income.

On July 11, after great difficulty, the UN Security Council voted on Resolution No. 2533, which stipulates the renewal of the mechanism for the introduction of cross-border humanitarian aid, specifically through the Bab al-Hawa border crossing that connects northern Syria and Turkey, for a period of one year.

The resolution also called on the UN Secretary General to submit their report on the functioning and progress of the aforementioned mechanism to the Security Council at least once every 60 days.

This investigation was completed with support of Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (ARIJ).

SIRAJ —Syrian Investigative Reporting for Accountability Journalism

The post COVID-19: A Ticking Time Bomb in Northern Syria and its Refugee Camps appeared first on SIRAJ.

Before one year and a half, a local Turkish phone number called to the Syrian refugee, Jihad Rahal, the content of the calling was ambiguous for him, because he doesn’t know the Turkish language.

At the next day the same number called him again, with a ” weak” Arabic language, the caller told Jihad that he is an employer of the Immigration Department, and asked him to provide his documents for obtaining the Turkish nationality, at the first the young Syrian thought that it is just a”joke” from one of his friends .

At the next day Jihad went to the Immigration Department in Gaziantep city (southern of Turkey) to check it out, he asked employees who talking the Arabic language about the caller’s number and the content of demand , they asserted to him that the call is real and the phone number really belongs to the Immigration Department .

Jihad is a 28 years old youth, from Idlib countryside, holding a Syrian secondary school’s certificate, residing in Aleslahia camp, he says to the person who prepares the investigation, ” in spite of that I will lose the aid & housing at the camp, but surely I prefer obtaining the Turkish nationality to be able working legally or travel to another country for work, after I became a semi-prisoner here because I can’t move among Turkish cities, and if I left turkey I can’t return back “.

Jihad not the only one who nominates to obtain the Turkish nationality, the person who prepared this investigation has documented dozens of cases inside and outside the camp that really obtained the nationality and a lot of them do not have a university certificates, and this contradicts with the Turkish official narrative that the nationalization is targeting the Competencies Syrians only.

This reality makes the resident Syrian at Turkish lands in front of many questions, why they are nationalized? What the aim of that in the near and long term? How many persons of the Syrians were nationalized? And where is concentrated their biggest percentage? We are trying in this investigation answering of these questions and other during making interviews with the experts, politician and Syrians have obtained the Turkish nationality. “And others still waiting for their roles amid the absence of a clear & followed methodology, to choose the nominees, for the Turkish nationality from the resident Syrians in the Turkish lands”, as saying the experts and the persons who follow-up the matter.

For five months, the investigation detected providing documents of 360 Syrian for obtaining the Turkish nationality at Hatay state alone. And each of the Syrian governorates: Aleppo & Idlib which is taking the highest rates of nationalization, and the Turkish Gaziantep & Hatay governorates are occupied the first ranks among the Turkish cities which the Syrians were nationalized inside it, due to the intensive presence for Syrians south of the country.

The lawyer: Gazwan krunful, of the Free Syrian lawyers gathering, “None precisely knows the criteria, which is followed by the Turkish government for nationalization the Syrians? And who are the nominees for that? And there are doctors and academic persons in turkey since five years and most of them are waiting for nationalization but in vain, In spite of that the Turkish government said two years ago, that Syrian nationalization is targeted the competences “.

– Comparison between granting the Turkish nationality for Syrians & foreigners:

Exceptional nationality conditions for Syrians:

– A directly call from the Immigration Department to the nominee for nationalization (there aren’t any criteria).

– Recommendation of an official governmental party, or close to the government (political Syrian mostly).

The Turkish nationality conditions for foreigners:

– Real estate investment, in a value of $ 250 thousand dollars.

-Bank deposit, in a value of $ 500 thousand dollars.

– Work/labor residence for 5 years without exceeding the period in abroad of 6 months, with paying taxes during all of this period and learn the Turkish language fluently.

– Marriage of a Turkish girl, and the continuation and stability of marriage for 3 years at least.

– Ancestries and proving that by documents and Turkish courts.

– The persons who are providing great services, for Turkish state on the economic or industrial or scientific or cultural or arts or sports level.

A foothold

The absence of precise numbers creates a lot of questions about the numbers of nationalized Syrians refugees, by the Turkish opposition and the Syrian street itself, in the same time experts & analysts consider that the nationalization has a linked goal in creating influence to Turkey inside Syria in the future.

“There is an idea on the table that the goal of nationalizing Syrian is doing on the basis to create a foothold at Aleppo & Idlib regions, but I assert that the nationalizing operation is including the Syrians from the different Syrian governorates, not on regional basis, but maybe there is a far goal for the Turkish state, to create a human element to be a supporter of it at the regions close to the border (Turkish) “as referred by Krunful.

To verify the speech of experts & the persons who follow-up the Syrian nationalization case, the person who prepared this investigation has made an opinion poll at a random sample of Syrians, about the percentage of who obtained the Turkish nationality at the Syrian density’s cities in Turkey.

By asking the following question to measure levels of obtaining the nationality from Syrians, did you obtain the Turkish nationality or you submitted your documents to take it?

The results which were taken of fifty Syrians in Istanbul, Gaziantep, and Hatay, shown that 6 of 10 persons interacted with the opinion poll, obtained the nationality or submitted their documents in Istanbul. While this percentage increased in Gaziantep to 2 of 10 and 3 of 10 in Hatay state.

In another opinion poll included 90 Syrians were nationalized or submitted their documents recently at the same three cities, and the opinion poll’s question was, which is the Syrian city you are from?

The high percentage of nationalized people was from Aleppo and its countryside: 25.5%, Idlib: 23.3%, Damascus & Damascus countryside: 23.3%, latakia: 12.2%.

And in the absence of reliable numbers & accurate governmental statics, the nationalization operation still happened continuously in most of the Turkish states after its stopping for several months in some states.

In Gaziantep at south , the local Turkish television “Mega ” published a news on the last 30 November , about that the Immigration Department  at the city resumed the nationalization operation for Syrians irrespective of the qualifications or conditions, after its stopping before months for unknown reasons.

Abed Alrefai, from Damascus he is residing in Istanbul, on October 2018 he submitted a request for obtaining the nationality after a text message which was sent to the company accountant’s cell phone, which he is working in it, that he must go to the Immigration Department in Istanbul, and when we asked him about his opinion of why is Turkey nationalizes the Syrians?

“He has a labor residency since two years ago, and giving him the nationality based on that, and his opinion that the nationality to facilitate his work and to dispose of foreigners residency procedures”, As Alrefai said.

” The nationalized Syrians form a strategic depth for Turkey currently , after solving the conflict in Syria & returning back the Syrian refugees of who obtained the Turkish nationality” , as saying Mustafa Hamed Uglu , the head of the Syrian community in Istanbul .

As for Ayham Numaan (alias name), from Aleppo city, who was waiting his wife’s father to obtain the Turkish nationality to enable him obtains it by his wife, he doesn’t care about the reason of granting him the nationality, ” All what I want to dispose of difficulties of obtaining a Syrian passport’s and to dispose of the residency transactions & brokers and to obtain the right of owning house in Turkey”, as he is saying.

Naturally ,obtaining the Turkish nationality is considers a facilitation factor for residence in Turkey , so no needs to renew the Turkish residency and the Syrian passport, where the Syrian consulate in Istanbul is granting the Syrian citizens a passport valid for two years with a cost of $800 U.S, in addition, $ 350 a cost of the appointment & consulate fees, in another hand, the Turkish passport for 10 years costs $140 , and the ability to travel to 69 countries around the world with entrance visa .

-Distributing the nationalized persons, originally according to their Syrian cities as follows:

1.1 % Deir Azzor     1.1% Hama     2.2% Raqqa         4.4% Hasaka

6.6% Homs   25.5 Aleppo & Aleppo countryside        23.3 Idlib

23.3 % Damascus & Damascus countryside               12.2 latakia

0 % Tartous , Daraa & Swidaa

This opinion poll, which based on a sample of 90 Syrians have obtained the Turkish nationality recently in Istanbul, Hatay & Gaziantep.

The nationality is for scientific competencies!

In Turkish Hatay state (south), the investigation preparer documented nationalization & submitting documents of 360 Syrians, from end of April till end of November 2018, during monitoring comments of the nationalized persons , who submitted their documents through a group by (Whatsapp) application , regarding to the nationalized persons from Hatay or who were nominated for it.

“Here didn’t refuse any submitted request for obtaining the nationality” saying one of the Immigration Department’s employee.

Mahmoud Ghazal , residing at Hatay state which near to the Syrian border, from Latakia & Idlib side, he obtained the Turkish nationality in spite of that he did not has any Scientific & scholastic qualification or any private work and he is from Idlib , and currently he owns a small restaurant in “Rihania” city , and he is one of the middle-income persons .

“I am very happy by obtaining the Turkish nationality, and I don’t care about my Syrian passport, currently I am working as a Turkish, I can travel and I have secured the medical care for my children & their future, and the most important thing that I can buy a house, and I don’t intend to return back to Syria never “.

Ezz Eddin Alali, a pediatric doctor, and he have a work residency in Istanbul since two years, and no one called to him, for submitting to get the nationality, he is waiting that “eagerly” as he is saying.

Getting, “a Syrian passport & Turkish labor residency became very exhausted & cost matter”.

“We are Syrian’s competencies and the government said that it will nationalize the competencies, so where it is? Alali is asking.

This reality is contrary to the assurances of Turkish government officials in more than one occasion & declarations which reported by media, one of it a declaration of the last Turkish Prime Minister Yilderm – currently the president of the Perlman, that “granting the Turkish nationality will be only for competencies’ persons from Syrians “.

Mahmoud Alhalabi is another Syrian, he got the Turkish nationality two years ago, and he added an amendment on his family name (nickname), by adding (Uglu) word,

And He is of Turkmen descents, he submitted his documents for nationality, through known persons by him in the Directorate of Awqaf / Endowment, which has a paved way to nominates names of certain persons for nationality, his father a religion man and has relations with Directorate of Awqaf and he is speaking Turkish fluently.

As too Safi Alrefai from Damascus, holding a bachelor in Arabic language, before 5 months his refuge request to Canada was accepted, and when he decided to travel at the determined appointment they did not allow him, because his name included inside the nominees lists for nationality.

Thus he had to postpone his travel 15 days and he paid financial amounts until he becomes able through brokers, the governor’s known persons and Directorate of Immigration in Istanbul to remove his name from those lists to allow him to travel.

The Turkish states which the Syrians percentages are exceeding of 15 % of the total population:

Gaziantep: 20%           Orfa: 23%          Hatay: 28%        Kles: 91%

The criteria of nationalization are” absent”:

There are no fixed answers at the Immigration Department’s officials, after going the person who prepared this investigation to the central Immigration Department in Ankara, for asking about the required criteria for Syrians to get the nationality, about the receiving requests and giving appointments, “No fixed criteria, wait for call or a message in case you were nominated “. As the official said.

The situation doesn’t different in Istanbul, through asking the Civil Status Affairs’ director by the person who prepared the investigation at the city about the number of the nationalized Syrians, he refused to declare about any official numbers.

Before five years ago from now, and before the parliament & presidency elections, “30 thousands Syrians will vote at the parliament & presidency elections, after they have gotten the Turkish nationality” as said Binali Yildirm in a press statement reported by “Reuters”, and in consideration that the average of the Syrian family in turkey is 4 persons, so the number indicates to about 120 thousands nationalized person, and those rates were doubted by the Turkish opposition.

Through this reality, “Up to date, the numbers of nationalized Syrians do not exceed 50 thousand, and in consideration that everyone has a family of 3 persons, so we are in front of 200 thousand nationalized Syrians” as asserted by the lawyer Gazwan krunful.

“We do not know the hidden & the real number but certainly more & more than that” As Unal Chivek Oz, the deputy head of the opposed Republican People’s Party to the government.

Economic interdependence enhances the Turkish influence:

According to the Turkish Ministry of Interior, “Kels” the southern border city which considers the most Syrians presence inside it, and their percentage reaches 91% of the state’s population, and it is itself the state which inside it, the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan is unleashed the issue of granting the Syrians competencies & investors the Turkish nationality exceptionally, in July 2016.

According to the Directorate of Trade & Customs data in southern Anatolia, the amount of Turkey exports to both of “Dire Alfurat” and “Ghusin Alzaytun” areas are $ 560 million dollars, and these numbers indicate strongly indicating the economic interdependence between it and the nearby Turkish cities.

And that accompanied with giving the permission of the Turkish government to the Turkish cars, investors & Turkish traders for going to Dire Alfurat’s areas across Jarablus crossing and returning back when they want, according to the local people asserts, to the investigation’s preparer.

The nationality for political purposes!

In spite of the Turkish government’s asserts that it will not grant the nationality to all Syrians which their numbers reached 3.5 million Syrian, so the Turkish opposition is accusing of the government in demographic changing in order to win the voters votes in the future.

So Camille Okaye Sender , the general secretary for the Republican People Party and he is one of the most prominent Turkish opposition parties, he  considers in a press statement to a group of journalists during November of 2018 that nationalize the Syrians is “a cover to achieve political goals”.

And “Yani Akeet” the Turkish journal which reported on the previous deputy of the opposition Republican people party Omot Oran that: ” the Syrians during 10 years will form about 10 percent of the population and that will leave a social, cultural and political effect on Turkey “.

“The nationalization of Syrians is concentrated at the south of Turkey due to the high intensive population for Syrians at sates of Hatay –Mersin –Orfa –Gaziantep – Kahraman, and Aramch” as saying the lawyer Krunful.

The reality is saying that the number of Syrian in Istanbul is exceeding on the half million, and the nationalized persons’ percentage not high as the results of the questionnaire showed, which has made by the investigation’s preparer.

And that imposes many new questions about the reason for increasing the nationalization rates at the south Turkish cities.

“The intensive nationalization hypothesis at the south Turkish areas, not related in elections issues or increasing votes of Justice and Development Party at these areas”, as saying the lawyer Krunful.

And he negates that the goal of nationalization in these areas for housing the nationalized persons in these areas to make a demographic changing, the authority, as he said “don’t have the right to force the residence at a certain area on the citizen”.

And Ibrahim Egman from “Denise” Center for polls, the same opinion, he thinks that “The authority cannot force a certain residence at certain cities on the citizens, but any Turkish citizen doesn’t have the right in any elections happening in Turkey, to elect outside of his department (his domicile registration place), unless he transferred it to his new city, and this is not a difficult step and it can be applied in any time “.

3.5 Million Syrians in Turkey (Ministry of Turkish Interior)

According to these statistics, the Syrians in Turkey form 4.2% of the total population for the country which estimated in 83 million people according to the Turkish statistics institute (Turkestat).

The position of the Turkish opposition and the street

There are different opinions in the Turkish street between rejectionists and pro-nationalization for Syrians, for many for many considerations linked to Syrians’ competition in the labor market, and the acquisition of governmental financial aids.

“Today there are more than 300 thousand Syrians have submitted their requests and we refuse to nationalize all these numbers and we do not accept that, because the nationalization process is happening not according to clear foundations” as Tashfik Oz , the deputy head of The People Party is saying to the investigation’s preparer.

Miral Uwkushnar , the leader of “Aljayid “party which dissident of the nationalist      movement , which established at the end of 2017 , she said ” The nationalization of Syrians should be stopped and agree with Syrian government “.

Yagmur Neil Gul, a Turkish citizen is clarifying that:” we don’t find work opportunities to give the nationality to Syrians”, and Zaki Banar, a Turkish citizen sees that “If they will work and pay the taxes I don’t have any problem in their obtaining the nationality”.

And this refusal for the Syrians nationalization process can be understood from convictions of the Turkish street and the opposition that the Syrians are causing unemployment to the Turks, in exchange for huge financial assistance from the Turkish government for them, and this is the conclusion of the general opinion polls about the Turks’ sight to the Syrians refugees.

This has been made by the Turkish police academy on 24 November 2018, and which its results were published by the Turkish channel “TRT HABER”.

Is this a granting nationality or for making them as Turks?

The Syrians nationalization’s issue and its development Coincides with the closure of the Syrian schools which are teaching by Arabic language, and forcing the Syrians students to enter the Turkish schools or going to the highly expensive private schools, which most of Syrians cannot bear its cost.

So the risks of the blending & nationalization process are become the last nail  in belonging the majority of the newborn babies & children to their country, even if number of them are nationalized or from the new “Turks”.

While the process of Syrians’ nationalization in turkey is going on, and blending the Syrians students in the Turkish schools and follow-up their scientific achievement in the Turkish language, and closing horizon of the near returning to Syria, because of risks losing the life, the deterioration of the local economy and establishing of economical projects in Turkey.

the Process of Making the next generation” as Turks /Turkification”, with vigorous attempts to make the current generation from Turkey’s Syrians as Turks, seems to be going on, in its way to becoming in future as Syria’s Turks.

This investigative story was completed by Syrian Investigative Reporting for Accountability Journalism – (SIRAJ). Published on DARAJ

The post What backgrounds of granting nationality to tens thousands of Syrian in Turkey? appeared first on SIRAJ.

On a rainy Wednesday, last year in September, a 188-metre-long container ship came to the port of Antwerp. The fourteen-year-old ship named Shiba sails under the flag of Iran. It was given berths in the port of Antwerp in the Churchill Terminal and the ABES terminal of Katoen Natie. All by the book.

But a month earlier, the Shiba showed a very suspicious travel pattern when passing through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. The ship departed Iran on 23 July, anchored in the Suez Canal on 9 August and arrived at its destination in Syria on 12 August. Between 2 and 5 August, it floated around seemingly aimlessly in the Gulf of Aden. Western security services had also noticed this, which see no logical, economic explanation for this. Every day of delay costs the shipowner money, so why all the delay?

In the same period, on August 3, the Yemeni Houthi rebels fired a missile at the Greek container ship Groton that was sailing in the Gulf of Aden at the time. To avoid such terror attacks and stay under the radar, Western ships switch off their automatic identification system (AIS) in that area. But the Houthi rebels are getting help from Iran for their attacks. The Iranian ship Shiba is suspected of having signaled the passing Western ship to the Houthis.

In January last year, a similar scenario took place. At that time, the Shiba was also hanging around there when the Houthis fired a missile at the dry bulk carrier Gibraltar Eagle on January 15.

And in March last year, it happened again, after the Shiba had left our country on February 25 and before the ship was back in Iran on March 13. In that interim period, the Shiba once again sailed through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, while the Houthis attacked the Propel Fortune with drones on March 8.

Such hidden Iranian aid to the Houthis is burning topical. In recent weeks, the rebels continued to target American targets, after which US President Donald Trump declared last week that he wants to eradicate the Houthis. Trump called on Iran to immediately stop all support to the rebels.

In addition to the Shiba, five other Iranian ships appear to have used their commercial traffic with the port of Antwerp as a cover for shady practices. The other ships are named Artam, Artenos, Azargoun, Daisy and Kashan. They are all large container ships that are 187 to more than 220 meters long and sail under the flag of Iran.

De Tijd started monitoring the shipping routes of the six suspected Iranian ships in September last year and mapped them on the basis of ship databases. We spoke with those involved in the ports and with security services in various countries. We also collected documents such as inspection reports and received help from fellow journalists from Syria in recent months (SIRAJ), Iran (Zamaneh), Germany (Paper Trail Media), Netherlands (Follow the Money) and the collectiveOCCRP. This research by De Tijd will therefore be published in English, Arabic and Farsi (the official language of Iran).

Weapons for Hezbollah

The shady practices of the Iranian ships do not appear to be limited to espionage for the benefit of the Houthis. According to Western and Israeli security services, they also made arms deliveries on their way to Antwerp at stopovers in Syria and Russia. It would mainly concern transports of parts to make weapons, rather than finished products, as well as of ammunition and dual-use goods that can be used for both civilian and military purposes. From Syria, the ammunition, weapons and parts would also have been transported to the radical Lebanese movement Hezbollah.

Our investigation into the traffic data confirms that the six Iranian ships have been going to Syria alternately and almost every month on their commercial route to Antwerp in recent years. This happened at least 27 times in 28 months (between June 2022 and October last year).

The six Iranian ships almost always followed the same route. That started after a long stay in Iran, often in Bandar Abbas, the country’s largest port controlled by the Iranian regime. From there, the ships set sail via the Suez Canal, usually without a stopover, to the main Syrian seaport in Latakia.

After one to three days in the Syrian port, the Iranian ships sailed on to Antwerp and other European ports in Italy (Ravenna), Spain (Valencia and Bilbao) and Romania (Constanta). The passage in Antwerp was often the last stop on the route and it usually took the longest. Then the ships returned to Iran.

What also makes the sailings suspicious: not all stopovers in Syria can be traced in the international shipping data on port visits and anchorages and berths, which the security services also use. We discovered at least one so-called dark port call, a stopover that has not been officially reported.

Our fellow journalists in Syria obtained confidential documents from the general intelligence service of the now fallen dictator Bashar al-Assad. They contain information about ships that came to Syrian ports between 2021 and 2024, including those from Latakia. Such a document shows that the Shiba visited the port of Latakia in May last year, which is not reflected in the official sailing records about that ship.

And the Iranian ships did not only make suspicious stopovers in Syria. On their way to Antwerp, the Azargoun and Artam also visited the Russian port of Novorossiysk. That happened in January and February 2023, about a year after Russia invaded Ukraine. In addition, the ship Artenos went to Venezuela in February and March 2023, also an alleged buyer of military systems from Iran. The ship also passed through Kenya and Tanzania, where Iran would also supply weapons.

Container numbers

The Belgian security services tried to catch the Iranian ships last year, De Tijd learned. This happened when the 207-metre-long container ship Azargoun entered the port of Antwerp on 30 June last year. Our security services had received exceptionally precise data from the Americans, even with the numbers of the containers in which the arms transports had taken place. But a thorough inspection, including of the crew’s cabins, found nothing at all. Not even remnants or any evidence that there were weapons or weapon parts on board before.

It illustrates how our security services have had to watch with dismay in recent years how the traffic to Antwerp was used for the anti-Western maneuvers of the Iranian regime. The alleged arms deliveries took place each time before the vessels behaved like legitimate merchant ships in European ports. When they came here to pick up goods, they were not even dual-use cargoes. So the ships have never been caught in Antwerp.

The issue was followed up by the Belgian Maritime Information Crossroads (MIK) and discussed with other countries in the North Sea and Channel Maritime Information Group (NSCMIG).

The Iranian ships also passed on information to Iran when they encountered military ships here. For example, the Daisy has already been spotted in Belgian waters when a military exercise with minehunters was underway.

Solemnly welcomed

Things may change. In March 2016, the Azargoun was the very first Iranian ship to be allowed to return to Antwerp after the EU had concluded a nuclear agreement with Iran and the sanctions had been lifted. The Azargoun was solemnly welcomed in the Deurganck dock by an official delegation led by the Antwerp port aldermen, eager to re-establish decades-old ties with Iran. Because until sanctions were introduced in 2010, Antwerp was the most important European destination for cargo from Iran.

Our investigation shows that the Azargoun came to the port of Antwerp seven times in the past three years and stopped six times in the Syrian port of Latakia along the way.

After a stop in the Russian port of Novorossiysk, the Azargoun was subjected to a purely technical inspection here in March 2023 at most. In the process, the inspectors discovered 37 defects, 16 of which were sufficiently heavy to hold the ship until everything was repaired. Among other things, the fire doors, fire extinguishing system and fire dampers were defective, the speed and distance indicator did not work, as did the oil filters and the emergency generator. But after 24 days, the Azargoun was released again and was able to continue its activities.

The crews of the Iranian ships also arouse suspicion. We learned that the ships are also accompanied by members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, who pretend to be different. “They do this to circumvent the sanctions and to spy in European ports,” it sounds. Our security services also heard this, but could not prove that the ships here had members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards on board incognito.

The confidential Syrian documents that our colleagues in Damascus found in the former headquarters of Assad’s general intelligence service contain the names, nationalities, dates of birth, passport details and functions of the varying 27 to 28 crew members of the Iranian ships Azargoun, Daisy, Kashan and Shiba when they visited the Syrian port. In addition to a handful of Indians, the changing crews, ranging from the captain to the cook, appear to consist only of Iranians.

An initial screening of the lists of names shows that there are at least some remarkable profiles among them. In addition to many crew members who are linked to the Iranian state-owned shipping company Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), there are also those who are not known as seafarers at all but officially have completely different, non-shipping-related jobs. There is also an Iranian officer who has a track record as an investigator in the General Inspection Department of the Iranian Law Enforcement Force.

Katoen Natie: ‘As a terminal, we don’t choose the ship’

‘The terminal follow the regulations, we don’t choose the ship,” says Patrik Naenen, business unit manager at Katoen Natie’s ABES terminal that received the Iranian ship Shiba. ‘It is the port authority that determines which ships are admitted and it follows the rules imposed by Europe.’

‘So if a ship is sanctioned, it won’t come. If it is not sanctioned, it can be booked by a forwarder, who then assigns the ship to a terminal to do the loading and unloading operations. The forwarder makes contracts with the terminals in the ports, which determine the pricing, and on that basis he decides where to send a particular ship with its cargo. That choice will be determined by the price, but sometimes also by technical or nautical aspects, such as the draught.’

‘It is also important to understand that it is not because an Iranian ship is coming, that you are doing business with an Iranian company. The ship is only the vehicle, the cargo is another matter. Katoen Natie is clear about this: we will not work with an Iranian company to set up a certain export flow. This is something else: we just carry out an operation on behalf of a forwarder.’

‘As a terminal, you don’t necessarily have a view of the cargo. If it is bulk, it is of course loose goods and then you can see what goes on or off the ship, and there are also documents that state which category of goods it is, but we do not do the check, it is customs that checks the goods.’

The owner of the Churchill Terminal on the right bank of the port of Antwerp, where the six Iranian ships came most often, refused to answer our questions. The terminal with a total surface area of 27 hectares and 70,000 square meters of storage capacity is owned by the Belgian group Nova Natie. CEO Maarten Geerardyn: ‘We are absolutely not going to respond to that.’

Front company

Officially, the Iranian container ships are owned by the Iranian company Hafez Darya Arya Shipping (HDS). But that would only be a front company of the Iranian state shipping company IRISL, which is known for providing logistical support to the Iranian army. The sanctions against Iran have caused dozens of ‘independent private companies’ to emerge in the Iranian shipping industry, but in reality they still operate under the umbrella of IRISL and used to be integral departments of it.

IRISL had already been sanctioned by the US and on November 18 last year, the state-owned shipping company also ended up on the EU sanctions list. The Council of the EU then expanded its sanctions against Iran for its support – with missiles and drones – of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Neither IRISL nor HDS answered our questions, but a German shipping agent who has been working with HDS since 2018 did. The German agent sees no problems with this cooperation and emphasizes that he only acted for HDS, never for IRISL. ‘Because there were no sanctions against HDS in the EU – and there still are none today – we thought it safe to operate as a line agent and ship broker for HDS within the EU. We are not aware that IRISL is the ultimate owner of the ships.’

Nevertheless, the Germans have now suspended cooperation with HDS ‘purely as a precautionary measure’, because according to them the sanctions against IRISL are ‘broad and vaguely formulated’. The EU sanctioning of IRISL has therefore suspended the visits of the six Iranian ships to the port of Antwerp until further notice.

The German agent said he did not know what goods the Iranian ships loaded and unloaded in the ports in Syria and Russia. ‘That falls outside the scope of our contractual obligations.’ The Germans say they only know about the innocent goods that were imported and exported here in Antwerp. ‘Typical imports on HDS ships are polyethylene for packaging, used cooking oil for the biofuel sector, ceramic products such as tiles and foodstuffs such as pistachios. Exports from Antwerp to Iran are new machines, including for the beverage industry, used industrial equipment such as car parts, textile processing machines and insulation materials.’

All Iranian weapons intercepted en route to Houthis

Between May 2021 and January 2023, the US authorities already intercepted a mass weapon of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards destined for Yemen. This happened during routine maritime security operations in and around the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. It involved more than 9,000 rifles, 284 machine guns, 194 rocket launchers, more than 70 anti-tank missiles and more than 700,000 pieces of ammunition. The French navy was also able to seize thousands of assault rifles, machine guns and anti-tank missiles in January 2023 in the Gulf of Oman, coming from Iran and on their way to the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

 

Now that the six Iranian ships are no longer coming to Antwerp (for the time being) – the Daisy was the last to arrive here until November 9, 2024 – it is striking that they have immediately shifted their entire route. They have not been to Syria or Russia in recent months. The Azargoun is now moving to China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Libya. The Artenos now goes to India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and the UAE. The Kashan to India, the UAE, Kenya and Tanzania. The Shiba to India, Libya, Turkey and the UAE. The Artam to China, India, Tanzania, Kenya and the UAE.

Can the ships still return to Antwerp? Antwerp Port Authority refers ‘all questions about Iranian ships’ to the Federal Public Service Mobility. According to Mobility spokesman Thomas De Spiegelaere, it is currently sufficient that the Iranian state-owned shipping company IRISL has been sanctioned to no longer allow the six ships to enter our ports, even though those ships are officially owned by another company. ‘IRISL is listed in the databases as the beneficial owner of the ships. That is enough for us to stop them. A ship has several managers and operators.’

Everything checked

“But other Iranian ships that do not belong to IRISL are still allowed to come to Belgian ports for legitimate reasons,” says the spokesperson for the FPS Mobility. “There are no sanctions against Iranian ships in general. We are not bound by the American sanctions against Iran and will therefore not follow them.’

In 2023 and 2024, twelve different Iranian ships came to Antwerp, accounting for 44 visits. In 20 of the 44 cases, it concerned ships that were sanctioned by the US. And six of the twelve ships would therefore have been involved in espionage or arms deliveries.

The question is whether other Iranian ships can now simply use Antwerp as a ‘cover’. Because the six ships remained untouched all this time. De Spiegelaere: ‘When these ships still came to the Belgian ports, there were no EU sanctions. There were sanctions against specific goods or dual-use goods. But that has always been checked, the calls of these ships were always legitimate and the goods that were loaded or unloaded were in accordance with the rules. So there were no legal grounds for refusing these ships.’

For our investigation into the Iranian ships, we received help from foreign fellow journalists: the Iranian Mahtab Divsalar (Zamaneh), the Syrian Mohammad Bassiki (SIRAJ), the German Ruben Schaar (Paper Trail Media), Birte Schohaus and Dimitri Tokmetzis (Follow the Money)and of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP).

The post From espionage to arms deliveries: the shady practices behind the Iranian ships in Antwerp appeared first on SIRAJ.